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Johan Jeroen De Deken \
Introduction
i
This paper sets out to investigate the development of social policy in 
Belgium during the period 1945 and 1989. Its main purpose is to offer a 
descriptive account of postwar institutional developments in the field of old- 
age pensions and housing policies. In addition the paper will discuss, as a 
first step towards working out a more explanatory account of these 
developments, some of the political concomitants of these changes. In order 
to understand the postwar policies, it will be necessary to go back to the 
period of, and prior to World War II. The inter-war years left an institutional 
heritage, which in turn was the outcome of attempts to moderate, if not 
mitigate, 19th century laissez-faire liberalism. The first part will describe 
these attempts and introduce some of the political controversies that 
accompanied those attempts, as a lot of the post-war debates are the 
continuation of the dispute between the Conservative Catholic Party and the 
emerging Socialist Party. Even if the postwar Christian Democratic Party had 
a far more progressive image than its Catholic predecessor, most of the 
debates on housing and pension policies of the late 1940's continued to be 
very reminiscent of the disagreements between the two main political blocs 
during the early 1920's.
The second part of the paper reviews the developments which 
occurred during the war years. It will be argued that only a few marginal 
m changes had an impact on the social policies of the country, extending beyond
j the war years. The period of the occupation was to some extent important as
the German occupant introduced on a small scale what would become one of 
the first grand postwar reforms: the system whereby a centrally collected 
single integrated social security contribution was redistributed over the 
various branches of social insurance. The war years were also important for 
the virtual standstill they prompted in residential construction, and for the 
expansion of collective life-insurances which received additional tax 
incentives. However, the most lasting impact of the period of the occupation 
of the country is to be found in the work of various groups who prepared in 
clandestinely the grand reforms which were implemented during the first 




























































































2 Social Policy in postwar Belgium
These reforms are discussed in the third part of the paper. It will be 
argued that these reforms clearly carried the imprint of the "new" Christian 
Democratic Party, even if some of the measures were formally implemented 
by a coalition of national unity — and for a brief period even by an anti­
clerical Government. It is in particular in the sphere of housing policies that 
one can identify an almost undisputed Christian Democratic hegemony. With 
respect to social security in general, and old-age pensions in particular, the 
power constellation of the first years following the end of the war prompted a 
stalemate which resulted in "provisional" measures that partly consolidated 
the prewar system, but at the same time superimposed a number of new 
arrangements. These new arrangemenmts were intended to be stopgaps to 
solve immediate problems but in the end they would last more than a decade 
and also structure the more definite arrangements
The fourth paper of the paper describes the long road towards the 
establishing of a more definite solution to the pension problem and discusses 
the consolidation of the Christian Democratic model of promoting home- 
ownership.
The final part of the paper examines how the neo-liberal germs built 
into the consolidated scheme started to mature during the 1970's and thereby 
began to erode the solidaristic nature of the postwar model. This part also 
looks at the first impact of the fédéralisation of the country on social policy. It 
is argued that during the last years of the period under study, this impact has 
remained limited to housing policies, but that even here it is probably to be 
too early to discern substantial policy changes, despite a divergence of 


























































































Johan Jeroen De Deken 3
1
The Conservative O rigins of Christian D em ocratic Social Policy: 
O ld Age Pensions and H ousing Policies 
up to the Second W orld War.
The Belgian postwar welfare state was not built up from scratch. 
Rather, it merely refined an edifice which had been erected since the late 19th 
century. During that formative period, the Catholic Party had ruled the 
country on its own (from 1884 to 1914), or it had been the largest party 
leading various coalition governments. Througout this period, the party 
moved from a staunch conservative party supporting laissez-faire liberalism 
to a centre-right party in which the nascent Christian labour movement 
became increasingly influential. However as will be demonstrated, after the 
dismissal of laissez-faire liberalism, the foundations of both old-age pensions 
and housing policies were established by Conservative politicians, and the 
institutions they created would have a lasting impact on the shape of the 
postwar Belgian welfare state.
The period prior to the Second World War can be divided into three 
epoches. During the first epoch, the epoch of laissez-faire liberalism which 
lasted till the turn of the century, the State refrained from intervening in 
solving the social question, and solutions were sought in paternalistic 
initiatives by industrialists (l). During the second epoch, which lasted from 
the turn of the century till the outbreak of the First World War, the State tried 
to encourage voluntary private initiatives by granting subsidies.
The third epoch, the era of compulsory social insurance, started after 
the First World War. During this period, policies clearly broke with the 19th 
century laissez-faire liberalism. But even though the Social Democrats 
participated twice in Government coalitions, the reforms both in the field of 
pensions and in that of housing were primarily inspired by conservative 
Catholics, and by the nascent Christian Democratic movement.
7 A notable exception here was the establishing of teh General Savings and Annuity Fund (ASLK 
- CGER), a semi-public institution, established by a homogenous Liberal Government, which 



























































































4 Social Policy in postwar Belgium
1.1. The Origins of the Four Main Old Age Pensions Schemes of the
Inter-War Period.
The prewar pensions system was primarily designed during the first 
half of the 1920's. After the Social Democrats had been removed from the 
Government of national unity, the Catholic Party imposed its model of class- 
segregated compulsory contributory insurance for wage-earners over the 
Social Democratic model of a universal general revenue financed pension (2). 
However, the origins of the inter-war system go back the period prior to the 
First World War. The system used some of the institutions established in the 
19th century, and even compulsory insurance was already introduced for 
miners as early as 1911.
The separate scheme for civil servants was legislated as early as 1844 
and remained largely unchanged throughout the 20th century. In contrast to 
the scheme for wage-earners, the civil servants scheme was based on the 
principle of a deferred wage, i.e. it was a general revenue financed scheme 
which did not require contributions.
1.1.1. The Prelude ofLaisser Faire Liberalism; Voluntary Pension Insurance.
The first old-age pension provisions on the territory of Belgium date 
back to the middle ages, when corporations established mutual benefit funds 
to assist their members in case of sickness, invalidity or old-age. After the 
French revolution the so-called Chapelier Act of 1791 forcefully dissolved 
these corporations (3). Despite the fact that the new Belgian state, founded in 
1830, also banned corporations by adopting its own version of the Chapelier 
Act, the 19th century saw the gradual reappearance of mutual benefit 
societies. These new mutual benefit societies were partly inspired by early 
Socialist thinkers like Saint Simon and by Christian social doctrines, but the 
Government perceived these initiatives as having a pure charitable character, 
and thereby turned a blind eye upon them.
The new mutual benefit societies hardly recruited their members 
among the industrial proletariat. Rather, those societies were primarily
2 The term "Social Democratic" refers here to the ideal type as it is specified in Gosta Esping- 
Andersen's "The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism" (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1990).
3 This act banned all associations of citizens based on occupations or estates. See M. MAGITS & 
M. QUERTON "De Opbouw van de Sociale Zekerheid in Belgie. Een Historisch Overzicht" in 



























































































Johan Jeroen De Deken 5
established by craftsmen, who were clearly still under the influence of the 
centuries-old tradition of corporations. Like the corporations, many of these 
early mutual benefit societies were characterised by nepotism and 
paternalism. It is nevertheless under such initiatives that the first 
occupationally segregated pension funds were established.
The first social welfare legislation on the territory of Belgium, dates 
back to a decree issued by Napoleon on May 26, 1812. This decree established 
in the province of Liège a mutual benefit fund to help miners and their 
families (4). This example was followed in the mining districts of Charleroi 
and Mons, and in the city of Namur. Soon most miners were affiliated to a 
mutual benefit fund. These funds were exclusively organised on the basis of 
the principle of individual capitalisation. The State and the provinces granted 
occasional subsidies to encourage these initiatives. In 1868, these mutual 
benefit funds were granted a legal personality (s).
In 1850, the General Pension Annuities Fund (Algemene Lijfrente Kas) 
was established under State guarantee (6). In 1868, this institution, which was 
the intellectual brain-child of the Conservative Liberal leader Walthère Frère- 
Orban, became the General Savings and Annuities Fund (Algemene Spaar en 
Lijfrente Kas or ASLK). The ASLK gave everyone the opportunity to 
voluntarily build up an annuity for a pension. The employers nor the State 
made systematic contributions to these individualised forms of provision. In 
1851, a law regulating the mutual benefit societies was adopted (7).
On the whole, these early measures cannot be considered to be true 
social policy measures, but rather as steps aimed at establishing a framework 
for workers to save for their own future. But as of 1891 some employers 
started to contribute to the pension capital formation of their employees; and
4 This fund ceased to exist in 1814, but was reconstituted in 1834 and legislated by a decree of the 
new Belgian state in 1839. See Walter LEEN Sécurité Sociale et Logement Populaire Brussels: 
Éditions Erasme. 1954, pp.270-271. For a detailed study see Léon-Eli TROCLET La Première 
Expérience de Sécurité Sociale Liège: Décret de Napoléon de 1813 Brussels: Éditions de la Librairie 
Encyclopédique, 1953.
5 See the Act of 28 March 1868 "Lois sur les caisses de prévoyance en faveur des ouvriers 
mineurs” in Moniteur Belge 2 April 1868.
6 See the Act of 8 May 1850 "Loi qui institute une caisse générale de retraite" in Moniteur Belge 17 
May 1850.



























































































6 Social Policy in postwar Belgium
the state began to allocate, on a more systematic basis, bonuses vii he ASLK 
to encourage individual savings.
In 1894, a law was adopted which recognised mutual benefit societies 
which facilitated their members in affiliating with the ASLK (s). By the turn 
of the century, there existed as much as 1,887 of these so-called "annuity and 
pension funds" (lijfrente en pensioenkassen), which started to associate on an 
ideological basis into national federations, such as the Landsbond der 
Christelijke Verenigingen van Vooruitzicht in Belgiè and the Nationaal Verbond van 
Socialistische Mutualiteiten.
1.1.2. Enter the State: the Short Interlude of Subsidised Voluntary Insurance.
The first authentic wage-earners' pension act was adopted in 1900 (9). 
This law still was modelled on voluntary insurance, but significantly 
increased the subsidies granted by the State. Under the new regulations the 
State accorded a subsidy amounting to some 60 per cent of the contributions 
made by the insured up to a maximum of 9 francs per year. However, this 
system of subsidized freedom was only short-lived. Already in 1912, the 
Catholic Government submitted a legislative proposal for the introduction of 
a compulsory pension insurance. The proposed scheme was to be financed 
by the insured, their employers and the state. In May 1914, this proposal was 
approved by the Chamber of Deputies, but because of the outbreak of the 
First World War, it was never approved by the Senate (10).
Nevertheless, in 1911 a compulsory old-age pension insurance scheme 
was legislated for miners (n). Under this scheme, miners were required to 
open account at the ASLK or adhere to a recognised private mutual benefit 
society (voorzorgskas). Apart from the existing state subsidies (60 per cent up
8 Emmanuel GERARD "De Christelijke Mutualiteiten" in Emmanuel GERARD, ed. De Christelijke 
Arbeidersbeweging in België Vol.2, Leuven: Universitaire Pers Leuven, 1991, pp.66-145 (p.81).
9 Act of 10 May 1900 'Wet nopens de ouderdomspensioenen" in Belgisch Staatsblad 14-15 May 
1900..
10 See B.S. CHLEPNER Cent Ans d'Histoire Sociale en Belgique Brussels: Editions de l'Université de 
Brussels, 1972, pp.136-138. Even if the 1912 proposal announced a compulsory scheme, it still 
was largely based in the existing system of "subsidised freedom" which became increasingly 
incompatible with large scale industrialisation and concentration of the economy. That is why 
it was abandonned after the war, and a new more radical reform was prepared.
11 Act of 5 June 1911 "Wet op de ouderdomspensioenen ten bate van de mijnwerkers" in Belgisch 
Staatsblad 9 June 1911. Already in 1844, the state had established a compulsory scheme for 



























































































Johan Jeroen De Deken 7
to 9 francs per year), the scheme also made mandatory a contribution from 
the part of the employers.
1.1.3. The End of Liberalism: the Era of Compulsory Social Insurance.
After the First World War, several provisional measures were adopted, 
such as the introduction, in 1920, of the so-called "free" pensions to workers 
older than 65 years. The benefit level of this means-tested pension varied 
annually between 600 and 720 francs — depending upon the size of the 
municipality (12). This provisional scheme had been designed by the Social 
Democratic Minister of Industry and Labour Joseph Wauters, and was to be 
the first step towards a more definite general revenue financed pension 
scheme (13). However, soon after the adoption of Wauters' provisional act, 
the Social Democrats were ousted from the coalition, and, in 1922, the work 
on the introduction of a compulsory social insurance system along the lines 
proposed in 1914, was resumed. This work resulted in the 1924 Manual 
Workers Act and the 1925 Salaried Employees Act (14). Apart from the 1930 
reform of the scheme for salaried employees (75), the amendments adopted
72 See Act of 20 August 1920 "Wet nopens de ouderdomspensioenen" in Belgisch Staatsblad. 30-31 
August 1920. In principal it granted pensions to all Belgian citizens born before 1858 who had 
reached the age of 65. However, the benefits granted by this provisional scheme were subject 
to a means-test (claimants could earn at most 120 francs per year, above this threshold, the 
benefit was reduced by slices of 1 /6th. In order to pass the law, the Socialists had to make a 
concession to their Liberal and Catholic coalition partners, by agreeing to limit the duration of 
the scheme to 3 years. Whereas under the prewar system of subsidised voluntary insurance 
only 80,000 persons enjoyed a pension benefit, the new scheme granted a benefit to more than 
221,000 pensioners (Joseph BONDAS "Pensions de Veillesse" in Les Cahiers de la Commision 
Syndicale No.9, December 1926).
13 The Socialists saw pension rights as elementary existential rights and envisioned a scheme the 
burdens of which would have to be carried by the collectivity.
"Elle procède du droit de vie et elle doit être porfié au compte de la solidarité nationale. Dans 
un système intégral d'assurances, elle seront non seulement gratuite, mais universelles, et 
couvert par des resources à prélever sur les classes possédantes."
(Jules Lekeu speaking, on behalf of the Socialist Party, in the Senate on November 26, 1924 in 
Annales Parlementaires de Belgique. Sénat Brussels: Imprimerie du Moniteur Belge, 1925, p.94.
74 Respectively Act of 10 December 1924 "Wet op de verzekering tegen de geldelijke gevolgen van 
ouderdom en vroege dood" in Belgisch Staatsblad 22-23 December 1924; and Act of 10 March 
1925 "Wet op de verzekering tegen de geldelijke gevolgen van ouderdom en vroege dood der 
Bedienden" in Belgisch Staatsblad 1 April 1925. The miners' scheme established in 1911 
remained in forced, but was amended in 1930. The new scheme compulsory scheme covered 
about 1,800,000 wage-earners.
75 Act of June 18, 1930. That year, the ASLK also was granted a monopoly in the administration 
of the pensions for manual workers, and a National Pension Fund for Miners, which had been 
established in 1920, obtained a monopoly in the administration of miners' pensions (Act of 14 



























































































8 Social Policy in postwar Belgium
throughout the remainder of the inter-war period did not fundamentally alter 
the system (36).
The 1924 Act was the work of the Catholic Minister baron Romain 
Moyersoen. It had also been supported by the Liberal Party, but opposed by 
the Socialists who favoured so-called "free" means-tested pension not 
requiring contributions. The Christian labour movement supported 
Moyersoen's pension reform because it was compatible with the their theory 
of a "just wage". The Christian Democrats argued that pensions should not be 
"free", because that would reduce them to a mere form of State assistance. 
Rather, pensions benefits should be part of a legitimate wage. The Social 
Democrats rejected this theory: they argued that the theory of a just wage 
could only be workable if workers alone would determine the wage level, 
which evidently was not the case (37). However, they did recognise the fact 
that an entire "free" (i.e general revenue financed) pensions system would 
outstrip the financial capacities of the State. They therefore proposed a mixed 
system and tactically voted in favour of the Moyersoen pensions act, as they 
considered it to be an important improvement compared to the existing 
situation (38).
The new schemes were characterised by very complicated benefit 
formula combining individual capitalisation with digressive means-tested 
bonuses, financed by the State. These bonuses, the so-called kostenloze 
rentetoeslag were to guarantee a minimum pension to those insured who, at 
the time the scheme was legislated, were too old to be able to capitalise the 
required pension capital. The bonuses were higher for married couples than 
for singles. The main thrust of the schemes for manual workers and salaried 
was comparable, in particular in their reliance upon the actuarían technique 
of individual capitalisation, but there were also two important differences.
A first major difference concerned the contributions and benefits. 
Manual workers paid a flat-rate contribution fixed at 1 francs for women and
Social Welfare), the employers and the insured, whereas the former was administered 
exclusively by representatives of the State nominated by the Ministry of Finance ("the King").
36 A number of amendments were legislated in 1937, when the compulsory scheme for self- 
employed persons, announced by the 1924 General Act and tentatively introduced in 1930, was 
again abolished because it had turned out to be inoperative.
37 See Bondas, pp.15-16.
38 For an overview of the position of the Socialists see Joseph WAUTERS "Note de la Minorité" 
added to report of the special commission investigating the pension reform in Documents 



























































































Johan Jeroen De Deken 9
minors, and at 3 francs for man. Employers paid a contribution for their 
manual workers relative to the taxable wage, varying between 1.5 (for women 
and minors) to 2.5 per cent (for men). On the other hand, salaried employees 
were required to pay a contribution calculated relative to their taxable 
income: 5 per cent (3 per cent if their annual salary did not exceed 6,000 
francs per annum). Employers had to pay a contribution of 5 per cent for 
their salaried employees. Manual workers received flat-rate benefits (¡9), 
whereas the benefits for salaried employees depended upon their 
individually capitalised contributions and thereby indirectly reflected past 
earnings.
A second major difference concerned the administration of the two 
schemes. Whereas the manual workers' scheme was administered by the 
General Savings and Annuities Fund (ASLK), the scheme for salaried 
employees maintained some form of institutional pluralism (20). Apart from 
the ASLK, salaried employees, or probably more appropriate their employers 
(27), could opt for one of the 15 recognised subsidiary institutions. In 1930, 
another semi-governmental institution was established: the National Pension 
Fund for Salaried Employees (Nationale Kas voor Bediendenpensioenen or 
NKBP). The NKBP was administered by equal representation of the State, the 
employers and the insured, whereas the board of the ASLK consisted solely of 
members nominated by the Ministry of Finance. Soon the NKBP became the 
most important insurance carrier for the old-age pensions of salaried 
employees. By 1937, there were 144,000 salaried employees affiliated to the 
NKBP, whereas 74,768 had opted for the ASLK (22).
79 The law foresaw the possibility for manual workers to pay suplementary contributions that 
would be individually capitalised and that would benefit from the same sort of subsidies as 
contribuions made in the statutory scheme. However, this provision was never made 
operational.
20 The law still allowed the existing mutual benefit funds to collect contributions which they 
would have to transfer to the ASLK, but the activities of these funds would decrease rapidly. 
See G. DE BROECK "Sociale wetgeving" in S.H. SCHOLL 150 jaar Katholieke Arbeidersbeiveging 
1789-1939 Deel 3: 1914-1939, Brussels, 1966, p.196; and G.M.J. VELDKAMP ¡nleiding tot de 
Sociale Zekerheid en de Toepassing eruan in Nederland en België. Deel 1. Karakter en Geschiedenis 
Deventer: Kluwer, 1978, p.206.
27 For example, the Kredietbank forced its employees to choose the insurance company of the 
farmers union (ABB, affliated to the Catholic pillar) as their old-age pension carrier.
22 Emile VAN DIEVOET Het Verzekeringswezen in België. Economische en Sociale Gegevens, Met 
Bestaande Redit, De Voorgestelde Hervormingen Part 1, Antwerpen: De Sikkel, 1940, p.43; 
Algemene Spaar en Lijfrente Kas van België Jaarverslag 1937;, data for the number of affiliations 
to the 15 licensed subsidiary institutions are far more difficult to obtain. In 1940, one of the 



























































































10 Social Policy in postwar Belgium
The 1924 Act also revised the miners' scheme and established a 
National Pension Fund for Miners (Nationaal Pensioenfonds voor Mijnwerkers), 
and amendments legislated in 1930 granted a monopoly to this national fund
(23).
1.1 A. The Origins of the Pension Schemes for Employees in the Public Sector.
The first scheme for civil servants was established in 1844 (24). This 
law was inspired by the French pensions act of 1790 and by some laws that 
had been implemented during the 15 years of Dutch rule (1815-1830). The 
idea behind this scheme was that of a deferred wage:
"From the beginning pensions were considered to be part of the 
statute of civil servants and to be an essential element in the 
contract the State concluded with its personnel" (25)
However, initially the scheme was financed by a contribution of 1 per cent 
(26). But as this contribution was seen as being in conflict with the 
fundamental aims of the law, it was again abolished in 1849. In the beginning 
the scheme was limited to civil servants with tenure employed by the various 
ministries, to provincial governors, and to priests. But later it was extended 
to cover also teachers, magistrates, employees in semi-governmental 
administrations like the postal and telephone service, the administration of 
waterways, to employees of municipalities that were affiliated with the so- 
called re-apportioning fund of the Ministry of the Interior, etc. In addition,
(communication via letter). In 1970, the largest subsidiary insurance carrier, the private 
insurance company Assurance Generales, had about three times as many affiliates as l'Intégrale 
(which extrapolated back to 1940 would mean about 30,000). For 1953, Pieter Frant2en has 
estimated that 287,116 salaried employees had opted for the NKBP or the ASLK, whereas 
162,897 were affiliated to one of the 15 subsidiary institutions (see Pieter FRANTZEN "Voor of 
tegen het ontwerp Troclet betreffende het bediendenpensioen" in Socialistische Standpunten 
Vol.4, N o.2,1957, pp.105-123 (p.112).
23 Even if apparently until the 1945 reform the miners could still choose between the ASLK and 
the National Pension Fund for Miners (see below).
24 Act of 21 July 1844 "Loi générale sur les pensions civiles et écclésiastiques" in Bulletin Officielle 
No.24 1844.
25 Jean Pierre DELVILLE Onderzoek van de Pensioenregeling van de Openbare Dienst 
Rondetafelconferentie: de Pensioentoekomst Voorbereiden, Brussels: Ministerie van 
Pensiœnen, 1993.
26 J.P. MASSON "Introduction a l'Étude des Pensions du Secteur Public" in Journal des Tribinau du 
Travail No.408, May 20, 1988, pp.1-5. In addition, civil servants do have to pay a contribution 
for the widows' pensions scheme. In 1936 this contribution amounted to 6 per cent, in 1939 it 



























































































Johan Jeroen De Deken 11
the State came to bore most of the costs of a number of relative autonomous 
schemes, in particular the pensions scheme of the National Railway Company 
(NMBS), the National Local Railway Company (NMBB), the General Savings 
and Annuities Fund (ASLK) and the Municipal Credit Bank (Gemeentekrediet). 
The armed forces and the gendarmerie administered their own schemes, which 
nevertheless closely resembled the civil servant's scheme.
In general the scheme introduced in 1844 calculated pension benefits 
on the basis of the earnings of the civil servant enjoyed during the last five 
years of his career. Benefits were computed as a fraction of this earnings 
basis. In general, this so-called tantième was set at 1/60 — which meant in 
practice that a full pension, amounting to 75 per cent of earnings base, could 
be achieved after 45 years. The scheme also foresaw preferential tantiemes, 
which depended upon the function of the servants: 1/55 for teachers, 1/35 
for magistrates, 1/30 for academic occupations at universities, 1/20 for 
catholic clergy, 1/12 for provincial governors, etc (27). The maximum benefit 
was limited to 75 per cent (90 per cent in the case of pensions for war-victims) 
and like in the case of wage-earners, the retirement age was set at 65.
Initially, culmination of a pension benefit with other earnings was 
prohibited (even if there were exceptions to this general rule, like in case the 
benefit was below a certain threshold), but in 1926 a more complicated 
arrangement on culmination was introduced (2«). During the remainder of 
the period under study, the scheme for civil servants underwent a series of 
minor amendments, but the main features of the system were never altered 
(29).
27 L. FRANÇOIS & J. BASYN Verslag over de Burgerlijke Pensioenen ten Bezware van den Stoat 
Koninklijk Commissariaat voor de Pensioenen, Brussels: Belgische Staatsblad, 1940, p.54; and 
Delville, 1993. The members of the armed forces formally do not enjoy preferential tantièmes, 
though the system of special bonusses in their scheme de-facto reduces the fraction to 1 /  50 (see 
Nationale School voor Fiscaliteit en Financiën De Militaire Ancieniteitspensioenen Brussels: 
Ministerie voor Financiën, 1993, p. 1.
28 For a discussion see Yolande DELEUZE L'Évolution de la Notion de Droit a Pension de Retraite et 
Survie du Secteur Public des Origines a Nos Jours Rapport de stage en vue d'obtenir une 
nomination au grade de Secrétaire d'administration aux Pensions, Brussels: Ministère des 
Finances, 1983, pp.15-17.
29 The most important change probably took place in 1956, when the scheme for the members of 
the armed forces was administratively merged with the other schemes. Since that year all 
pensions fo civil servants and employees of various semi-Govemmental institutions are 
administered by the Pensions Administration (Dienst Pensioenen) of the Ministry of Finance. 
Other important amendments included changes in the method of valorization (the so-called 
perekwatie provisionally legislated in 1951, amended in 1955, and substantially improved in 
1969) and the introduction in 1971 of a guaranteed minimum benefit for civil servants who 



























































































12 Social Policy in postwar Belgium
Some of the main differences between the four main pension schemes 
operating during the inter-war period are summarized by the following table. 
The table does not attempt to summarize information on the benefit structure 
as the formula were too complicated to be summarized comprehensively in a 
table.
Table 1. A Comparison of the Four Main Pension Schemes of inter-war Period
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(ASLK)
Government Nat. Pens. Fund Nat. Pens.
Sal. Employ. (NKBP), Fund Miners
General savings and ASLK and 
Annuities Fund (ASLK)mutual benefit 
and 15 licensed funds 
subsidiary institutions
General Savings and 
Annuit. Fund
com p o sit ion  o f  
m ain  in su ran ce  
carr ier :
n/a
1/3 repr. State 
1/3 repr. employers 
1/3 repr. insured
1/3 repr. State 
1/3 repr. empi. 
1/3 repr. ins.
all members of the 
board nominated by 
the Government
1.2. Housing Policies during the inter-war Years.
Housing policies followed a trajectory parallel to the development of 
old-age pensions. Towards the end of the 19th century appeared the first 
measures aimed at supporting private initiatives which had a strong
HAUBRECHTS "Het Pensioenstelsel ten laste van de Schatkist" in CEPESS-Documenten 
Vol.12, N o.4,1973, pp.66-90.
30 Depending upon whether the miner work under or above the ground (Women were not 



























































































Johan Jeroen De Deken 13
paternalistic bias. Here too the First World War brought the State more to the 
foreground. A public housing institution was established under Social 
Democratic pressure. Even if initially this institution embarked on a 
progressive housing policy de-commodifying the real estate market by 
supporting the stabilising of tenants cooperatives, its policies were drastically 
reversed after the Socialist Party was removed from the coalition of national 
unity. In addition to redirecting public money from the new public 
institution to schemes promoting home-ownership, the Conservative 
governments of the 1920's effectively terminated the development of tenants 
cooperatives. The public housing institutions came to attributed a residual 
role of providing rental housing for the very poor, or to promote home- 
ownership for all those who came close to be able to afford it.
1.2.1. The First Housing Laws of the late 19th Century.
In 1889, Parliament adopted the first major housing law (37). This law 
had been designed by the Catholic Minister of Finance August Beernaert. The 
law introduced various tax exemptions to encourage the construction of 
workers' housing, it incorporated the General Savings and Annuity Fund 
(ASLK) into this financing, and established so-called "district-level protection 
committees" (arrondissementele beschermcomités). These committees played a 
mediating role in the creation of housing associations. They had to 
investigate the specific housing needs of the various districts and promote the 
establishing of private housing associations. The law foresaw two types of 
housing associations (32): construction associations and credit associations. 
The construction associations were to operate like real-estate agencies: they 
had the exclusive mission of building, buying selling or renting dwellings 
reserved for workers. These construction associations could take the form of 
private corporations or of cooperative societies (33). The credit associations, 
on the other hand, had the exclusive goal of offering loans for the construction 
or acquisition of workers' housing. The credit associations were eligible to 
take up loans with the ASLK at an interest rate of 2.5 per cent. In their turn,
31 Act of 9 August 1889 "Loi Relative aux Habitations Ouvrières et à l'Institution de Comités de 
Patronage" in Moniteur Belge 10 August 1885.
32 H.J. SPELTINCX Historique de la législation belge relative au logement social Brussels: Institut 
National du Logement, 1980, p.4.
33 The first of these associations already appeared as early as 1857. Those early initiatives were 




























































































14 Social Policy in postwar Belgium
they granted mortgage loans to individual builders at interests rates varying 
between 4 and 5 per cent. The difference between the two interest rates was 
to cover the administration costs of the credit associations and had to allow 
them to establish necessary financial reserves. The loans granted by the credit 
associations could be used to finance a dwelling with a maximum value of
5.000 francs and the worker taking up the loan had to make a down-payment 
of at least 10 per cent of the amount lent. The law also foresaw tax- 
exemptions for loan-takers: a waiver of cadastral taxes and a reduction by 
half of the registration duties. Because of the substantial down-payments 
required, the law was only to the benefit of the better-off segments of the 
working class. In 1908, the maximum value of the dwelling was increased to
10.000 francs. This increase turned the law into a mere tool of subsidising 
small house-owners and its social policy dimension became even more 
debatable. The Socialist housing expert, Louis Betrand, thus appropriately 
commented that
"Les ouvriers qui sont dans ces conditions sont ceux qui gagnent 
relativement un bon salaire et sont sûrs du lendemain. Ceux-là, 
au besoin, pourraient bien se loger ou à peu près. Mais la 
masse, celle précisément qui a le plus à souffrir de la situation 
actuelle des logements, celle-là ne retirera aucun avantage de la 
mesure préconisée. Que veut-on, en définitive? Améliorer la 
condition des ouvriers qui ont le moins à se plaindre! Mais c'est 
là chose évidemment injuste." (34)
The main goal of the housing associations consisted of encouraging home- 
ownership. The conservative intentions of this policy were openly recognised 
by De Bavay, the president of the associations pour l'amélioration des logements 
ouvriers, De Bavay. At the occasion of the 1895 general members' meeting he 
declared
"By turning a worker into an owner and thereby more 
conservative and friendly towards the existing order, we 
consider not to have lost our time." (35)
The promotion of home-ownership not only made the workers more tributary 
to the existing order, it also fostered a split within the working class between
34 Louis BERTRAND Le Logement de l'Ouvrier et du Pauvre en Belgique. Avec une Préface sur 
l’Hygiène du Habitation par C. de Paepe Brussels: A Lefèvre, 1888, p.278.
35 Associations pour l'Améliorations des Logements Ouvrières Rapport Annuel Brussels, 1895 
(quoted by Marcel SMETS De Ontwikkeling van de Tuinwijkgedachte in België. Een Overzicht van 
de Belgische Volksiooningbouw. 1830-1930 Brussels: Piere Mardaga, 1977, p.49. See also Fernand 
GOSSERIES U  Habitations à Bon Marché Louvain: Editions de la Société d'Etudes Morales, 



























































































Johan Jeroen De Deken 15
those who were more well-off and capable of building their own house with 
the help of subsidies, and the poorer strata who even despite the subsidies 
failed to dispose of the means to become a home-owner.
During the first eight years following the adoption of the Beernaert 
Act, more than 60,000 dwellings were constructed via the mediation of the 
Protection Committees.
1.2.2. The Establishing of the National Society for Inexpensive Housing (NMGW).
The ideas, on the basis of which the Nationale Maatschappij voor 
Goedkope Woningen was established, date back to proposals made in 1885 by 
the Socialist representative Hector Denis in the so-called Labour Commission 
(Commission de Travail). Denis ideas were substantially amended by an 
investigatory commission, which he chaired and which was established in 
1912, the Commission pour Vétude des réformes à préconiser en matière d'habitations 
à bon marché. The commission's work resulted in a legislative proposal 
submitted to Parliament on May 2, 1914. Because of the outbreak of the war 
the proposal only became a law in 1921. The NMGW was a semi-public 
corporation. Half its capital was subscribed by the central Government and 
half by the provinces. The board of management was composed of 
representatives of the authorities at both these levels (36).
The Socialist and the Catholic Party strongly disagreed on the mission 
of the new institution. According to the former, the NMGW was to be the 
engine of a new housing policy inspired by the modernist movement and by 
the English garden city (37).
"Special estates would be erected in which the inhabitants 
would participate in a «rich social life». The locus of the new 
policy would not be the individual dwelling, but the necessary 
collective utilities and an integrated green pleasant living 
environment -- the garden city." (38)
36 "Housing Policy in Belgium" in International Labour Review No.60, July-December 1954, pp.86-
100 (p.88).
37 See O.VELGHE "Coopératives de Locataires" in L'Habitation a Bon Marché Vol.9 No.2 1922, pp. 
205-210; and Catherine MOUGENOT "Promoting the Single-Family House in Belgium: the 
Social Construction of Model Housing" in International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 
Vol.12, N o.4,1988, pp.531-549.
38 Luc GOOSENS "Het Sociaal Huisvestingsbeleid in België sinds 1830" in L. GOOSENS & G. 




























































































16 Social Policy in postwar Belgium
The Catholic Party on the other hand followed the prescriptions of the social 
teachings of the Catholic church and saw individual home-ownership as the 
material basis of a balanced family life and for individual well being of the 
members of a family. The Catholics also favoured private initiatives in 
contrast to what they considered to be the etatism of the Socialists. This 
aspect of the Catholic vision closely corresponded to the vision of the liberals, 
and was also reinforced by the interest some of the accredited building 
associations who were the heirs of the early building corporations and the 
workers' housing construction initiatives of the employers.
Initially the NMGW extensively sponsored the construction of 
modernist garden cities, administered by tenants cooperative. On the basis 
on the 1921 Act, members of tenants cooperatives were de facto only required 
to make a down-payment of 10 per cent of the value of the dwelling, which 
made cooperative dwellings more accessible to lower income groups, and 
which partly explains the early success of the cooperative schemes. The most 
prominent of these early initiatives were the Logis-Floreal estates and the 
Kapelleveld estate in suburbs of Brussels (39). However, once, in December 
1921, the Socialists were removed from the coalition, the Government started 
to openly challenge the tenants cooperatives. Officially, the Government 
argued that these cooperatives were granted too much financial advantages 
while only providing housing for their members. For example, the Catholic 
Minister of Labour and Industry, baron Romain Moyersoen, argued before 
the Senate that
"Les sociétés de locataires sont des sociétés constituées par des 
personnes qui ne construisent par pour autrui, qui construisent 
pour elles-mêmes sans devenir propriétaires de leur maison, 
c'est-à-dire sans s'imposer le sacrifice que doit s'imposer celui 
qui veut acquérir la propriété. Ces sociétés exigent le maximum 
ae sacrifices de la part ae l'Etat et le minimum de sacrifice de la 
part du bénéficiare" (40)
39 Other important examples were the Cité Moderne in Sint Agatha Berchem, also a suburb of 
Brussels, the Unitas estate established by a union of salaried employees in Deume, a suburb of 
Antwerpen, the cooperative "Eenheid" in Antwerp, and the cooperative "De Vrije Woonst" in 
Mechelen. For a discussion of the history of these cooperatives see "La Cité-jardin du 
Kapelleveld à Woluwe St-Lambert" in L'Habitation a Bon Marché Vol.4 No.6 1924, pp.123-146; 
''Unitas-Tuinwijk. Cooperative de Locataire à Anvers-Deume" in L'Habitation a Bon Marché 
Vol.6 No.8 1926, pp.140-148; Victor BOURGEOIS "La Cité Moderne" in L'Habitation a Bon 
Marché Vol.3 No.10 1923, pp.245-254).



























































































Johan Jeroen De Deken 17
But in fact, the Government opposed the autonomy and independence of the 
cooperatives. They were "too socialist" for a Government which was only 
interested in promoting home-ownership:
"... la politique financière du Gouvernment est défavorable aux 
coopératives de locataires, d'allure trop socialiste à son gré, et 
elle n'entend favoriser que la petite propriété individuelle.^ (41)
The Government probably wanted to prevent the formation of a "red circle" 
around Brussels, as the one which at the time was developping around 
Vienna. The tenant cooperatives were indeed characterised by an intense 
communal life, which was to prepare the tenants for thr future Socialist order. 
A members magazine of the tenants cooperative Le Logis described this 
educating role as follows:
"Grâce à la création et au développement d'un tel ensemble 
d'institutions, les cités-jardin rempliront leur mission d'écoles de 
solidarité sociale et d'esprit civique ... elles enseigneront à leurs 
habitants, vivant d'une vie plus saine et moins mesquine que 
dans les villes, qu'en margedes légitimes intérêts individuels, il 
existe aussi certains devoirs et certains intérêts de nature sociale 
et collective qu'il est indispensable de cultiver et de 
sauvegarder." (42)
In addition, it indeed was the case that the first cooperative estates were 
originally established by associations close to the Social Democratic labour 
movement (43). The first such cooperative, Les Foyers Collectifs, was 
established by a Socialist association of war veterans (44). The most successful 
cooperative, Le Logis, was established by a group of employees of the General 
Savings and Annuity Fund, some of whom were also active in the same 
Socialist war veterans association (45).
47 See J. LESPES "Une Cité-Jardin «Le Logis» in Les Trois Tilleuls Vol. 1 No.12, 1924, pp.2-3 (p.3) 
(originally published in Education-Récréation the paper of the Social Democratic Centrale 
d'Education Ouvrière). The idea of the garden city indeed had a strong affinity with Socialism: it 
involved (urban) planning, active state involvement (not in the least in financial terms), it 
conceived housing in collective terms by paying particular attention to collective spaces. In a 
way the garden cities were symbolic for the new Socialist society.
42 M. FAUCONNIER "A nos lecteurs" in Les Trois Tilleuls Vol.l, No.l, 1924, p.l.
43 A. DELDIME "Les Cooperatives de locataires" in Les Trois Tilleuls Vol.2, N o.4,1925, p.1-2.
44 This cooperative errected the garden city Moortebeek in the Anderlecht, a suburb of Brussels.
45 See Le Logis: Histoire de la Société Brussels: Société Cooperative de Locatiare Le Logis (published 
on the occasion of its 30th anniversary), 1951, p.3-4. Part of the success of Le Logis can be 
attributed to the fact that statutes explicitly opened it up to all moderate-income wage-earners, 
including both manual workers and salaried employees. Untill then social houising had been 



























































































18 Social Policy in postwar Belgium
In order to abort the breeding of "Socialist" tenant cooperatives, baron 
Moyersoen implemented two crucial changes in the Government's policies: 
he stepped up the encouraging of individual home-ownership and of private 
initiative, and he placed the tenants cooperatives on equal footing with 
employer's initiatives aimed at housing their work force (46). The tenants 
cooperatives thus had some privileges withdrawn which came to be reserved 
solely for the semi-public local building associations. In 1922 Moyersoen 
abolished the exemption to repay one fourth of the borrowed sum, and the 
share holders of the cooperative were required to make down-payment of 20 
per cent instead of 10 per cent; in 1923, he cancelled other subsidies; and in 
1924, he forced the cooperatives to increase their rents to a minimum of 6 per 
cent of the value of the dwellings and cooperatives were forced to sell a 
certain number of the dwellings built in their estates (47). The new policy was 
effective indeed: by 1929, there were only 13 tenant cooperatives in contrast 
to some 242 local building associations (46).
In order to encourage home-ownership, Moyersoen also implemented 
a policy change whereby the NMGW was forced to sell its dwellings, and its 
funds to built new houses were cut (49). Instead, Moyersoen introduced a 
new scheme of subsidies for individual housing construction an for the 
promotion of home-ownership. Families with an income below a certain 
maximum became eligible for subsidies to allow them to purchase or 
construct their own house. Finally, in 1927, a law was adopted, proposed by a 
Catholic representative, whereby all privately built houses with a cadastral
sort of wage-earners: bank-clercs, low-rank civil servants, teachers, postmen, police agents, 
fremen etc. By the end of the 1950's Le Logis had built more than 1,000 dwellings (see the anual 
report of the cooperative of 31 December 1961).
46 The so-called sociétés à charactère industriel (see A. DES TILLEULS "Les Coopératives de 
Locatiares et le Parlement" in Les Trois Tilleuls Vol.l, No.9, 1924, p.1-2). Up to then the tenants 
cooperatives had enjoyed the same privileges as the semi-public local building corporations.
47 See "Les Projets du Gouvernement en Matière d'Habitation à Bon Marché" in L'Habitation à bon 
Marché Vol.2, N o.8,1922, p.198-203.
48 Fernand GOSSERIES L’Oeuvre de la société nationale des habitations et logements a bon marché Gent: 
Raport du congrès de 23 juin 1929. The Government also obstructed the development of 
cooperative estates by refusing to free the necessary credits for the building of facilities in 
already existing neighbourhoods, and by forcing tenant cooperatives to sell their dwellings to 
non-members, if the members failed to show an immediate interest.
49 In 1926, the Government even refused to pay its annual subsidy to the NMGW in attempt to 
force the society to sell the dwellings it completed. The Government also forced the NMGW to 
change its policy by constructing new dwellings on the promise of purchase. During the first 
twenty years of its existence, the NMGW nevertheless did erect 60,000 dwellings; of these, 



























































































Johan Jeroen De Deken 19
value below a certain threshold became eligible for an exemption of land tax 
for a period of ten years.
1.2.3. The Establishing of the Housing Fund of the League of iMrge Families 
(WBKGB) and of the National Society for Small Holdings (NMKL).
The private sector was further promoted by an initiative of colonel 
Lemercier of the League of Large Families (Bond der Kroosterijke Gezinnen) 
which extended the State subsidies to all institutions and enterprises which 
were building low-cost housing (so). In 1928, this association also established 
a cooperative housing society for its members. The main goal of this Housing 
Fund of the League of Large Families (Woningfonds van de Bond der Kroosterijke 
Gezinnen or WBKG) was to help large low-income families to acquire 
ownership of houses (si). This goal was to be achieved by granting low 
interest mortgage loans. The cooperative society was supervised and 
guaranteed by the Government. In 1949, the fund introduced an original 
scheme of so-called digressive interest rates whereby the interest rate for the 
mortgage loans was reduced according to the number of children the 
breadwinner taking up the loan had to feed.
In 1935 yet another national institution was created to alleviate the 
housing problem. Officially the National Society for Small Holdings 
(Nationale Maatschappij voor Kleine Landeigendommen or NMKL) was created as 
part of a series of measures to counteract the economic crisis of the 1930's. 
The unemployed were to be given financial aid to develop land in the 
country-side. However, the main goal of the NMKL in fact consisted of 
housing unemployed workers in the countryside -- far away from the 
"perverting" influence of the city.
The NMKL is controlled by three government departments: the
Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of Public Health and Family, and the 
Ministry of Finance. It is administered by a council appointed by the 
Government. The central Government and the nine provinces are its sole 
shareholders. It operates through approved regional societies which are 
administered on the basis of a close cooperation between the authorities and 
charitable bodies, industrial undertakings, trade unions and private
50 Smets, 1977, p.145.
57 V.A. DE RIDDER & P. MINON Economische en Sociologische Aspecten van de Activiteiten van het 



























































































20 Social Policy in postwar Belgium
individuals {si). The central Government and the provinces never hold more 
than two-fifths of the capital of a regional society, so that in practice each one 
is administered by the local organisations.



























































































21Johan Jeroen De Deken
2
The Period of the Second W orld War.
The period of the second war only marginally affected the social policy 
institutions developed during the inter-war period. In contrast to what 
happened in some other countries, the war did not fundamentally upset the 
power structure of the prewar regime (53). By leaving the structure of Belgian 
capitalism more or less intact, the sort of occupational regime Belgium 
experienced, allowed for the cooptation of "moderate" elements of the labour 
movement, and thereby helped to moderate the reforms demanded by a 
population that had suffered the deprivations of the war.
After the capitulation of the Belgian army on May 28, 1940, the country 
was placed under the so-called Militärverwaltung which can be contrasted 
with the Zivilverwaltung applied in countries like the Netherlands.
"The main difference between these two occupational regimes 
was, at least in theory, that they served different purposes: the 
military administration only was to maintain order and 
safeguard the German military interests, whereas the civil 
administration in addition was also to intervene politically as to 
nazify the population, and prepare the annexation of the 
country to the Reich." (54)
In practice this difference was less clear, and often simply meant that certain 
measure came to be implemented in Belgium only with a delay of a year or 
so. Under both forms of occupation, the Germans tried to use the existing 
administrative apparatus, but at the same time super-imposed a relatively 
small parallel bureaucracy upon the existing state structure. In Belgium, the 
main purpose of this parallel bureaucracy was to steer the economy to serve 
the needs of the Nazi war machine.
53 Such a fundamental breakdown did occur in countries like Czechoslovakia, where the German 
occupoation and the integration into the Reich led to a fundamental re-configuartion of class 
power. For a discussion of the Czechoslovak case see Johan Jeroen DE DEKEN Social Policy in 
Postwar Czechoslovakia, the Development of Old Age and Housing Policies during the Period 1945- 
1989 European University Institute, Working Paper, SPS /1994, pp.
54 Annemieke KLIJN Arbeiders- of Volkspartij. Een Vergelijkende Studie van het Belgisch en 



























































































22 Social Policy in postwar Belgium
2.1. Social Policy during the Occupation.
The Nazi's did not fundamentally alter the structure of the Belgian 
economy. The limited changes they implemented tried to re-orient the supply 
in function of requirements of the German economy (ss). The changes in 
social policy too seem to have been of a rather limited nature. The two 
notable exceptions to this general state of affairs concern social security. 
These exceptions have been very poorly documented and are generally 
ignored by the literature on the history of Belgian social insurance.
2.1.1. The Experiment with Central Re-Apportioning and the Rapid Expansion of 
Group Insurances
A first important exception was the rapid diffusion of occupational 
enterprise-based pension plans, the so-called groepsverzekeringen (S6). They 
knew a rapid expansion during the war years: whereas in 1938 the total 
insured capital amounted to only 1,612 million francs, by 1945 it had grown to 
as much as 11,147 million francs. This spectacular growth has been attributed 
to
"une volonté patronale de se soustraire aux effets conjugués des
ordonnaces et arrêtes bloquant les salaires." (57)
In addition, the schemes had been stimulated by tax exemptions, such as the 
order of 28 January 1944 which made contributions paid by the insured and 
by their employers, to group insurance plans, tax-deductible.
55 For example, in September 1940, the so-called Warenstellen were established that were to 
regulate the distribution of industrial goods. By 1941 there were 13 of such central 
administrative institutions, including one for the distribution of coal, one for the distribution of 
steel and iron, one for textile products etc. Other institution established by the Germans 
included a central administration that was to subject prizes and wages to a strict control; a 
corporatist organisation for agriculture and the so-called Winterhulp, an organisation under the 
leadership of the former Catholic Minister of Social Welfare, Hendrik Heyman, that was to 
alleviate the social needs of the underprivileged.
56 Léon-Eli TROCLET Initiation au Problème des Pensions de Veillesse Brussels: Institut E. 
Vandervelde, 1953, pp.52-53.
57 Henri LEW ALLE "Les Pensions Légales et Complementaires" in Courrier Hebdomadaires du 



























































































Johan Jeroen De Deken 23
A second important innovation was the introduction of the system of 
central re-apportioning (centrale repartitie) (58). This system was modelled 
after the model that had proven its merits in Germany
"A «Central Re-apportioning Fund for Social and Fiscal 
Burdens» was established to which all employers who worked 
for the occupying authority were required to deposit a certain 
percentage or the wages they paid to their employees. This 
«Central Fund» subsequently would re-partition part of the 
monies thus collected to the various administrations needed to 
comply with the social and fiscal legislation: State assistance for 
families; the generals savings an annuities fund for manual 
workers pensions, the national pension fund for salaried 
employees, the national fund for annual paid holidays, and ... 
the various private insurance companies for accident insurance."
(59)
The total contribution to this central re-apportioning fund was set at 18 per 
cent. The fund was administered by a committee of directors composed of 
civil servants of the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare and of the Ministry 
of Finance (60). The new system of central re-apportioning only applied to 
wage-earners employed by the German military authorities and by German 
employers that settled in Belgium after May 10, 1940.
2.1.2. The Aborted Experiment of a More Planned Housing Policy.
There was hardly any residential construction activity in Belgium 
during the war, but in 1940, in the midst of the power vacuum that had 
emerged after most political leaders had left the country, there was issued a 
legislative order on urbanisation and reconstruction (67). This order reflected
58 See "Besluit van 12 October 1940 tot bepaling der spéciale modaliteiten voor het innen der 
sociale en fiscale lasten, betreffende de arbeiders door de Duitse militaire overheid en door 
zekere Duitse werkgevers tewerkgesteld" in Belgisch Staatsblad No.140 October 24, 1940. 
pp.1430-1432; and "Besluit van 15 October tot bepaling der Statuten van de Centrale Kas tot 
repartitie der sociale en fiscale bijdragen" in Belgisch Staatsblad No.140 October 24, 1940. 
pp.1432-1434.
59 Hendrik HEYMAN "De Maatschappelijke Zekerheid in België. Twee jaren toepassing" in De 
Gids op Maatschappelijk Gebied Part 1 in Vol.38, No.9, 1947, pp.663-730 (p.698).
60 See "Besluit vàn 19 October — centrale kas tot repartitie van de sociale en fiscale bijdragen. 
Benœming van de leden van het directie comité en van den directeur" in Belgisch Staatsblad 
No.140 October 24,1940. pp.1434-1435.
62 Legislative Order of 12 September 1940 "Besluit Betreffende de Urbanisatie van bepaalde 
Gemeenten met het oog op 's lands wederopbouw" in Belgisch Staatsblad 14 December 1940. 
See also Rafaël VERWILGHEN "Waar Staan wij met de Stedebouw in België" reprint of Bouzven 



























































































24 Social Policy in postwar Belgium
the ideas of Rafaël Verwilghen (62) who had been inspired by the modernist 
architect and advocate of the garden city, Louis Van der Swaelmen. Apart 
from establishing a framework for a more planned and coordinated housing 
policy, the decree also legislated a system of restoration loans with a 
maximum interest rate of 2 per cent (63). The effect of this policy was 
annihilated, first because the declaration of "total war" had led on August the 
5th 1942, to the issuing of a legislative order which prohibited all construction 
work (64); later, after the liberation of the country, the policies failed to have 
any lasting effect because most of the civil servants who had been involved in 
its promotion and implementation were purged after the war, as they were 
suspected of having collaborated too much with the Nazi occupier (6s). Upon 
its return from London, the Government also declared the legislative order of 
September 1940 null and void (66), and replaced the lustrated civil servants by 
"a number of ignorant creatures, who presented themselves as experts in an 
area which they had never has set foot on.” (67)
62 Rafaël Verwilghen was an architect-engineer who, when the war broke out, became general 
director of the Department of Architecture and Urbanisation within the General Commission 
for the Country's Reconstruction (Dienst Bouwkunst en Stedebouiv of the Commissariaat-Generaal 
voor 's Lands Wederopbouw). In this position he could benefit from the power vacuum, that had 
emerged after the capitulation of the King and the departure into exile of the Government, and 
translate the theoretical tradition of a more planned housing policy into legislative orders. 
Rafaël Verwilghen is not to be confused with Carlos Verwilghen, the Secretary-General, who at 
the time was responsible for the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare, and the Ministry for 
Reconstruction, and who signed the legislative orders in question.
63 Erik BUYST An Economic History of Residential Building in Belgium betioeen 1890 and 1961 
Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1992, p.224.
64 See "Verorderung van 5 augustus 1942 houdende verbod bouwerken uit te voeren" in 
Verordnungsblatt des Militärbefehlshabers in Belgien und Nordfrankreich für die besetsen Gebiete 
Belgiens und Nordfrankreichs No.82, 12 August 1942, pp.985-986. This order was made more 
strict by "Aanvullende bepaling bij de verordening van 5 augustus 1942 houdende verbod 
bouwerken uit te voeren" in Verordnungsblatt des Militärbefehlshabers in Belgien und 
Nordfrankreich für die besetsen Gebiete Belgiens und Nordfrankreichs No.86, 2 October 1942, p.1042; 
and by the "Verordening van 12 Juni 1943 houdende verbod bouwerken uit te voeren" in 
Verordnungsblatt des Militärbefehlshabers in Belgien und Nordfrankreich für die besetsen Gebiete 
Belgiens und Nordfrankreichs N o.103,16 June 1943, pp.1325-1326.
65 Francis STRAUWEN "Renaat Braem: van Beheerst Functionalisme tot Fórmele Retoriek. 
Architectuur als Tastbaar Gemaakte Dromen" in VJonen -  TAJBK 1979, No.14, p.13-27.
66 Verwilghen, 1960, p.l.



























































































Johan Jeroen De Deken 25
2.2. The Re-Configuration of Social and Political Forces 
and the Preparation of a New Social Order.
On the whole, the institutional changes in the social policies of the 
country were limited, and the period of the Second World War probably was 
far more important for the shifts in political power it induced, and for the 
plans for postwar reconstruction that were prepared after this re­
configuration of social and political forces had taken place. Not that the war 
caused a complete reversal of the prewar power structure. Rather, it led to 
the cooptation of a labour movement which at any rate was bound to gain 
influence because of the expectations of the war-tom population. At the same 
time this re-configuration marginalised calls for more radical reforms.
2.2.1. The London Exile Government and the Galopin Comittee at Home.
After the capitulation of he country, the Government broke with the 
King and left the country. After having spent some time in France and Spain, 
most members of the Government ended up in London where they 
established a Government in Exile under the leadership of the Catholic Prime 
Minister Hubert Pierlot. The London Government in Exile promptly obtained 
international recognition, as the allied powers were aware of the strategic 
importance of the mining resources in the Belgian colony of Congo.
On May 15, just before the capitulation of the country the Government 
had organised a meeting with the main representatives of Belgian finance 
capital: Alexandre Galopin (governor of the Société Générale), Max Leo Gérard 
(president of the Bank of Brussels), and Fernand Collin (president of the 
Kredietbank). De facto, the Government transferred its power to this banker's 
syndicate, the so-called Galopin Committee (68). The Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, Paul-Henri Spaak, is said to have declared to the members of the 
committee: "Gentelmen, I entrust you Belgium" (69).
The Committee soon implemented such measures as the extending of 
the working day to 10 hours, the drastic reduction of unemployment 
insurance benefit, a blocking of wage increases and in some cases even a 15 
per cent reduction of wages, and the cancelling of various social laws. It has
68 Jaak BREPOELS Wat zoudt gij zonder 't werkvolk zijn? Anderhalve eeuw arbeidersstrijd in Belgie 
Leuven: Kritak, 1988, p.147; Mark VAN DEN WIJNGAERT Het Bestuur van de Secretarissen- 
Generaal in Belgie tijdens de Duitse Bezetting 1940-1944 Ph.D. Thesis of the History Department, 
Leuven: Katolieke Universiteit Leuven, 1972, pp.24-29.



























































































26 Social Policy in postwar Belgium
been argued that even if the Belgian business leaders did not actively support 
the Nazi's new order, they did
"take advantage of the political climate created by the occupant 
to institute, by themselves and on their own terms, many 
reforms adumbrated before the war." (70)
The new order provided big business with an additional amount of power to 
influence the formation of public opinion, the acts of legislators, and state 
policies generally. This influence had impact extending well beyond the 
period of the occupation.
2.2.2. Occupation, Political Parties, Trade Unions and Collaboration.
Immediately after the capitulation of the Belgian army, the country 
was swept both by a wave of loyalty vis-à-vis the King, who was heralded for 
his readiness to share the fate of his army, and by a general dislike towards 
Belgian politicians. In particular the London exiles, who were seen as the 
incarnation of a declining world became the subject of this scorn. In addition, 
Luykx has argued that
"the first contact of the Belgian population with the German 
occupant had turned out better than expected; there was an 
admiration for the discipline of the German army, a discipline 
which had been lost in the country, and there was a general 
feeling that the occupant of World War II was totally different 
from that of World War I. Because of all this, the population 
had, during the first days of the occupation, a positive 
inclination towards the so-called «new order» which the 
German occupant promoted." (77)
The legitimacy crisis which the Parliamentary regime already faced before the 
war was aggravated by the military defeat. Whereas those leaders of the 
Catholic or Liberal parties, who returned to the country after its capitulation, 
kept a low profile, some prominent Socialist openly accepted the so-called 
New Order. On June 28, only a week after the capitulation of the French 
army, Hendrik De Man, the president of the BWP, dissolved the Social 
Democratic party and published a manifesto in which he called for the 
acceptance of the German victory.
"La guerre a amené la débâcle du régime parlementaire et de la 
plutocratie capitaliste dans les soi-disant démocraties. Pour les
70 John GILLINGHAM Belgian Business in the New Nazi Order Gent: Jan Dhondt Stchting, 1977, 
p.191.



























































































Johan Jeroen De Deken 27
classes laborieuses et pour le socialisme, cet effondrement d'un
monde décrépit, loin d'etre un déssastre, est une délivrance." (72)
De Man was convinced that the Germans were going to win the war and that 
Belgium would regain its sovereignty. During the first months of the 
occupation, an overall majority of the population shared this opinion (73). De 
Man hoped that the framework of the New Order would allow him to realise 
the renewal he had tried to implement during the 1930's (74). In July 1940 he 
launched a programme for "un front unique de travail sur la base 
coopérative". This programme was approved not only by the "new BVV" (i.e. 
that part of the Socialist trade union federation that had followed De Man in 
his acceptance of the New Order), but also by such eminent Socialists as 
Achiel Van Acker, who would later become one of the main leaders of the 
underground trade union movement and the president of the underground 
Socialist Party.
De Man also played an important role in the negotiations leading to the 
foundation on November 22, 1940 of the German sponsored unified trade 
union federation, the Unie van Hand- en Geestesarbeiders (UHGA), but had 
himself refused to take up a function within this organisation. He saw the 
UHGA as a countervailing power to the another organisation sponsored by
72 This manifesto was quoted in the newspapers Le Soir, De Vooruit and Le journal de Charlerloi. 
This quoted is taken from Luykx, 1973, p.387.
73 Brepoels, 1988, p.141.
74 See Klijn ,1990, p.97. De Man was without doubt the most prominent of the pre-war leaders 
openly expressing his support to the New Order. However, it were not only Socialists who 
flirted with anti-parliamentray corporatist ideas. For example, in August 1940 a manifesto was 
published that reflected the agreements reached during negotiations between representatives 
of the Catholic employers’ association, most notably René Goris, and the Christian trade union 
federation, in particular Paul Willem Segers. The manifesto can be seen as a Catholic 
alternative to De Man's plans. It called for the abolishing of the old party system, a radical 
reform of the parliamentary system and the establishing of a corporatist order inspired by the 
doctrine of Solidarism. The manifesto was welcomed by the Flemish Christian trade union 
leader August Cool but decisively rejected by his Walloon counterpart André Pauwels (for a 
discussion see Jozef MAMPUYS "De Christelijke Vakbeweging" in Emmanuel GERARD, ed. De 
Christelijke Arbeidersbeioeging in België Vol.2 Leuven: Universitaire Pers Leuven, 1991, pp.146- 
271, in particular pp.211-213; Dirk LUYTEN "Het katolieke patronaat en het korporatisme in 
de jaren dertig tijdens de bezetting" in Bijdragen van het Navorsings- en Studiecentrum voor de 
Geschiedenis -van de Tioeede Wereldoorlog No.13, October 1990, pp.91-148, in particular pp.111-117; 
and Brepoels, 1988, p.142). The Catholic employers also developed plans for far more 
authoritarian forms of corporatism in which labour would play a much more subordinate role. 
In particular a group around Henri Velge a legal adviser of the Walloon Christian employer 
association APIC. Velge' s proposals were to suffocate the labour movement and replace 




























































































28 Social Policy in postwar Belgium
the Germans, the Witrschaftsabteilung, which clearly supported the interests of 
the employers (75).
The UGHA was an umbrella organisation controlled by a committee of 
eight trade union leaders representing (part of) the Socialist, the Christian, the 
Liberal and the Fascist trade unions. Initially the UGHA was supported by a 
sizable part of the labour movement. Some trade unionist, like the Socialist 
Victor Grauls who would become the first president of the UGHA, supported 
the federation because they genuinely believed in a unified labour movement. 
Others merely joint out of opportunistic reasons as part of a policy of being 
present in the new structures. The Christian syndicalist, August Cool, for 
instance, never supported the idea of a unitary trade union movement and 
always had insisted in maintaining the Christian identity of his federation. 
As a result of the establishing of the UGHA, the existing trade unions were 
split between those who were prepared to collaborate (the Socialist "new 
BVV", and most the Flemish wing of the Christian federations) and those who 
preferred to establish an underground organisation (the leaders of the "old 
BVV" and most of the Walloon wing of the Christian federation). However, 
when from 1941 onwards the Nazi's tried to increase their grip on the UGHA 
by systematically replacing the secretaries of the various federations by pro- 
German elements or by outspoken collaborators, the Christian union decided 
to leave the organisation and was officially dissolved (76). In 1941, the 
Socialist Achiel Van Acker too broke all his contacts with the UGHA, and 
when even the "new BVV" faced massive dismissals of its national and 
regional cadres the nazification of the federation had become inevitable. The 
process that was concluded by the replacing of the Socialist president of the 
UGHA Victor Grauls by the Fascist Edgard Delvo (77). As membership to the 
UGHA was not compulsory, the union never succeeded to attract more than
250,000 members. Towards the end of the war, despite its clientilistic policies
75 Mieke CLAEYS-VAN HAEGEDOORN Hendrik De Man. Een Biografie Antwerpen: De 
Nederlandse Boekhandel, 1972, p.335.
76 In particular the replacing of Cool and Roscam and the announcing of a merger of various 
federations lead the Christian trade unions to rupture with the UGHA. For a discussion see 
Jean NEUVILLE La C.S.C en l'an 40 Brussels: Vie Ouvrière, 1988, pp.86-96.
77 During the fall of 1941, De Man completely disillusioned with degeneration of the UGHA into 
a Quisling organisation, also withdrew all his support and went into exile in the Haute Savoy 
close to the Swiss border. After the war he was convicted to twenty years imprisonment and 



























































































Johan Jeroen De Deken 29
copied upon the DAF's Kraft durch Freude, it was left with a mere 150,000 
members (78).
In the meantime various underground groups were formed that 
started to prepare postwar order (79). When the Christian trade union 
federation was dissolved in August 1941, most of its leaders and officials were 
helped out by prominent Catholic employers like the captain of the metal 
industry, Léon Bekaert, and by Fernand Colin of the Kredietbank. An 
illustrative example was that of the ACV leader August Cool, who became a 
mattress salesman for Bekaert. Commenting in this period Cool has said that
"It was Bekaert who gave ah our people a job. I became a 
travelling salesman in mattresses and indeed I sold a lot of 
mattresses, even if this was only secondary, or let us say a 
pretext. It was intended to give me the opportunity to travel 
throughout the country." (so)
By helping out Christian trade unionists the Catholic employers hoped to 
limit the rising influence of the Communists upon the working class.
"Together with their bosses (broodheren), the leaders of the ACV 
would start to prepare the postwar period." (si)
The employers also sponsored moderate Socialist trade unionist. For 
example, the governor of the Société Générale, Alexandre Galopin, took care of 
the Socialists Joseph Bondas (until he left for London), and of Achiel Van 
Acker.
78 Before the war, in 1939, the Socialist federation B W  had 524,224 members, the Christian 
federation ACV had 339,796 and the Liberal federation ACLVB 89,717. Lehouck even argues 
that the UGHA never attracted more than 110,000 members of which a mere 17,000 were 
Walloons (see F. LEHOUCK "Oorlog en sociale zekerheid" in Arbeidsblad Vol.81, No.9-10, 
September-October, 1980, pp.643-693).
79 A comprehensive overview of these groups goes well beyond the scope of this paper. Only the 
activities of those groups that on some way or another significantly contributed to the postwar 
social security reforms will be discussed here A comprehensive overview of these groups goes 
well beyond the scope of this paper. Only the activities of those groups that on some way or 
another significantly contributed to the postwar social policy reforms will be discussed here.
80 Interview of the Belgian Radio and Television (BRT) with Agust Cool, reprinted in Joost 
FLORQUIN Ten Huize van... Zevende Reeks Leuven: Davidsfonds, 1971, pp.181-215 (p.197).
81 Wouter DAMBRE Fundamenten van de Verzorgingsstaat. Planning en Uitvoering van de Sociale 



























































































30 Social Policy in postwar Belgium
On the Christian side, this form of cooperation lead to the signing of a 
number of agreements on the principle for postwar reconstruction (82). These 
agreements were based on reports prepared by investigatory commissions set 
up by the Federation of Catholic Employers (83) and by the underground 
Christian unions. The conclusions of these commissions had been discussed 
and fine-tuned in discussions between Cool and Bekaert. These agreements 
can be considered to be the harbingers of the modernization of the Catholic 
Party into a Christian Democratic Party, even if the Christelijke Volkspartij or 
CVP officially was only established after the war in August 1945 (84).
Most of the anti-German Socialist trade union leaders had gone into 
exile in London where they had established the Centre Syndical Beige with Jef 
Rens as President and Joseph Bondas as Secretary General (85). This centre 
prepared several studies (86), but as will be argued, after the liberation of the 
country, these "Londeners" would be side-tracked. It would be primarily the 
political, economic and syndicalists interest groups that during the war were 
active in the country's underground movement, that would determine the 
postwar reforms.
The Social Democratic underground was first founded by a few radical 
young Socialists who had remained in the country, or had returned 
immediately after the capitulation of the French army. Later they were joined
82 For example, in October 1943 a common programme was adopted which reflected the prewar 
Catholic ideas on industrial relations (see also Luyten, 1990).
83 This Federatie van Katholieke Werkgevers was a merger of the Algemeen Christelijk Verbond van 
Werkgevers and the Associations des Patrons et Ingénieurs Catholiques.
84 A first step was taken already before the war when in 1937, the Katholieke Partij had been 
renamed into Blok der Katholieken. The origins of the Christelijke Volkspartij can be traced back to 
various Catholic groups that were active during the occupation in preparing a postwar order. 
They included outspoken conservative groups such as the one around baron Romain 
Moyersoen, as well as more progressively inclined groups close to the Christian labour 
movement. For a detailed account of the founding of the CVP from within, see Mark VAN 
DEN WIJNGAERT Ontstaan en Stichting van de C.V.P/P.S.C Brussels: Instituut voor Politieke 
Vorming, 1976.
85 Before the war, Rens had been the National Secretary of the Social Democratic Syndicale 
Commissie. After having been active in the opposition to the UGHA, Bondas had joined his 
comrades in London during the Fall of 1942.
86 Of particular importance here was a study of Jef Rens, Joseph Bondas, and Paul Finet, 
"Réflexions sur la restauration du syndicalisme belge" which amongst other things called for a 
generalised system of social insurance, for the establishing of a single central social insurance 
fund which to a significant extent would have to be financed by State subsidies, and for an 
increased progressivity of the taxation system in order to make the whole system more 
redistributive. This report is reprinted in Dore SMETS and Jef RENS Historique du Centre 



























































































Jokan Jeroen De Deken 31
by more eminent figures, primarily belonging to the right wing of the party, 
such as Achiel Van Acker, Léon Delsinne, Louis Major, and Herman Vos. 
Soon these "moderates" came to dominate the Socialist underground. In 
September 1941, the underground Social Democratic party even succeeded in 
organizing an illegal congress in the Walloon provinces. At this congress, a 
programme was discussed, prepared by Henri Fuss (former general director 
at the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare), Léon Delsinne and a number of 
progressive Catholics. It is at the occasion of this meeting that the Social 
Democrats symbolicaly changed their name from Belgian Labour Party 
(Belgische Werklieden Partij or BWP) into Belgian Socialist Party (Belgische 
Socialistiche Partij or BSP).
Fuss and Delsinne were also the main architects of the Avant Projet de 
Pacte d'Union Traivailliste agreed upon by a group of Socialists and of 
progressive Christian Democrats («7). This pact proposed to establish a 
unified labour party, but after long consideration it was rejected by the "new" 
BSP. The pact included a rather detailed programme of 48 proposals. Several 
of these proposals concerned the establishing of a comprehensive system of 
social security. Here one can find for the first time the idea of a National 
Social Security Office (Rijksdient voor Sociale Zekerheid) administered by equal 
representation.
The underground Social Democratic party also created a series of study 
commissions to prepare a new programme. The commission responsible for 
social security included Achiel Van Acker and Arthur Jauniaux. Before the 
war, Van Acker had been studying social security reform in the context of the 
Study Centre for the Reform of the State, whereas as Jauniaux was the main 
leader of the federation of Socialist Mutual Benefit Societies and a well-known 
advocate of a unitary mutual benefit society administered by equal 
representation.
2.2.3. The CEPAG Social Security Plan.
In the beginning of 1941, the London-based Government in Exile 
established the Commission pour l'Etude des Problèmes d'Après-guerre (CEPAG). 
The CEPAG was to function as a think-tank and to prepare plans for the 
postwar reconstruction of the country which the Government was to
87 They included the Socialists Jospeh Bondas (at the time still in Belgium) and Louis Major, and 




























































































32 Social Policy in postwar Belgium
implement immediately after its return to a liberated Belgium (88). The 
former Catholic Prime Minister, Paul Van Zeeland was recalled from New 
York to become the President of the CEPAG, but as Van Zeeland was often 
absent, the everyday leadership was in the hands of Jef Rens, one of the main 
exile leaders of the Socialist trade unions. In addition, there was a central 
committee which included Socialists like Louis de Brouckere, and 
representatives of business and Industry like Raoul Richard and Gustave 
Jossart (89). Most of the preparatory work for the CEPAG reports was done 
by about 100 volunteers of the London exile community. The CEPAG never 
had plenary meetings, but worked in different sections which analysed 
various problems and reported their conclusions to the Central Committee.
Among the political parties, the Social Democrats were the largest 
group among the London exiles. The group included prominent figures such 
as Louis De Brouckere, Camille Huysmans and Arthur Wauters. The 
Socialists became particularly well represented in the CEPAG, and in its social 
section in particular (90). De Brouckere was one of the members of its Central 
Committee and participated in the work of the social section. Wauters, who 
before the war had been director of the Socialist daily Le Peuple and Minister 
of Labour and Social Welfare, chaired its social section.
The CEPAG plan was based on a study prepared by the Socialists 
lawyer Roger Roch (97). The social section had six meetings in January and
88 Brigitte HENAU "Shaping a new Belgium: the CEPAG -  the Belgian Commission for the Study 
of Post-war Problems, 1941-44 in M.L. SMITH and Peter M.R. STIRK, eds. Making the New 
Europe. European Unity and the Second World War London: Pinter, 1990, pp.112-131.
89 For a comprehensive listing of the members of the CEPAG and their political background see 
Diane DE BELLEFROID La Commission pour l'Étude des Problèmes d'Après-guerre (CEPAG, 1941- 
1944) unpublished MA-thesis, University of Louvain-la-Neuve: 1987, pp.l 15f.
90 Apart from Wauters and DeBrouckère, the social section included Socialists like Jef Rens, Roger 
Roch, Isabelle Blum, Joseph Bondas and George Housiaux. Lehouck though seems to 
exaggerate the case when he claims that "except for Paul van Zeeland ... all members were a 
mouthpiece of the B W " (Lehouck, 1980, p.687. In the discussions of the social section, there 
were also Liberals such as Julius Hoste and Roger Motz, and other non-Socialists like baron R. 
Boël, and the leader of the Belgian economic mission in London and E. Bigwood of the Belgian 
Red Cross.
91 Roger ROCH Les Assurances Sociales London: Commission Belge pour l'Étude des Problèmes 
d'Après Guerre Doc. S 5/21, January, 1943 (Algemeen Rijksarchief Rens-CEPAG 11). The Social 
Section primarily worked on proposals to reform the social security system. However, the 
commission also formulated some recommendations for postwar housing policy. In particular 
it suggested the granting of mortgage loans at extremely low interest rates to allow for the 
construction of inexpensive housing and for the purchase of furniture. After the war these 
proposals led to the expansion of the system of housing construction subsidies and to the 



























































































Johan Jeroen De Deken 33
February 1943 where it discussed Roch's proposals. According to Roch, the 
members of the social section unanimously agreed on the principle of social 
security for all. He claims that there were only minor disagreements on 
technical details.
"During these negotiations all the members, in a general burst of 
patriotic feelings, unanimously expressed them ambition to 
provide the country and its inhabitants with a general 
compulsory social security system, that would cover all risks 
from the cradle to the grave. Despite this general sense of 
agreement, there emerged here and there differences of opinion 
between the members of the section, committed as they were 
with the desire to realise the economic and social security in the 
shortest possible time-span. But these differences of opinion 
primarily concerned technical questions..." (92)
The CEPAG plan proposed a radical reform of the prewar social insurance 
system. It was argued that system was to become the true expression of a 
national solidarity:
"The system of generalised and compulsory insurance has the 
consequence that the burdens common to societal life are re­
apportioned between the individuals that form the nation. 
Without question, this can indeed be considered to be the 
expression of a effective expression of the spirit of solidarity 
which should inspire all those who belong to the same 
community" (93)
It proposed to include both the right to work and the right to social security 
into the constitution. The architects of the plan were clearly influenced by 
Beveridge (94). In terms of financing, they foresaw a contribution to be paid
(see Roger ROCH "Een sociale-zekerheidsplan" in Arbeidsblad Vol.59, No.10, October 1958, 
pp.1207-1250 (p.1248)).
92 Roch, 1958, p.1209. Roch, though, seems to exagérate the degree of consensus. Judging on the 
transcripts of the meetings of the Social Section, there do seem to have emerged important 
disagreements between the Socialists and baron R. Boël, officially the leader of the Belgian 
Economic Mission in London, but de-facto representing the viewpoint of conservative 
employers. Boël was particularly reluctant to acccept the idea of the administrative unification 
into a central semi-public social insurance office. On several occasions expressed his strong 
preference for mainatining a pluarlity of private institutions (see for example his intervention 
during the meeting of the Social Section of 12 February 1943 London: Commission Belge pour 
l'Étude des Problèmes d'Après Guerre Doc.PVS5/20 (Algemeen Rijksarchief Rens-CEPAG 11).
93 Roch, 1958, p.1214.
94 Though the work of the Social Section started before the Beveridge Report was issued, the 
CEPAG did carefully study the report. See for example A. DELIERNEUX Rapport Beveridge 
London: Commission Belge pour l’Étude des Problèmes d'Après Guerre Doc. S 5/18, 21 
December 1942, a study which compares Beveridge’s proposals with the system that existed in 
Belgium before the war; and Jean LEROY Analyse du Rapport Beveridge London: Commission 



























































































34 Social Policy in postwar Belgium
by everyone who was engaged in gainful activities, but wanted to rely 
primarily upon general revenue financing. The contributions would be flat- 
rate, even if there would be some variations depending upon the category to 
which an insured belonged. The increased reliance upon general revenue 
financing necessitated a general reform of the tax system. The tax rates were 
to become far more progressive and tax evasion was to be made much more 
difficult. Here too the system existing in United Kingdom was considered to 
be a possible source of inspiration:
"The method of financing chosen by the social section requires 
an important financial involvement from the part of the State; it 
requires a appropriate reform of the tax system, in particular an 
increased progressivity and control. In this respect, the 
legislator could look for inspiration in the tax system as it exists 
in the United Kingdom" (95)
The plan proposed the introduction of a uniform old-age pensions scheme 
advocated a benefit "sufficient to have a dignified old-age" that was to be 
granted without a means-test (96). Both benefits and contribution were to be 
uniform in order to facilitate the administration of the scheme. However, 
there should be the possibility to have voluntary contributions for a 
supplementary pension.
For wage-earners, it would be the employer who would be 
withholding the contribution and depositing it directly at the National 
Insurance Office (Rijksdienst voor Sociale Verzekeringen). The employee would 
get in return a stamp on his contribution card. This card would allow him to 
prove that contributions had been paid on his behalf. Non-wage-earners 
would be required to deposit their contributions periodically at the post 
office. In return they would get a stamp to stick on their contribution card. 
The establishment of the National Insurance Office would lead to the 
abolishing of all the existing mutual benefit funds, public and private:
"In addition, the establishing of the National social Security 
Office would be accompanied by important changes in the role 
of professional associations, in particular of the trade unions 
ana of the mutual benefit societies; the abolishing of all existing
Algemeen Rijksarchief Rens-CEPAG 11). International learning was not limited to the British 
"example". The CEPAG also studied the system operating in Central Europe before the 
outbreak of the war. For instance, in July 1943, the Czech Frantisek Krauss presented a report 
to the CEPAG on social services in Central Europe which largely focussed on prewar 
Czechoslovakia.
95 Roch, 1958, p.1214.



























































































Johan Jeroen De Deken 35
public and private funds, of all central and subsidiary funds for 
accident insurance, family allowances and annual paid holidays; 
the disappearance of the «accident insurance» departments in 
private insurance companies; of the National Office for 
Employment Exchange and Unemployment (Rijksdienst voor 
Arbeidsbemiddeling en Werkloosheid), of tne Providence Fund for 
the Victims of Occupational Diseases (Voorzorgfonds ten behoeve 
van de door Beroepsziekten Getroffeneri), of the unemployment 
funds of the trade unions (syndicate werkloosheidskasen), of the 
National Pension Fund for Miners (Nationaal Pensioenfonds voor 
Mijnwerkers), of the mutual benefit funds (voorzorgskassen), of the 
National Pension Fund for Salaried Employees (NKBP) and of 
the Special Bonus Fund (Toelagefonds) ; . . . ( 9 7 )
The various social insurance funds would be integrated into the new central 
administration. The National Insurance Office would be governed by a 
council consisting of the Minister of Social Affairs, by representatives of the 
insured, of the most representative trade-unions, of employers associations, of 
organisations of self-employed workers, of mutual benefit societies, of 
cooperatives, and of experts in socio-economic matters.
The Social Insurance Office (RSV) would have regional 
(intercommunale) and local branch offices which would administer a card 
system of all the insured, and keep a copy of these files (the other copy would 
be at the central office of the RSV). The state subsidies to the system were be 
determined independent from the economic cycles. The surplus in revenue 
during an economic boom, was to be placed in a reserve fund to cover 
expenses during a recession.
In order to be able to participate in the administration of the new 
social security institutions, it was considered inevitable that trade unions 
adopt a legal personalty (rechtspersoonlijkheid):
"It will be necessary that, while maintaining their freedom of 
expression and action, the trade unions, and other professional 
associations dispose over a legal personality, in order to enable 
their participation in the administration, the management and 
the direction of the National Office and of its regional and local 
branch offices, as to make it possible to appear Before court, to 
file appeals, and, in general, to perform the powers linked to the 
implementation of the social laws and fulfil the tasks which they 
will be attributed in the new organisation" (98)
The plan may have had unanimous support of the Social Section, but it was 
rather severely criticised by Hubert Pierlot, the Catholic Prime Minister of the
97 Roch, 1958, p.1231.



























































































36 Social Policy in postwar Belgium
Government in Exile. Pierlot argued that the plan proposed far too much 
state intervention, and that it was not enough based on the insurance 
principle (meaning a balance between contributions and benefits). In 
addition he criticised its universal scope:
"il est difficilement soutenable que l'État doit assurer des 
pensions à des personnes qui peuvent vivre de leurs ressources 
... L'idée de l'intervention de l'Etat en faveur d'ayants droit dont 
la situation ne justifie aucun sacrifice par les pouvoirs publics 
tend à diminuer le sens de la responsabilité individuelle et 
familiale." (99)
The Social Democratic under-secretary of Labour and Social Affairs, Joseph 
Bondas rejected this very restricted meaning Pierlot attributed to insurance. 
For Bondas, social insurance did not require that the insured would be 
primarily responsible for the financing of the system. In fact, he argued, 
general revenue financing was essential to assure the realisation of a system 
of national solidarity:
"Il peut être acompli par un tiers, en l'occurence de l'État, qui 
assure, par son intervention financière, la réalisation du concept 
de solidarité nationale, qui est à la base du système." (100)
At all costs Bondas wanted to avoid the establishing of a dual system that 
would separate the needy from those who could insure themselves via their 
own means. Instead he proposed a system to which every citizen was to 
contribute — even if the granting of benefits would still to some extent would 
take into account need:
"... on doit admettre qu'il est très difficile de justifier l'octroi 
d'une pension aux personnes, qui peuvent vivre de leurs 
ressources, parce qu'à la base du système, il y a un concept de 
solidarité nationale. Il serait loqique que l'obligation d'effectuer 
des versement soit générale, mais que l'exercice du droit aux 
assurances sociales soit subordonné à l'existence d'un état de 
besoin. Toutefois celui-ci serait présumé exister; il 
appartiendrait à l'Office des assurances de faire la preuve 
contraire." ( jo î)
99 Hubert PIERLOT Note sur le Rapport de la Section Sociale 31 August 1943, Document 
II/FVH/3032 p.7, in Navorsings- en Studiecentrum voor de Geschiedenis van de Tweede 
Wereldoorlog PD40 No.287.
700 Joseph BONDAS Examen de la note de Monsieur le Premier Ministre du 37 auôt 1943 sur le rapport 
de la Section Sociale (doc S5/28) 5 October 1943, p.5, Document II/N H /3524 in Navorsings- en 
Studiecentrum voor de Geschiedenis van de Tweede Wereldoorlog PD40 No.289, p.5.



























































































Johan Jeroen De Deken 37
2.2.4. The Social Pact.
After in 1940, the German authorities had decided to dissolve the 
board of directors of the National Office for Employment Exchange and 
Unemployment (Nationale Dienst voor Arbeidsbemiddeling en Werkloosheid or 
NDAW), a number of its members took the initiative to maintain contacts 
between employers and workers. This group included Henri Fuss (before the 
war, royal commissioner in charge of investigating the reform of the 
unemployment insurance system, and general director at the Ministry of 
Labour and Social Affair), Georges Velter (president of the employers' 
association Pabrimetal), Paul Goldschmidt (president of the employers 
association Comité Central Industriel), the Christian syndicalist Henri Pauwels, 
the Socialist syndicalist L. Watillon, and Gaston Grignard (the former director 
of the NDAW). In addition, there were some occasional participants in the 
talks: the Christian syndicalist August Cool, the Socialist syndicalist Joseph 
Bondas (until he left for London, when he was replaced by Hubert Lapaille 
from the Socialist metalworkers union), Léon Delsinne (an economics 
professor who had been affiliated to the Socialist Workers Academy), Arthur 
Jauniaux (the leader of the federation of Socialist Mutual Benefit Societies), 
and the Socialists Louis Major and Achiel Van Acker (102). Léon Bekaert 
would also participate in these negotiations in his position as coordinator of 
the social commission established by the employers towards the end of 1942 
(103). Initially, Alfred Van Melle of the federation of Christian mutual benefit 
societies was also involved in the talks, but as he fundamentally disagreed 
with Fuss' proposals on the reform of the sickness insurance system he 
basically dropped out of the negotiations (104).
According to Watillon, the negotiations primarily own their success to 
commitment of the two civil servants, Fuss and Grignard (70s). Without their
702 Guy SPITAELS "Achille Van Acker: Père de la sécurité sociale en Belgique" in Liber Amicorum 
Achiel Van Acker Brugge: Orion 1973, pp. 173-206 (p.185); and Herman BALTHAZAR "Sociale 
Welvaart en Overlegeconomie, een Onvolkomen Wens" in De Industrie in België. Twee Eeuwen 
Ontwikkeling 1780-1980 Brussels: Gemeentekrediet van België, 1981, pp.243-260 (p.244).
703 Bekeart had been asked by Alexandre Galopin the governor of the Société Générale (and one of 
the leaders of the Christian employers association) to coordinate the various study groups of 
the employers that dealt with the postwar social order (see Luyten, 1990, p.134 and p.141).
704 Patrick PASTURE Kerk, Politiek en Sociale Actie. De Unieke Positie van de Arbeidesbezoeging in 
België 1944-1973 Leuven: Garant, 1992, p.99.
705 L. WATILLON "Het Ontstaan van het Ontwerp van Akkoord van Sociale Solidariteit in België.



























































































38 Social Policy in postwar Belgium
help employers and workers would probably never had come to the 
agreement reached in 1944, the so-called "draft agreement on social solidarity" 
(ontwerp van akkoord van sociale solidariteit) which is generally referred to at as 
the "Social Pact" (W6).
This Social Pact sets out the framework for postwar industrial relations 
and for a reform of the social insurance system. The industrial relations part 
sought to guarantee social peace by institutionalising consultation between 
the main trade unions and the employers associations. This system was to 
reinforce the position of the moderate unions vis-à-vis the radical left wing of 
the Socialists and the Communists. However, a discussion of the industrial 
relations chapters of the Social Pact goes beyond the scope of this study.
The social security chapter of the Social Pact contained six paragraphs 
dealing respectively with old-age and premature death, sickness and 
invalidity, unemployment, family allowances, annual paid holidays, and 
finally the apportioning of the contributions. The two most important 
innovations were the introduction of a compulsory sickness insurance scheme 
for wage-earners, and of establishing a central institution which would collect 
a single all-encompassing social security contribution, combining the existing 
contributions for old-age pensions, sickness, health care, invalidity, 
unemployment and family allowances. This encompassing contribution 
would be deposited into a national fund that was to be administered by equal 
representation. This fund would re-apportion the single contribution over the 
various branches of the social insurance system.
During the inter-war period, the idea of a generalised compulsory 
social insurance (including sickness insurance) had already been advocated 
by the Catholic Minister of Labour and Social Affairs Hendrik Heyman, and 
by Henri Fuss when he was general director at this Ministry (107). Proposals 
in this respect had also been formulated as early as 1936 by the social security
106 This draft agreement has been reprinted in Arbeidsblad Vo.59, N o.7-8,1958, pp.848-862.
107 See Hendrik HEYMAN and baron M. HOUTART "Wetsontwerp betreffende de sociale 
verzekeringen" Parlementaire Documenten -  Kamer van Volksvertgenwoordigers 1929-1930, No.22, 
meeting of 10 December 1929. This legislative proposal only concerned the introduction of 
compulsory insurance against the risks of sickness and invalidity. However, the explanatory 
note (memorie van toelichting) presented the new scheme as part of a a future comprehensive 
system of compulsory insurance against the risks of sickness, invalidity, and of old-age and 
unemployment. At the time, old-age pension insurance already was compulsory for wage- 
earners. The proposed sickness-invalidity scheme was initially also to be limited to wage- 
earners, but the first article of the proposed law, announced a gradual expansion of the 
coverage to include other categories of workers such as cottage industry workers, seamen, 



























































































Johan Jeroen De Deken 39
commission established in the framework of the Labour Plan of Hendrik De 
Man. Camille Huysmans and Arthur Jauniaux even succeeded to include 
these proposals into the program of the second Van Zeeland government, but 
they were never implemented (ïos). The system of a single all-encompassing 
contribution had already been proposed by Van Acker as early as 1929 in a 
report he wrote on the budget of the Ministry of Industry, Labour and Social 
Welfare. Between 1936 and 1938, he had further developed this idea when he 
worked in the commission for social security of the Studiecentrum voor de 
Hervorming van de Staat (109).
Before the war, employers had to complete 23 forms for their 
employees. The various branches of the social insurance system used 
different methods to calculate the contributions: some were flat-rate, others 
were earnings-related, some contributions had to be paid monthly, others 
annually, and yet others each time the wage was paid out. Each branch of 
social insurance also had its own separate control administration (no). Apart 
from the advantage of administrative simplicity, a system with a single all- 
encompasing contribution would make it impossible to pick and choose the 
insurance against specific risks. Before the war, some employers, in 
agreement or not with their workers, tended to exclude for example old-age
108 Louis MAJOR "Interviewed by Michel Magits" in Socialistische Standpunten Vol.31, No.5-6, 1984, 
pp. 15-20.
109 C.V. "De Maatschappelijke Zekerheid der Arbeiders in België" in De Gids op Maatschappleijk 
Gebied No.1-2, 1945, p.34-40. The general report on the work of the study centre was published 
as De Hervorming van de Staat, Besluiten, Negende Commissie (Brussels: Studiecentrum voor de 
Hervorming van de Staat, 1938), but the report of the commission investigating the 
rationalisation of the system of social legislation was supposed to be published in the course of 
1940 (Henri VELGE "Le Problème de la Simplification des Lois Sociales" in Bulletin Social des 
Industriels Vol.17, No.110, March-April 1940, pp.53-59). However, because of the outbreak of 
the war, the complete report was never published. In the beginning of 1940, the part of the 
study dealing with the schemes for civil servants nevertheless was made pubic (see François & 
Basyn, 1940). For a discussion see also Léon FRANÇOIS "Les Pensions Civiles à Charge de 
l'Etat" in Comptes-Rendus des Traveaux de la Société d'Economie Politique de Belgique No.151, 
March 1940. In that partial report, François strongly criticised the system of re-apportioning, 
and the lack of an autonomous pension fund for civil servants.
The CEPAG in London also published excerpts of the report as Étude tendant à Simplifier 
l'Application des Lois Sociales Rapport de la Neuvième Commission du Centre d'Études pour la 
Réforme de l'État, Conclusion Additionelles, CEPAG Doc. S5/15 September 1942 [available in 
Algemeen Rijksarchief Rens-CEPAG 11]. The report called for the standardisation of 
contribution bases (which for the pension-scheme would have meant the introduction of a 
contribution reflecting a percentage of wages), for the establishing of a central social insurance 
fund (Caisse Sociale Centrale), and for the introduction of a single social security card, and of all- 
encompassing trimesterial contributions.
110 Joos FLORQUIN "Ten Huize van Achiel Van Acker" in Liber Amicorum Achiel Van Acker 



























































































40 Social Policy in postwar Belgium
pension insurance because it was something to worry about later; in other 
cases, workers of good health would not be covered for sickness etc.
With respect to old-age pensions, the Social Pact proposed a benefit 
consisting of two components: a smaller component would still be based on 
capitalisation and be related to the contributions paid. The larger component 
would be financed by the state subsidies of the prewar era and some new 
State bonuses. These new bonuses would have to allow to immediately 
increase the benefits to about 50 per cent of the average wage:
"Pour couvrir les charges ainsi accrues, employeurs et 
travailleurs verseraient un total correspondant pour chacune 
des deux parties à 3.5% du salaire. Une partie de la somme 
servant au paiement des cotisations ouvrières et patronales 
prévues dans les ois de pension existantes pour être mscrite au 
compte individuel de chaque assuré, et le surplus étant consacré 
aux majorations par voie de répartition." (ni).
2.2.5. A Comparison of the CEP AG Plan and the Social Pact.
Whereas the CEPAG plan proposed the introduction of a universal 
social security system covering all citizens (including, under certain conditions 
even other residents), the Social Pact limited its basic universe of solidarity to 
wage-earners (and their dependents) only. The CEPAG plan proposed a new 
system of social security primarily financed by progressive taxation, the Social 
Pact, on the other hand, merely wanted to make all existing contribution- 
based social insurance schemes compulsory for wage-earners, and integrate 
those schemes only to some extent by introducing the single all-encompassing 
contribution. The following table summarises the main features of the two 
blueprints.
111 Arthur DOUCY La Sécurité Sociale en Belgique. Le Plan Van Acker Paris: Librairie Générale de 



























































































]ohan Jeroen De Deken 41
Table 2.1. A Comparison of the Proposals of the CEP AG Plan and of the Social Pact.
CEPAG Plan Social Pact




primarily financed by 
progressive taxes 
combined with stricter 
control on the enfor­
cement of the system
primarily financed by 
contributions of wage- 
earners and employers
administered by one 
national institution 








ciations and trade unions 
only if they accepted a 
legal personality; also 
other interest groups
administration by 
equal representation of 
employers and employees 
without requiring the 
acceptance of legal 
personality
establishing a National 
Health Service with 
regional health care 
centres
maintaining fragmented 
system of health care with 
consolidation of the power 
of mutual benefit societies
inspired by Beveridge 
report and by 
"Social Democracy”
inspired by proposals 
formulated in Belgium 
before the war to reform 
an essentially 
Bismarckian system
The radical reforms proposed by CEPAG plan were clearly influenced 
by the Beveridge Report. In London, far away from the vested interests in the 
existing social insurance system, and from the power relations as they had 
developed at home during the occupation, it turned to be more easy to attack 
sacred cows like the "ideological pluralism" of the mutual benefit societies, the 
power of private insurance companies, or the interests of the trade-unions in 
the Ghent system.
The Social Pact, on the other hand, was based on proposals already 
formulated before the war in various investigatory commissions, and was 
tailored towards the vested interests of various groups and institutions. The 
architects of the Social Pact had simply been building upon the nascent pre­
war tradition of corporatist negotiations between unions and employers. 



























































































42 Social Policy in postwar Belgium
contact with the realties as they evolved in the country during the occupation. 
Their ideas emanated from the collective consciousness of the social groups 
they represented.
The extent to which they had been influenced by the Beveridge Report 
remains subject to debate. Some have argued that the report reached the 
Belgian underground via parachute and that it was studied by the various 
groups that prepared a post-war order (ni). However, Henri Fuss, one of the 
main architects of the Social Pact, has argued that
"Of course we knew about the existence of such a plan. But we 
never had the opportunity to study it. The social security 
arrangements conceived by the underground committee are 
hundred per cent Belgian and have nothing in common with the 
British scheme. The latter was based on the principle of 
covering the entire population. Ours was limited to wage- 
earners. It was an approach that reflected common sense." (723)
The Social Democrats in the London exile Government, probably also 
succeeded to obtain more radical concessions from the bourgeois parties, as 
there still was far more uncertainty about the stability of a postwar Belgium. 
When Bondas came in 1942 to London, he urged the CEPAG to elaborate a 
"sufficiently substantial program" in order to prevent "tout entraînement de 
les classes ouvrières à des mouvement de violence" (774). Bondas was clearly 
alluding to the increasing popularity of the Communist resistance. However 
towards the end of the war, the spectre of Communism appeared to be less 
threatening, as an overall majority of the working class had been co-opted by 
the Social Pact. In order to stop the expansion of Communism, the far- 
reaching concessions in the field of social security proposed by the CEPAG 
were no longer imperative.
When the Pierlot Government returned to the liberated country with 
boxes full of plans, the "Londoners" were coolly received. The CEPAG plan 
disappeared into the national archives, without even being considered or 
discussed. The proposals of the Social Pact, on the other hand, were smoothly 
translated into decrees and laws.
112 Leon-Eli TROCLET De Sociale Zekerheid in België. Deel 1: Algemene Vraagstukken inzake Sociale 
Zekerheid Brussels: Solvay-Instituut voor Sociologie, 1958, p.30.
113 Henri FUSS "Het Onstaan van het ontwerp van akkoord van sociale solidariteit in België. I. De 
sociale zekerheid" in Arbeidsblad Vol.59, No.7-8, July-August 1958, pp.863-870 (p.863).
114 "Procès Verbal de la Séance de la Section Social CEPAG London: Commission Belge pour 



























































































Johan Jeroen De Deken 43
3
The Failure of a Social D em ocratic Reform : 
the First post-w ar Social Policy Com prom ises betw een Christian  
and Social D em ocracy.
The first years following the liberation of the country are paradoxical 
in that even though the Socialist Party seemed to be stronger than ever, it 
failed to leave its imprint on the foundations of the post-war welfare state. 
The provisional measures adopted by the Government returning from 
London, had little to do with the Social Democrat blueprints worked out by 
the CEPAG. Rather, they were the almost literal translation of the plans 
worked out by co-opted trade unionists and representatives of employers. 
The successive Socialist dominated governments failed to redirect the spirit of 
these provisional measures, and refrained from developing Social 
Democratically inspired housing policies. When the Christian Democratic 
Party returned to power, it consolidated the sort of housing policies its 
Catholic predecessor had initiated during the 1920's.
In the 1946 elections, the parties of the left obtained a record share of 
the vote, almost 45 per cent, though they remained short of a majority (ns). In 
addition, one can argue that labour also reinforced its position because there 
were substantially more representatives of the Christian labour movement 
elected under the ticket of the "new" Christian Democratic party, than had 
been before the war under that of the Catholic Bloc (m). The renamed
775 Before the war the Social Democrats and Communists combined, had obtained their best score 
in the 1925 elections when they received about 41 per cent of the vote. The 1945 victory was 
short-lived: after the introduction of female suffrage in 1948, the leftist share of the vote 
returned to its "usual" level between 35 and 40 per cent of the vote.
776 On August 19, 1945, the Christelijke Volkspartij was founded. The new Catholic party tried to 
get rid of the conservative image of its prewar predecessor, the Katholieke Partij which in 1937 
had renamed itself into Blok der Katholieken. The Christian Labour movement was strongly 
represented in the new party: Paul Willem Segers, Jef Deschuyffeleer, Alfred De Taye, Geraard 
Van den Daele and Alfons Verbist were 5 of the 11 members of the organisational committee.
On the Walloon side there were O. Grégoire and O. Behogne (2 out of 12). The national 
secretary of the Christian trade unions, Paul Willem Segers, the main architect of the new 
party, had a particular strong influence in the formulation of the so-called Christmas 
Programme "België moet wederopgebouwd worden, Wie zal de bouwmeester zijn?". This 
programme was published in the beginning of 1946 and was based on the principles of 



























































































44 Social Policy in postwar Belgium
Catholic party significantly increased its share benefiting from both the lack 
of competition from the right, and its capacity to limit descent from its left 
wing (117). However these moderate shifts in electoral configuration are only 
relevant to the extent that they can be seen as reflection of the societal power 
relations. The policies under discussion in this section, were not formulated 
in Parliament, but in the framework of various extra-parliamentary 
corporatist negotiations that prepare drafts which were translated in 
legislative decrees (besluitwetten).
Table 3.1. A Comparison of the 1939 and the 1946 Parliamentary Elections 
(and Number of Seats in the Chamber of Representatives — total 202):
1939 1946
Catholics 32.7% (73) 42.5% (92)
UDB ~ 2.2% (1)
Socialists 30.2% (64) 31.6% (69)
Liberals 17.2% (33) 8.9% (17)
Liberal-Socialist Cartel — 1.5% (ns)
Communists 5.4% (9) 12.7% (23)
Flemish Nationalists 8.3% (17) —
Fascists (Rex) 4.4% (4) -
Others 1.8% (2) 0.5% (0)
one hand, and the "collectivism" of the Socialists and Communists on the other hand. 
However, in terms of practical policy recommendations, this "personalism" offered little more 
than some general guide-lines, and before the war it had been a reference for many political 
groups ranging from the Blok der Katholieken to the Fascist Rex party. After the war, even the 
leftist UDB (see next footnote) referred to personalism.
127 In the Walloon provinces and attempt was made to establish a labourist party which was to 
transcend confessional cleavages, the Union Démocratique Belge (UDB). Even if the movement 
was strongly supported by a lot of the leaders of the Walloon Christian trade unions, it 
miserably failed in the 1946 elections (despite the fact it had controlled 2 out of 18 ministries in 
the anti-royalist Second van Acker Government. This failure can be attributed to various 
reasons: Cardinal Van Roey had called for Catholic unity which meant Catholic voters were 
not to vote for the UDB. More important probably was the ambiguous attitude of the UDB 
towards the return of the king and its tough stands on collaboration. The party lacked a grass­
roots organisation and consisted mostly of intellectuals. For a discussion of the short history of 
the UDB see J.C. WILLAME "L'Union Démocratique Belge (U.D.B.) Essai de création 
«travailliste»" in Courier Hebdomadaire du CRISP No.743-744, November 26,1976.





























































































Johan Jeroen De Deken 45
3.1. Social Security: A Compromise between Christian 
and Social Democracy?
The first social security reforms were the translation of the social pact 
concluded in clandestinity by moderate representatives of labour and capital. 
The labour movement abandoned the proposals for a radical "Beveridgean" 
reform as they had been formulated by Social Democratic exiles in London. 
The employers had to forsake their plans for an occupationally segregated 
social insurance system embedded in a strict conservative-corporatist order. 
The compromise was a "provisional" reform, which introduced measures that 
were to last for more than a decade. The "provisional reform" in fact 
consisted primarily of the implementation of most of the measures that, 
during the 1930's, had been proposed by representatives of the Christian 
labour movement and by politicians belonging to the pragmatic wing of the 
Socialist Party. As such they can be qualified as a compromise between 
Christian and Social Democracy, even if it seems to have been a compromise 
biased in favour of the ideas of the Christian Democratic movement.
3.1.1. The Van Acker Plan.
When in September 1944, the Government returned from its London 
exile, the Secretary of State for Social Affairs, Joseph Bondas, asked the main 
initiator of the Social Pact, Henri Fuss, to coordinate the social policies of his 
department. Fuss kept on having this responsibility after Achiel Van Acker 
became the new Minister of Labour and Social Welfare. On the basis of the 
reports prepared in the framework of the Social Pact, Van Acker designed a 
plan that would be the basis for the Social Security Act pushed through 
Parliament on December 28, 1944 (us). The 1944 Social Security Act was a so- 
called legislative decree (besluitwet), based on a law adopted by Parliament 
only few months before the war had broken out: in September 1939, 
Parliament had granted extensive extraordinary powers to the Government 
(72o). In December 1944, these extaoridinary powers had been modified and 
supplemented; after this amendment, explicit mention was made of issues 
relating to social insurance, and to the organisation of social security (!2 i).
779 For a detailed discussion of the plan and its translation into the 1944 Act, see Doucy, 1946.
720 See Act of 7 September 1939 "Wet waarbij aan de Koning buitegewone machten worden 
toegekend" in Belgisch Staatsblad 8 September 1939.
727 See Act of 14 December 1944 "Wet tot aanvulling van de wet van 7 September 1939 waarbij de 



























































































46 Social Policy in postwar Belgium
For wage-earners, the 1944 Social Security Act introduced compulsory 
sickness and invalidity insurance and compulsory unemployment insurance. 
It increased old-age pension benefits to a "descent" level, and improved the 
manual workers' arrangements for annual paid holidays. However, apart 
from a few minor amendments, the prewar pension laws and the regulations 
governing family allowances largely remained unchanged. And even if the 
1944 act legislated important changes in the field of sickness and invalidity 
insurance, there too it relied primarily on existing institutions, in particular 
the ideologically segregated mutual benefit funds (222).
The act foresaw a steep increase of the employers' contributions. 
Whereas before the war these contributions amounted to about 6 per cent, 
under the new legislation they would be a little over 15 per cent. The miners 
were excluded from the 1944 Act in part because of the fact that due to their 
early retirement age (55 as compared to 65 for other wage-earners), their 
pension scheme was about twice as expensive. On the 10th of January 1945, a 
separate law was adopted to reform the miners' scheme which at the time 
covered about 150,000 workers in 72 enterprises (223). From 1945 onwards, all 
contributions for the miners were deposited into the National Pension Fund 
for Miners (Nationaal Pensoenfonds voor Mijnwerkers) and the responsibilities of 
the fund were enlarged to also include the administration of the miners' 
invalidity insurance and their scheme for annual paid holidays (224).
the sixth article. This act also suspended the pension rights of civil servants who were accused 
of collaboration with the Nazis (see in particular, article 3).
722 As argued the scheme was made compulsory for wage-earners. In addition, the law 
introduced standardised benefits, where before the war they had varied according from fund 
to fund. In order to integrate the multitude of funds into the centralised system of collecting 
contributions, the law introduced a voucher system designed by Paul Goldschmidt (one of the 
Social Pact negotiators). Employers were to give their employees sickness insurance vouchers 
(bijdragebonnen) which indicated the wage on the basis of which the employer had paid the 
contributions to the newly established National Social Security Office. Subsequently, the 
insured employee had to submit these vouchers to the insuring institution of his choice.
123 Doucy, 1946, p.49.
724 Up to 1945, the pension scheme for miners was also administered by the General Savings and 
Annuity Fund (ASLK). The ASLK kept on administering contributions made to the fund 
before 194G, and remained responsible for paying out annuities resulting from funds thus 
capitalised. See Freddy KELDERS L'Organisation Administrative de la Sécurité Sociale en Belgique 
Liège: Faculté de Droit de l'Université de Liège, 1955, p.14, and the annual report of the ASLK 
of 1947 (Brussels, 1948). The fund also collected other social security contributions which it re­



























































































Johan Jeroen De Deken 47
Table 3.2. The Contributions to the 






employees 8.25% 8.0% 8 .0 %
employers 15.25% 15.5% 17.5%
total 23.5% 23.5% 25.5%
The contributions would be centrally collected by a new institution: the 
National Social Security Office (Rijksdienst voor Maatschappelijke Zekereheid or 
RMZ). The RMZ was a public institutions administered by a board composed 
of an equal number of representatives of employers and employees. In 
addition, the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs also had one 
representative on this board, but this agent only had an advisory role (12s). 
One of the negotiators of the Social Pact, the director of the employers 
associations CC1 Paul Goldschmidt, became the first general director of the 
RMZ. Another Social Pact negotiator, Henri Fuss became president of the 
administrative board. George Velter, also pact veteran represented the 
employers, together with M. van der Rest of the CCI, M. Pivon and L. Maes of 
the Christian employers association ACVW. The employees side also 
included two pact veterans: August Cool and Henri Pauwels for the
Christian trade unions. The socialists trade unions were represented by L. 
Spillemaeckers and C. van Belle.
Under the new regulations, the employer was to deduct the 
contribution of his employee from the latter's wage and deposit it at the end 
of each trimester, together with his own contribution, at the RMZ. The RMZ 
would then re-apportion the sums collected over the various branches of the 
social security system. This re-apportioning would be done as follows:
725 The representative of the Ministry nevertheless had a right to veto ail organisational rules he 



























































































48 Social Policy in postwar Belgium
Table 3.3. Breakdown of the Re-Apportioning of the Contributions 






old-age pensions 10.5% 7.0% 9.0%
sickness-invalidity 5.0% 6.0% 6.0%
unemployment insurance 2.0% 2.0% 2.0%
family allowances 6.0% 6.0% 6.0%
annual paid holidays 0.0% 2.5% 2.5%
total 23.5% 23.5% 25.5%
These percentages were intended to be only provisional, as the 
correspondence between revenue and expenses was only based on estimates. 
They could be adjusted in the future once the system would be operational 
(126).
Van Acker was very keen to translate his plan as soon as possible into a 
law. There were two main reasons for his precipitance. On the one hand he 
was well aware of the fact that the power constellation of the months 
following the liberation of the country was to the advantage of the labour 
movement, and that this was only a temporary situation which was not going 
to last that long (127). In retrospect, Louis Major has argued that
"We said to the employers: you accept this or we go on strike (we 
leggen de blokken er op). For us it was a very advantageous power 
relation and we have benefited from it." (72s)
At the time Van Acker gave a more profound justification for his hastiness. In 
the beginning of December, in a speech before Parliament he gave evidence of 
an iron logic when he declared that
"Je répète ici ce que j'ai dit à la commission et dans les mêmes 
termes: «C'est maitenant le moment de faire cette réalisation, 
car, si vous ne la faites pas aujourd'hui, vous ne la ferez pas
126 See Achiel VAN ACKER "Voordracht aan de Regent Besluitwet van 28 December 1944 
betreffende de Maatschappelijke Zekerheid der Arbeiders" in Belgisch Staatsblad December 30 
1944, reprinted in 1958, Troclet, 1958, Appendix No.3, p.326-344. The adjustments would turn 
out to be only marginal.
127 In this respect the labour movement had drawn adequate lessons from what had happened 
after he First World War.



























































































Johan Jeroen De Deken 49
demain, et voici pourquoi: parce qu’un mètre se compose de 
cent centimètres et non de cent deux centimètres.»" (129)
A second, more technocratie, reason has been suggested by Arthur Doucy,
who commenting on Van Acker's plan has argued that
"Si le plan avait été mis en application dans une période de bien- 
être et non pas dans le régime de disette que nous connaissions 
en janvier 1945, sans doute l'augmentation se serait-elle traduite 
par une hausse du coût de la vie, qui n'aurait pu freiner. Il 
fallait pouvoir mettre le plan en application dans une période où 
la disette régnait encore.1 (130)
3.1.2. Was the 1944 Act a Social Democratic Reform?
It cannot be disputed that several important Social Democrats played a 
central role in the formulation and implementation of the 1944 social security 
act. Achiel Van Acker has been called the "founding father of social security" 
in Belgium (137). However, one can question to what extent Van Acker and 
Socialist Social Pact negotiators such as Louis Major were really implementing 
Social Democratic ideas. The theoretical origins of the measures they ended 
up proposing can be traced back by to plans formulated in 1930 by the 
Christian Democratic Minister of Industry, Labour and Social Welfare, 
Hendrik Heyman, and even to measures which the Germans started to 
implement during the occupation. Van Ackers' plan had hardly anything in 
common with the plans worked out by the prewar Social Democratic 
leadership during its exile in London. Van Acker's plan not only differed 
from the blueprints of the London exiles, it was also strongly criticised at 
home.
For example, at the first congress of the Socialist trade unions after the 
liberation, Arthur Gailly, a trade union secretary vigorously opposed the 
continuation of a pensions scheme financed by contributions. He argued
"I represented the metalworkers. Already before the war we 
demanded equality in terms of pensions. We still adhere to this 
conviction ... Let us pay a pension to everyone, without
129 Parlementaire Handelingen Senaat 1944-1945 session of December 7 ,1944, p.53.
130 Doucy, 1946, p.34. Van Acker made a similar point in the Senate, when he argued that 
"actuellement notre économie est en train de se construire, de se stabiliser, et ... le moment est 
venu de réaliser le projet de sécurité sociale, parce que le jour où la situation économique se 
sera stabilisée, il ne sera plus possible d'imposer ces changes aux employeurs." Parlementaire 
Handelingen Senaat 1944-1945 session of December 7, 1944, p.53.



























































































50 Social Policy in postwar Belgium
exception, financed by a general tax paid by the society at large."
(732)
Instead of representing a Social Democratic conception on social security, Van 
Acker can more be seen as the loyal executor of the Catholic inspired Social 
Pact. Even if in his introduction to the law, Van Acker used what one could 
call a "Beveridgean terminology" such as "freedom from want”, the prewar 
conservative heritage remained dominant in various aspects of the law. Van 
Acker continued to apply the anti-etatist views from which the Social 
Democrats had gradually started to move away from. His view had more 
affinities with the ideas promoted by the Christian Democrats, than by the 
doctrinal innovation of Belgian Social Democracy hesitantly initiated during 
the 1930's by Hendrik De Man, and translated into practical reforms by the 
social section of the CEPAG.
There were indeed several Socialists involved in the negotiation of the 
Social Pact, and compared to the existing system, they had been relatively 
successful in increasing the financial burdens for the employers. However, 
these concessions could be conceived of as financial compensations through 
which those employers sought to buy of more radical reforms in a similar 
vain as they had subsidized, during the occupation, such "moderate" 
syndicalists as Agust Cool, Louis Major and Achiel Van Acker to help them to 
maintain control over the underground unions, and thereby prevent a 
radicalisation of the working class.
From such a perspective the Social Pact can simply be seen as modern 
form of Bonapartist strategies of class abatement. The fact that a prominent 
ultra-conservative Catholic politician like baron Romain Moyersoen highly 
approved of the Social Pact and actually encouraged the Government to use it 
as an "inspiration for its social policies" corroborates such a view. Crticisising 
the new Government's plans in this respect, Moyersoen argued before the 
Senate that
"It should be made public that there have been a multitude of 
negotiations between the best representatives of the employers 
ana of the trade union movement, who together have laid the 
foundations for the future social institutions. We hope that the
732 Algemeen Belgisch Vakverbond Vakbondscongres December 23-25, 1944, p.60. At the same 
congress the general secretary of the BVV, the "Londoner" Paul Finet kept on demanding the 
establishing of a National Health Service and also called for general revenue financing, in order 



























































































Johan Jeroen De Deken 51
Government will understand that it is in these circles that she 
has to look for inspiration for her own social policies." (133)
3.1.3. The "Provisional" Pension Reform.
The single all-encompassing contribution, introduced by the 1944 act, 
was still ear-marked according to the various branches of the social security 
system. The contributions paid for pensions in the two main wage-earner 
schemes could thus be broken down as follows:
Table 3.4. Breakdown of the Contributions 
for Pensions by Source for the 






(on a total of) (15.5%) (15.25%)
wage-earner: 3.5% 4.5%
(on a total of) (8.0%) (8.25% )
The only important amendment to the pension scheme, contained in 
the 1944 act, concerned the raising the benefits to a "minimum adequate level" 
(134). In order to finance these increases, the system of individual 
capitalisation was replaced by a mixed system in which part of the 
contributions were to be used for re-apportioning via a solidarity fund. The 
manual workers' scheme used most of the contributions for re-apportioning, 
whereas in the scheme for salaried employees, individual capitalisation 
remained the most important insurance technique. The following table gives 
an overview of the share of the two insurance techniques in the two schemes:
733 Romain MOYERSOEN in the Senate on October 4, 1944 Parlementaire Handelingen — Senaat, 
September 1944 - November 1944, session of 4 October 1944, p.16.



























































































52 Social Policy in postwar Belgium
Table 3.5. Share of Individual Capitalisation in 





total contribution: 23.5% 23.5%
total pension contr: 7.0% 10.5%
individually capitalised: 25fr.(+/-l%) 7.0%
re-apportioning fund: + /- 6% 3.5%
This meant that from 1944 onwards, a pension benefit for a wage-earner had 
four components (735):
1. an annuity (rente);
2. a state subsidy of 50 per cent or at most 1,200 
francs of the annuity (staatsbijdrage);
3. a flat-rate supplement of 2,100 francs for singles or 
3,200 francs for couples (kostenloze rentetoeslag);
4. a complementary old-age bonus, introduced in 1944 
financed from the so-called solidarity fund by means 
of re-apportioning; this bonus was set at 5,900 
francs for singles and 8,900 francs for couples 
(aanvullende ouderdomstoelage).
The flat rate supplement was only granted to those who had been unable to 
make enough contributions in order to built up a sufficiently high pension 
capital. Those pensioners born before 1870, received the full flat-rate 
supplement. It then was progressively reduced for those born after 1870 to 
disappear altogether for singles born after 1898, and for married couples born 
after 1910. Initially, this supplement was only granted after a means-test. 
However in 1946, a law was adopted which exempted most pensioners from 
this means-test. The impact of this law is reflected in the drop of the number 
of pensioners, who were granted a benefit after a means-test, from 210,434 in 
1945 to 91,655 in 1948. Whereas during the same period, pensioners obtaining 
a benefit without means-test increased from 61,543 in 1945 to 142,183 in 1948
(736).
3.1.4. What Prompted the "Provisional" Pension Reform?
The most important amendment of the pension scheme, the replacing 
of a system entirely based on individual capitalisation by a mixed system of
235 See Heyman, 1947, p.684 and Fr. MORRENS "Het Pensioensvraagstuk" in De Christelijke 
Werkgever Vol.2, N o.5-6,1946, pp.145-149 (p.146).



























































































Johan Jeroen De Deken 53
re-apportioning and individual capitalisation, was not inspired by a coherent 
social doctrine. Rather, it was motivated by pragmatic considerations. The 
wartime induced inflation had devalued the capitalised pension funds. This 
devaluation had made it necessary to adjust benefits. These upward 
adjustments were urgent and could only be financed by a "pay-as-you-go" 
system. As the successor of Van Acker, the Minsiter of Labour and Social 
Welfare, Leon-Eli Troclet has argued
"A too radical change of the pension scheme would have 
delayed the implementation of the global reform. That is why a 
temporary amendment was adopted replacing capitalisation by 
re-apportioning." (137)
This system was intended to be provisional, but it was not to last longer than 
three years.
3.1.5. The Coal Battle and the Amendments of the Scheme for Miners.
In 1945, the coal production had dropped to a mere 23 per cent of its 
pre-war level, and the Government announced the restoration of the prewar 
production as one of its first priorities. During the war, Belgians had been 
more prepared to take on the dangerous work, in order to escape from the 
recruitment for forced labour in Germany. However after the war thousands 
of Belgian workers left the mines. This labour shortage reinforced the 
position of the miners who launched a series of strikes. The Government did 
not hesitate to solve these problems with a determined stick and carrot policy. 
On the one side, this so-called "Coal Battle" (Kolenslag) involved the forceful 
breaking of strikes. On the other side, it consisted of a series of welfare 
measures to keep or attract workers to the mines (¡3 8 ). Just as during the 
inter-war period the Government recruited foreign "guest workers" from 
Italy, Poland and Czechoslovakia in order to reduce he bargaining power of 
the unions. In addition the Government forced some 60,000 German 
prisoners of war and Belgians who had been accused of collaboration, to work 
in the mines (139). However, in the longer run other more stabilising 
measures were needed. One of these measures was the improvement of the 
pension scheme for miners . In May 1945, The Minister of Labour and Social
137 Troclet, 1958, p.37.
138 One of the most important measures were implemented in the field of housing. These 
measures will be discussed in section 4.2.



























































































54 Social Policy in postwar Belgium
Welfare Troclet implemented a provisional reform of the miners scheme (240). 
This provisional reform was consolidated by a legislative order in February 
1947 (242). The order confirmed the monopoly of the National Pension Fund 
for Miners (Nationaal Pensioenfonds voor Mijnwerkers or NPM) (142).
The scheme also saw some changes in the method of financing, in 
particular an increase in the state's subsidies, though on the whole it 
remained based on the principle of individual capitalisation. Under the new 
regulations, retiring miners were granted a benefit which consisted of two 
parts: a part constituted through a system of subsidised individual 
capitalisation, and a portion financed by means of re-apportioning. The part 
constituted on the basis of individual capitalisation had three components:
(1) an annuity from their individual capitalised account at the 
ASLK (i.e. from contributions made prior to January 1, 1947);
(2) a so-called complementary annuity payable by the 
complementary annuities fund of the NPM for miners, equal to 
188 per cent of the annuity constituted with the ASLK during 
the period between January 1,1931 and December 31, 1945;
(3) an old-age annuity from the accumulation fund of the NPM, 
accruing from contributions made after January 1, 1946.
140 See in particular the legislative order of 8 May 1945 "Besluitwet houdende wijziging van het 
pensioenstelsel der mijnwerkers" in Belgisch Staatsblad 10-12 May 1945 (ILO Legislative Series 
1945-Bel.2 Geneva: International Labour Office, 1945).
141 See the legislative order of 25 February 1947 "Besluitwet tot samenvoeging en wijziging van de 
wetten betreffende het pensioenstelsel voor de mijnwerkers en de er mee gelijkgelstelden" in 
Belgisch Staatsblad 19 April 1947 (reprinted in English in ILO Legislative Series 1947 Bel.l, 
Geneva: International Labour Office, 1947).
142 Which had been granted in 1946 by the "Besluit van de Regent tot inrich ting van de 
«kapitalisatie» bij het Nationaal Pensioenfonds der Mijnwerkers" (Order of the Regent respecting 
the organisation of capitalisation in the National miners' Pension Fund), dated 30 February 1946 in 
Belgisch Staatsblad 18/19 February 1946 (reprinted in English in ILO Legislative Series 1946-Bel.4, 
Geneva: International Labour Office, 1946. The ASLK nevertheless remained responsible for 
the contributions made before 1945 to its funds. In 1958, an attempt was made to integrate the 
administration of the miners’ scheme into the newly created National fund for Old-age and 
Widows Pensions (Rijkskas voor Rust en Overlevingspensioenen) which already administered the 
manual workers' scheme. Though it seems to be the case that after the Socialist Minister of 
Labour was ousted this attempt was abandoned and the miners' scheme remained under the 



























































































Johan Jeroen De Deken 55
In addition, the State granted a subsidy amounting to 50 per cent of the 
benefit resulting from the sum of these three components (243). The part of the 
benefit financed by means of re-apportioning consisted of flat-rate sums 
which were only granted to those miners who had worked at least 20 years in 
the mines. They varied according to the marital status of the miner and also 
depended upon whether he worked under or above ground:
744 francs per year for married miners 
underground;
who worked
600 francs per year for married miners who worked above 
the ground;
492 francs per year for non-married miners 
underground;
who worked
600 francs per year for non-married miners 
above the ground.
who worked
The 1947 order also granted retired miners the right to 3,400 kilograms of coal 
per year. The distribution of this coal would be the responsibility of the NPM.
The different treatment of miners who worked underground and those 
who worked above ground also led to differential contribution rates. Those 
who worked underground paid a total social security contribution of 31 per 
cent (8 per cent by the miner and 23 per cent by his employer). A miner who 
worked above ground only paid a contribution of 27 per cent (8 per cent by 
the miner and 19 per cent by his employer).
3.1.6. The Stalemate on the Definitive Pension Reform.
Already in 1946, Troclet, now Minister of Labour and Social Welfare in 
an anti-Royalist Government (without the Christian Democrats), established 
an investigatory commission to prepare a definitive old-age pensions scheme. 
During more than a year this commission met about twice a week, but failed 
to formulate a consensual proposal. The major point of disagreement 
concerned the choice between re-apportioning and capitalisation. The 
Socialists were divided on this issue. Some favoured a system primarily 
based on individual capitalisation. Part of the reason for these Socialists to 
opt for individual capitalisation was their lack of confidence in the capacity of
243 During a transitory period, the rates would vary between 60, 75 and 100 per cent depending 
upon the year of birth (respectively 1880-1884, 1875-1879, 1867-1874 for men, and 1880-1884, 
1875-1879, and 1872-1874 for women). For miners who had worked underground, there was 



























































































56 Social Policy in postwar Belgium
their movement to control in the future the State, and by consequence, a 
continued commitment towards a "ghetto-strategy": they argued that under a 
system of individual capitalisation
"the claim of the worker vis-a-vis the community comes to be 
recognised at all times in a direct and mathematical relation..."
(144)
a system of individual capitalisation thus makes the recognition of pension 
rights
"entirely independent of the social convictions of the political 
groups who in the future will govern." (J26)
Other Socialists favoured a system of "collective capitalisation" which would 
have an important element of re-apportioning of contributions and thereby 
would dilute the insurance character of the pension scheme (745). The 
commission ended up proposing three different systems to the Minister. 
Troclet favoured the proposal of the Socialist Senator Jean Van Laerhoven, but 
as he was now again part of a Government with the Christian Democrats, he 
failed to convince his coalition partners and the pension question remained 
unresolved.
In September 1949, the Catholic-Liberal Government of Gaston 
Eyskens launched a new initiative aimed at resolving the pension question. 
The Christian Democratic Minister of Labour and Social Welfare, Oscar 
Behogne, nominated Henri Fuss and Walter Leen as respectively national and 
vice-national commissioner with the task of rationalising the entire social 
security system (146). Instead of working out a compromise, the two 
commissioners each filed their own report (147). Fuss, initiator of the Social
144 See the discussion of Jauniaux’s proposal in Roger ROYER Het Vraagstuk der Sociale Pensioenen 
in België. Vergelijkende Studie over de Pensioenstelsels: «Individuele Kapitalisatie» en «Collectieve 
Kapitalisatie» Brussels: [author], January 1948 (available in the Library of the Assurance van de 
Belgische Boerenbond -  Leuven), p.6.
145 J. MARCY "La Réforme des Pensions Capitalisation ou Répartition? in Problèmes Vol.l, No.7, 
1947, pp.414-419.
146 Behogne was a Walloon Christian Democrat who had repeatedly defended the interests of the 
Christian Labour Movement and of the national Federation of Christian Mutual Benefit 
Societies (LCM) when he worked with Paul Willem Segers in the Department of the Ministry of 
Public Works. At the time, Leën was director of the National Social Security Office close to the 
Christian Democrats. The social pact veteran Fuss on the other hand, was close to pragmatic 
Socialists like Van Acker.
147 Henri FUSS & Walter LEEN Verslag over de Hervorming van de Maatschappelijke Zekerheid 



























































































Johan Jeroen De Deken 57
Pact negotiations, represented more the cautious viewpoint of the Pact 
Socialists who were afraid to loose some of the concessions they had obtained 
from the employers. He considered a real definite reform impossible, and 
instead proposed to increase the subsidies from the state to the system, and to 
make the benefits more flat-rate.
Leen, on the other hand, reflected more the Catholic point of view (j48). 
He advocated a system based on personnel responsibility with less state 
intervention. He advocated a territorial or sectoral decentralisation, though in 
contrast to the employers he favoured more the former, as a sectoral 
decentralisation could encourage occupational selfishness. Leen rejected flat- 
rate minima and wanted to finance the system more on the basis of labour 
performances. Finally, he proposed a separate scheme for wage-earners and 
for self-employed persons.
Because there were two separate reports neither of them had a direct 
impact on policy making and the stalemate on pensions remained unresolved. 
In 1952, Behogne nevertheless submitted a radical reform of the pension 
scheme for manual workers, which was primarily inspired by Leen's report. 
The proposed law would make benefits more dependent than before upon 
past earnings and length of employment career, and would introduce a 
mechanism of valorization (749). Behogne's blueprint failed lo muster 
sufficient support in Parliament, but the traits of his proposal would be 
incorporated in the reform implemented by his successor Geerard Van den 
Daele, who would also take some ideas of the Fuss report.
3.2. Housing Policies: The Persistence of Christian Democratic Ideas and 
Practices.
In Belgium, the war had led to a virtual standstill in housing 
construction. According to the Economic Commission for Europe, there were 
practically no new dwellings erected in he country during he period of the
748 Leën had been a senior officer in the apparatus of the Christian labour movement. He was 
assisted by a commission which included the conservative Christian labour movement leader 
August Cool and L. Deweerdt, the secretary of the national federation of Christian mutual 
benefit societies for salaried employees (the Landelijke Bedienden Centrale or LBC).
149 Geeraard VAN DEN DAELE "Memorie van Toelichting bij het Wetsontwerp betreffende het 



























































































58 Social Policy in postwar Belgium
war. In addition, the country lost some 156,300 dwellings or 6.2 per cent of its 
1939 housing stock. The average number of inhabitants per dwelling 
increased from 3.32 in 1939 to 3.44 in 1947 (iso). One of the first general 
measures of the Government in the field of housing was the basic law on 
compensation for war damage which was adopted on October 1, 1947. The 
1947 Act made small proprietors eligible for a hundred per cent 
compensation, whereas large proprietors only received a partial 
reimbursement. The latter nevertheless could finance the remainder of their 
reconstruction costs by loans at low interest rates varying between 2.0 and 
2.75 per cent. The total cost of these programmes is estimated at some 55 
billion francs (l5l).
On the other hand though, the Second World War had barely 
interrupted the continuity of Belgian capitalism. Its productive capacity had 
hardly been damaged, and the country thus experienced a fast post-war 
recovery which during the period 1945-1951 led it to achieve the highest 
standard of living in Western Europe. However, because of the outdated 
industrial apparatus and a conservative enterpreneural class, the country was 
unable to maintain this position.
In its policy declaration, the Government of national unity under the 
leadership of Van Acker emphasised the necessity to speed up the recovery of 
the mining industry. As part of the "Coal Battle", the Government launched a 
campaign to attract workers to the mining industry and to keep them there. 
Apart from the earlier described improvements in the pensions scheme, the 
Van Acker Government adopted in April 1945 a law granting extraordinary 
low interest rates for mortgage loans for those who were prepared to work in 
the mining industry (152):
750 Data from Economic Commission for Europe, Committee on Housing, Building and Planning 
European Housing Problems E /EC E/110 Geneva: United Nations, 1949, Appendix 1 table 2. 
Immediately after the war, the Government issued a lower damage assessment: 36,672 houses 
were declared completely destroyed, 21,950 as damaged beyond repair and 92,770 as seriously 
damaged but still repairable (see "Wetsvoorstel houdende bijzondere bepalingen tot 
aanmoediging van het privaat initiatief bij het oprichten van goedkope woningen en het kopen 
van kleine landeigendommen" in Parlementaire Bescheiden 1946-1947 No.258).
757 Luykx, 1973, p.424.
752 Legislative order of 14 April 1945 "Besluitwet betreffende het toekennen van leningen tegen 
lage rente aan de mijnwerkers met het oog op op de aankoop of het bouwen van een woning of 
woonvertrekken" in Belgisch Staatsblad No.16, 17 April 1945 (See also the legislative order of 13 
December 1945 "Besluitwet van de Regent houdende uitvoering van de besluitwet van 14 april 
1945, betreffende het toekennen van leningen tegen lage rente aan de mijnwerkers met het oog 




























































































Johan Jeroen De Deken 59
* 2.5% for Miners who had been employed in the industry for less
than 5 years;
* 2.0% for miners with a career of 5 to 9 years;
* 1.5% for miners with a career of 15 to 19 years;
* 0.5% for miners who had worked in the industry for more than 20
years.
During this period the commercial interest rates for regular mortgage loans 
were almost twice as high as the maximum rate for miners, and the social 
rates of the ASLK were set at 3.75 per cent (jS3). The preferential interest rates 
were contingent upon the fact that the miners would remain employed in the 
industry. The miners lost their privileges as soon as they changed 
employment and left the mining industry.
3.2.2. The De Taye Act: A Christian Democratic Success Story.
In 1945, the new Christian Democratic Party issued its program for 
post-war reconstruction with the symbolic title "Belgium needs to be rebuild. 
Who will be the master builder?" (;54). This so-called "Christmas Programme" 
was primarily based on the Christian-Personalist ideas of the Jesuit Valére 
Fallon and his book "Principes d'economie sociale". In this book Fallon linked 
private initiative to the Christian duty of charity and social justice (755). In 
line with Fallon's ideas, the Christian Democratic Party advocated a social 
legislation which promoted the spirit of ownership for the large mass of the 
population. As has been demonstrated, this already had been the main 
guide-line for the Catholic housing policies during the period between the 
two world wars. At the time Fallon had explicitly endorsed the policies first 
enacted by baron Moyersoen (756). In the field of housing it would be one of
253 During the period 1945-1950, the commercial interest rates varied between 4.5 per cent and 5.1 
per cent.
154 See Christelijke Volkspartij "België m œt heropgebouwd worden. Wie zal de bouwmeester 
zijn" (1945) reprinted in M. VAN DEN WIJNGAERT Ontstaan en Stichting van de CVP/PSC. De 
Lange Weg naarhet Kerstprogramma Brussels: Instituut voor Politieke Vorming, 1976, pp.91-161.
255 Valère FALLON Principes d'Économie Sociale Brugge: Beyaert, 1923.
256 See Valère FALLON "Le problème du Logement. Quelque mots de Réponse au «Peuple»" in 
Vingtième Sciècle Vol.36, No.18, January 18, 1930, p.l. In his contribution to this Catholic 
doctrinal daily paper, Fallon reacted to Socialist criticism of the Catholic Government, 
defended the policies of Minister Heyman, who continued to implement the housing policies 
of his predecessor Moyersoen:
"L'orientation donné à la politique du logement populaire par M. le Ministre Heyman est la 



























































































60 Social Policy in postwar Belgium
Fallon's students, Alfred De Taye, who would become the "master builder" of 
Belgian postwar reconstruction (257).
In March 1947, De Taye submitted a proposal to Parliament to extend 
the field of application of the Moyersoen scheme. On May 29, 1948, his 
proposal could become the so-called De Taye Act, the cornerstone of Belgian 
postwar housing policies (25«). Like the Moyersoen scheme, the De Taye Act 
granted subsidies for the purchasing of a modest dwelling. The new scheme 
offered two types of subsidsies: a subsidy to purchase a dweling constructed 
by the NMGW or by the NMKL, and a construction subsidy for the private 
erection of a moderately priced dwelling. In addition, in the case of a 
construction subsidy, the State guarantied a mortgage loan amounting to 
some 70 to 90 per cent of the value of the property. In contrast to the 
Moyersoen subsidies, the new scheme did not involve a means-test, nor a 
maximum value of the dwelling to be built. The only conditions were that the 
total surface of a dwelling, built with a De Taye subsidy, could not exceed a 
maximum of 95 square meters, and that prospective applicants were not 
allowed to own already a dwelling, except if this dwelling was considered to 
be unhealthy and not fit for reconstruction.
The basic subsidy was set at 22,000 francs. This basic sum was 
increased by 10 per cent if the dwelling was located in a municipality of more 
than 30,000 inhabitants, and by 20 per cent if it was located in of the five 
largest cities in the country. In addition this total amount was increased by 20 
per cent for each child (259). This last feature of the law was justified in terms 
of a pro-natalist policy. During the parliamentary debates around the law, 
the Christian Democratic Senator, Theofiel Van Peteghem argued fhat
encourager la vente et la construction par des primes proportionnées du nombre d'enfants, 
diminuer les loyers pour les familles nombreuses, veiller à l'observation pris ... par les Sociétés 
d'Habitations à bon marché -- cette méthode est la seule qui partiquement, puisse résoudre la 
question des habitations à bon marché et qui puisse suprimer les abus dont nous avons eu trop 
souvent à nous plaindre dans le passé."
157 De Taye studies at the Centrale Hogeschool voor Christelijke Arbeiders in Heverlee,where Fallon 
was lecturing.
158 "Wet van 29 mei, 1948 houdende bijzondere bepalingen tot aanmoediging van het privaat 
initiatief bij het oprichten van goedkope woningen en het kopen van kleine landeigendommen" 
in Belgisch Staatsblad June 10,1948.
159 This meant that in 1949, the subsidy could cover up to 15 per cent of the total cost of a working 



























































































ìohan ¡eroen De Deken 61
"A large family needs to be able to build its own house. It are 
after all the large families that maintain the fatherland, and who 
maintain the numerical strength of the Belgian army." (;6o)
Even if it were primarily the relatively well off within the group of moderate 
income families who benefited from the subsidies of the De Taye scheme, the 
idea underlying the system was that in the end, by saturating the housing 
market with new dwellings, the lower income groups would also benefit, as 
they would be able to rent those houses that became available at 
comparatively lower rents.
From the beginning the new scheme was quite successful. During the 
first year, some 7000 new dwellings were erected with State support. 
However, there were important regional variations. As much 60 per cent of 
the new houses were build in the Flemish provinces, with the remaining 40 
per cent evenly split between the bilingual province of Brabant on the one 
hand, and the four Walloon provinces on the other hand. Originally the 
scheme was to remain operative for five years or up to the moment when
50,000 subsidies had been paid. But as early as 1951, the budget was close to 
be exhausted and the scheme had to be prolonged much earlier than had been 
anticipated (76i).
The De Taye Act meant a fulfilment of the demands of the Christian 
labour movement. In 1946, the umbrella organisation of the Christian labour 
movement the ACW (762) issued a report on the housing problem, in which it 
recommended the promotion of home-ownership as a means to de-proletarise 
the working class (763). This recommendation was justified by references to 
the Papal encyclicals Rerum Novarum, Quadragesimo Anno and Divini
160 See his intervention in Parlementaire Handelingen — Senaat, 1947-1948, No.40 March 24, 1948, 
p.813.
161 See The Act of 20 March 1951 "Wet tot verlenging der wet van 29 mei 1948 tot aanmoediging 
van het privaat initiatief bij het oprichten van gœdkope woningen en het kopen van Ideine 
landeigendommen" in Belgisch Staatsblad April 7, 1951.
762 The ACW (Algemeen Christelijke Werkersverbond) coordinates the activities of the Christian trade 
union federation ACV (Algemeen Christelijk Vakverbond), the national federation of Christian 
mutual benefits societies LCM (Landsbond der Christelijke Mutualititeiten), the Christian manual 
workers unions KWB (Katholieke Werkliedenbonden), the association of Catholic workers' women 
KAV (Katholieke Arbeidersvrouwengilden) and the Catholic youth organisation KAJ (Katholieke 
Arbeidersjeugd).




























































































62 Social Policy in postwar Belgium
Redemptoris (:U4). Even though it recognised the fact that home-ownership 
was only accessible for the better-off workers, the report explicitly rejected the 
promotion of social rental housing as a means to alleviate the housing needs 
of the less well-off strata of the working class:
"It is true that up to now only the most courageous workers 
were capable to acquire a dwelling through a loan. However, 
instead of concluding from this that rental housing ought to be 
generalised, we must investigate measures that will allow the 
average working man to become a home-owner too." (us)
A year before, an investigartory commission of the Christian employers had 
made a similar recommendation, even though they stressed a more active role 
for the employers in the promotion of home-ownership:
"Bâtir des logements ouvriers et en faciliter l'acquisition par leur 
personnel en chercant à conjuger cette acquisition par leur 
personnel en cherchant à conjuger cette acquisition facile avec la 
fidélité du personnel de l’entreprise." (766)
The Socialists, on the other hand, were far less enthusiastic in endorsing the 
renewed scheme. They argued that the new law did not substanially change 
the existing regulations, but rather simply increased the number of recipients 
of existing construction subsidies (7 67). The De Taye scheme thus had all the 
shortcomings of the pre-war Moyersoen scheme. The Socialists were 
particularly critical of the absence of a means-test, of the fact that the 
maximum surface of 95 square meters did not take into account cellars, attics, 
staircases, entrance or annex-buildings, of the general lack of planning 
requirements and coordination, and of the fact that the new scheme still 
required significant down-payments, thereby making it inaccessible to low- 
income groups. At the advent of the June 1949 elections, the executive 
committee of the Socialist Party concluded that
"... the act favours those who dispose over a starting capital of
50,000 to 100,000 francs, as well as over a sufficiently high and 
stable income, and thereby excludes the economically weak. It 
is rather a scheme for the middle class than a scheme for the
U4 See C. VAN GESTEL, ed. Kerk en Samenlevtng. De Bi/zonderste Sociale Documenten van de Pausen 
Leo XIII, Pius XI, Pius XII en lohannes XXII Brussels: DAP Sociale Uitgaven, 1964.
165 "Volkswoningen voor onze Arbeiders", 1946, p.61.
166 "Les Patrons Face au Problème du Logement des Travailleurs" in Bulletin Social des Industriels 
Vol.17, No.111, August-October 1945, pp.267-268 (p 267)



























































































Johan Jeroen De Deken 63
workers. It is more applicable in the country-side. The workers 
who live in the cities nave little use of the new law." (i6s)
3.2.2. The Brunfaut Act: A Minor Christian Democratic Concession
To some extent the Socialists did appreciate the de-prolitising aspect of 
the De Taye scheme, but even in this respect they argued that the scheme was 
limited in scope and too elitist. During the debates on the De Taye Act, the 
most prominent Socialist expert on housing issues, Fernand Brunfaut, pointed 
out that in the past modest income workers who had become a proprietor 
under the 1889 scheme and the Moyersoen scheme, later on had been forced 
to sell their house, as they were unable to to meet redemption charges. Others 
had been forced to become what he called "dry bread proprietors" 
(propriétaires à pain sec) and had to make too much sacrifices to pay of their 
mortgage loans (769). As an alternative Brunfaut proposed to construct multi­
family housing in the centres of towns and to revive the development of the 
1920's garden cities in the suburbs.
In the beginning of 1949, Brunfaut submitted a legislative proposal to 
reorient the emphasis of State's policies. Originally Brunfaut's proposals 
aimed at reviving the spirit of the garden city and of establishing a social 
living environment, but his proposal was only accepted by the Catholics (J70) 
after it was drastically watered down (m). The planning of the global living 
environment was reduced to a set of technical guide-lines. In addition, in the 
implementation of the law public funds for infrastructure were only allocated 
for basic utilities like gas, electricity and water. Investments for infrastructure 
to promotes community formation and social contacts were altogether
768 Uitvoerend Comité van de BSP Syllabus No.3. Voor een Woningspolitiek Elections of June 1949 
Brussels: SAM, 1949, p .ll (available at AMSAB, the archives of the Flemish Socialist Labour 
Movement in Gent, File M / A D /02301).
769 See his intervention in Parlementaire Handelingen -  Kamer Van Volksvertegenzooordigers January 
15, 1948, p.4.
770 who at the time controlled 92 of the 202 seats in the Chamber of representatives compared to 
only 69 for the Socialists.
777 "Wet van 15 April 1949 tot Instelling van een Nationaal Fonds voor Huisvesting" in Belgisch 
Staatsblad April 25-26, 1949. The original legislative proposal had the title "Establishing of a 
National Fund for Investment and Financing a National Housing Policy". Already from the 
title of the law that ultimately came to be adopted one can deduce the reduced scope: 



























































































64 Social Policy in postwar Belgium
cancelled (372). Whereas Brunfaut had wanted to subordinate the granting of 
the De Taye subsidies to a global housing policy, in practice the two systems 
of promoting home-ownership and of promoting social rental housing, 
continued to exist along one another.
The most important feature of the Brunfaut Act was the establishing of 
a National Housing Fund (Nationaal Ponds voor de Huisvesting). The idea to 
establish such a fund had already been launched by the Socialists in 1933 
when they issued their Labour Plan (Plan van de Arbeid) (173). The underlying 
goal of the establishing of the fund was to render the financing of social 
housing more immune to political alterations and fluctuations in the State's 
finances. Brunfaut proposed four sources to finance this fund. First he 
wanted to introduce an annual housing tax on the profits of Belgian insurance 
companies and on the private enterprises holding the monopoly on the 
production and distribution of electricity; second, municipalities would be 
required to reserve part of their budget to endow the fund; thirdly, he 
proposed to introduce a annual personnal solidarity tax for housing purposes; 
and finally, the State was to pay an annual subsidy to the fund. After the 
Christian Democratic amendments only the fourth method of financing was 
retained. The State subsidy came to became a separate chapter in the budget 
of the Ministry of Public Health and Family. The fund was to be used 
primarily to finance the construction of low-cost rental housing. The fund 
also was to pay the difference between the interest rates paid by building 
societies for the loans granted by the NMGW and the NMKL, and the 
commercial interest rates paid by the latter to finance its activities (374).
The Brunfaut Act also created the framework for a number of 
institutions responsible to investigate housing problems and to give technical 
assistance to the recognised building societies. Thus was created a research
772 Hilde VAN DEN BOSCH Het Huisvestingsbeleid in België. Deel 7: Literatuurstudie unpublished 
MA Thesis, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Departement Sociologie, 1984, p.38.
773 The housing proposals had been worked out by the Commission for Urbanisation and Housing 
Construction, which stood under the leadership of Emil Vinck, who had been the first 
president of the NMGW. The conclusions of this commission can be found in Bureau d'Études 
Sociales l'Exécution du Plan de Travail Antwerpen: De Sikkel, 1935. In terms of housing policies, 
the plan had initiated the gradual abandonment by the Socialist of the idea of a socially 
constructed living environment and of the model of the garden city. Instead it only conceived 
of infrastructure in technical, if not technocratic terms. The Plan failed to mention anywhere 
such issues as tenants participation, community formation which had been at the centre of the 
modernist initiatives sponsored by the party under the form of the 1920's tenants cooperatives.




























































































Johan Jeroen De Deken 65
institution that later in 1956 would become the National Housing Institute 
(Nationaal Instituut voor de huisvesting), and an administration for control and 
implementation (Uitvoerings- en Controledienst). Brunfaut had envisaged far- 
reaching responsibilities for these new institutions, but as argued after the 
amendments of his legislative proposals the new institutions were left with 
only marginal powers.
3.2.3. Semi-Governmental Housing Policies and Housing for the Middle Class: the 
case of the NKBP.
During the Parliamentary debates around the De Taye Act and the 
Brunfaut Act, baron Moyersoen submitted a legislative proposal aimed at 
subsidising middle class housing. He proposed to establish a new national 
building society to alleviate the housing needs of salaried employees, civil 
servants, and for those who worked in liberal professions, small trade or who 
were self-employed. At the time this proposal was rejected, but in 1953, it 
was re-formulated by the Catholic Senator Maurice Schot, to be adopted in 
March 1954 (775). Under the new law, the State guarantied mortgage loans 
through the intermediation of the ASLK, the Central Bureau for Mortgage 
Credit (Central Bureau voor Hypothecair Krediet) and the National Fund for 
Occupational Credit (Nationale Kas voor Beroepskrediet). The State guarantied 
50 to 60 per cent of a mortgage loan which could amount up to 80 or 90 per 
cent of the purchasing price (776). The definition of a middle-size dwelling 
varied with the number of children. A middle-sized dwelling could have a 
maximum sale-price of 450,000 BEF to 700,000 BEF if it was built on one of the 
five large conurbations or in the cities of Aalst, Brugge, Doornik, Genk, 
Hasselt, Kortrijk, La Louviere, Mechelen, Namur or Oostende. Otherwise the 
maximum value was set at 400,000 BEF to 600,000 BEF. In both cases the 
maximum allowed value could be increased by 5 per cent for each child, 
starting with the third child. In addition the value could be increased by 20 
per cent if the applicant needed the dwelling for professional reasons. The
175 Act of 8 March 1954 "De wet tot bevordering van de bouw, de aankoop en de verbouwing van 
middelgrote woningen" in Belgisch Staatsblad April 5-6, 1954. The law had been fiercely 
opposed by the Socialists, in particular by L6on-Eli Troclet, but in the end was adopted by a 
Parliament in which the Christian Democrats were holding an absolute majority of 108 seats on 
a total of 202.
176 This included the price of the land. The higher percentages were applicable if the loan-taker 



























































































66 Social Policy in postwar Belgium
social dimension of this measure has been questioned (177). It seems to be the 
case that these measures were more inspired by demands from the part of 
employers, who believed that there middle class work-force were increasingly 
unable to meet their housing needs when they moved to large conurbations to 
work in the booming service sector of the economy. The measures thus also 
were intended to contribute to the mobility of this pivotal segment of the 
work-force.
The impact of this law nevertheless remained very limited, as soon 
after its adoption, the Christian Democrats lost their absolute majority in 
Parliament and their homogeneous Government was replaced by an anti­
clerical coalition of Socialists and Liberals (i7g). The Socialists were effective 
in imposing severe restrictions by manipulating the orders implementing the 
act, so that the new scheme offered few advantages compared with the 
existing provisions for middle-class loans, in particular the mortgage loans 
granted by the ASLK and NKBP.
The role of the NKBP (National Pension Fund for Salaried Employees) 
tends to be ignored in studies on Belgian housing policies. Up to 1968., when 
this pension fund was integrated into the general pension scheme for wage- 
earners, the NKBP granted each year more than a thousand mortgage loans, 
at strongly reduced interest rates, to salaried employees who had been 
affiliated with the fund for at least one year. Normally the preferential 
interest rate was set at 4.5 per cent, in some cases even as low as 4.0 per cent 
(179). The loans were only for the construction of owner-occupied dwellings, 
and applicants were not allowed to have the disposition over another 
dwelling. Thus, during the period 1949-1967, the NKBP reserved each year
777 See for example, Goosens, 1993, p.26.
178 The fourth Van Acker Government with the Socialists Leburton and Troclet holding the 
Ministries of Population and Family and of Labour and Social Welfare.
179 See the annual reports of the NKBP published as Nationale Kas voor Bediendenpensioenen 
Verslag van de Verichtingen Brussels: NKBP, 1947-1967. Other financial institutions involved in 
granting mortgage loans at preferential interest rates were the General savings and Annuity 
Fund (ASLK), the Belgian Workerscooperative Deposit Fund (Belgische Arbeiderscodperatieve 
Depositokas) which was close the Christian labour trade union federation, the Fund of Farmers' 
Cooperatives (Centrale Rafeisenkas), the Volks depositokas, the Anwerpse Hypotheekkas, the bank of 
the Christian Labour Movement, CODEP and the IPPA (see Dirk VAN DAMME De Politiek 
Determinanten van het Sociaal Huisvestingsbeleid in Belgie unpublished MA thesis, Departement 



























































































Johan Jeroen De Deken 67
between 7 and 44 per cent of its assets for the granting of some 23,000 
mortgage loans (jso).
Another important semi-governmental institution in the field of 
housing policies, was the aforementioned Housing Fund of the League of 
Large Families (Woningfonds van de Bond der Kroosterijke Gezinnen van Belgie or 
WBKGB). Between 1950 and 1978, this fund granted loans to some 54,379 
families ( i s i ) .  These loans could be used to build, renovate or repair houses, 
or to pay back previously accumulated debts that were caused by such 
activities. In order to be considered "large" a family needs to have at least 
three children, and families applying for a loan are not allowed to dispose 
over another dwelling. There were certain limits in terms of the total value of 
the dwelling, and the family was required to occupy the dwelling during the 
entire period of the loan. Applicants were expected to conclude a life 
insurance contract with the ASLK, and eligibility was subject to income limits 
(782).
In 1964, the temporary character of the De Taye scheme was even 
abolished, and the subsidies became a permanent provision of Belgian 
housing policies.
180 Data for the year 1961 are missing. Most of these loans were granted at the strongly reduced 
rates of 4.0, 4.5 or 5.0 per cent, though some years a substantial number of loans was granted at 
rates of 5.75 and even 6.75.
181 De Ridder and Minon, 1979, p.29.
182 For example, in 1979 a family with three children could get a loan at 5.25%, provided its 
taxable earnings in 1977 did not exceed the ceiling of 440,900 BEF. If its earnings would exceed 
this limit by at most 45,000 BEF, the family would still be eligible for a loan though at 6.25%. 
At that time, the rules in the region of Brussels, and in the Walloon provinces were stricter: the 
respective maximum ceiling were only 358,500 BEF and 30,000 BEF. In addition, in Flanders, 
there exists the notion of "young family" (a family married since less than 10 years) which 






















































































































































































Johan Jeroen De Deken 69
4
The Long Road Tow ards a D efinitive Statutory Pensions Scheme 
and the Consolidation of O w ner-O ccupation.
The ideological disagreement between the Christian and Social 
Democrats on the organising principles of social security had produced a 
stalemate. Provisional measures had been adopted inspired by pre-war 
reform proposals and by the mandate of the pragmatic Social Pact. Even if 
these measures were intended not to last for more than three years, it would 
take more than two decades before a more definitive system would be 
consolidated. The 1950's were characterised by a series of reforms and 
counter reforms. These reforms were inspired by the ideological 
prescriptions of the two main protagonists, the Christian and Social 
Democrats. The Liberal Party sometimes operated as a power broker, and 
succeeding in obtaining a number of important concessions, that even at the 
time appeared not to be all that important, would set the agenda for policy 
making during the 1970's.
On the housing front there was less turmoil. Here the Socialist Party 
failed to make any substantial adjustment of the path initiated by the 
Christian Democrats during the late 1940's -- a path which as was argued was 
little more than a continuation on a more extensive scale of the policies 
devised by the Catholic Party during the inter-war period.
4.1. The Christian Democratic Offensive and the Return of Troclet as
Minister of Social Welfare.
After the Socialists had failed to implement their ideas on how the 
definitive pension scheme was to look like, the homogeneous Catholic 
Government, that ascended to power in 1950, launched its attempt to model a 
pension system conform to the demands of the Christian labour movement 
which had become pivotal to Christian Democratic power. However, soon 
after the legislation reforming the scheme for manual workers was adopted 



























































































70 Social Policy in postwar Belgium
was replaced by a coalition between Socialist and Liberals. Even if this 
Government failed to implement the progressive social policy the Socialist 
electorate had hoped for, it retroactively cancelled the reforms of the Christian 
Democratic Government, to pass its own reform. The Socialist Minister of 
Labour and Social Affairs, Léon-Eli Troclet, incorporated a number of the 
features of the cancelled reform, but added several Social Democratic accents, 
in particular a more important role for public institutions. Next, Troclet 
reformed the scheme for salaried employees, abolishing altogether individual 
capitalisation in the statutory arrangements, though leaving, probably under 




























































































Johan Jeroen De Deken 71
4.1.1. The Christian Democratic Pension Reform of Geerard Van den Daele.
In 1953, the Geerard van den Daele, Minister of Labour and Social 
Welfare in the second homogeneous Christian Democratic Government of 
Jean Van Houtte, made the first successful attempt to establish a more definite 
pension scheme for manual workers. His reform adopted the main features 
of the scheme proposed by his predecessor Behogne, in particular the benefit 
formula which took into account past remuneration, the length of career, and 
the cost of living (i83). The reform also definitively abolished the small 
element of individual capitalisation in the workers' scheme (284), and 
established the National Office for Manual Workers' Pensions (Rijksdienst voor 
Arbeidspensioenen or RAP) (285). This new institution took over the 
responsibilities of the institutions that previously had been responsible for 
administering the state subsidies (staatsbijdrage), the supplements (kostenloze 
rente toeslag), and bonuses (aanvullende ouderdomstoelage) (286). Apart from a 
simplification, this reorganisation also introduced equal representation into 
the administration of these funds which before had been controlled by boards 
made up of civil servants and experts nominated by the Government. 
Whereas the method of financing the scheme exclusively through re­
apportioning can not be said to have followed the prescriptions of Christian 
Democracy, the introduction of equal representation clearly was a reflection 
of the long-standing demand of the Christian labour movement and 
contrasted with the etatism of the Socialists. The so-called individualisation 
of the pension, which established a more direct link between past wages and 
length of employment, also reflected the merit-based conceptions of Christian 
Democracy, even if most Socialists also favoured such a formula as it allowed 
for much higher replacement ratio's.
183 Act of 19 December 1953 "Wet van 29 December betreffende het Arbeiderspensioen" in Belgisch 
Staatsblad 31 December 1953. For a discussion of the main characteristics of the law see 
"Verslag van de Commissie van Arbeid en Sociale Voorzorg, belast met het onderzoek van het 
wetsontwerp betreffende de arbeiderspensioenen" in Parlementaire Handelingen -  Senaat session 
November 26,1953.
184 As mentioned, under the 1944 regulations, only about one seventh of the pension contribution 
of manual workers was used for the purpose of individual capitalisation.
185 The establishing of such a single national office had been proposed by the report of the Royal 
Commissioner Henri Fuss.
186 i.e. the National Fund for Old-Age and Orphan Supplements (Nationale Kas voor Ouderdom- en 




























































































72 Social Policy in postwar Belgium
4.1.2. The Return of the Socialist Troclet to the Ministry of Social Welfare.
In the elections of April 1954, the Christian Democrats lost their 
absolute majority, and the homogeneous Catholic Government was replaced 
by a Coalition between the Social Democrats and the Liberals.
Table 4.1. A Comparison of the 1950 and the 1954 Parliamentary 
Elections (and Number of Seats in the Chamber of Representatives):
1950 1954
Christian Democrats 47.68% (108) 41.14% (95)
Socialists 34.51% (77) 37.34% (86)
Liberals 11.25% (20) 12.15% (25)
Socialist-Liberal Cartel 1.77% 2.13
Communists 4.74% (7) 3.57% (4)
Flemish Nationalists — 2.20% (1)
Others 0.05% (0) 1.47% (1)
The new Government was led by the Socialist Social Pact veteran, Achiel Van 
Acker, and the Socialist Léon-Eli Troclet returned to the Ministry of Labour 
and Social Welfare. The new Government was restrained by the Liberal 
coalition partner in implementing the progressive social policy the Socialist 
electorate had hoped for. Instead, the Socialists put most of their energy in 
the common anti-clerical programme and the conflict of the financing of 
private Catholic schools (rsz).
4.1.3. Troclet's Reform of the Scheme for Manual Workers.
Troclet nevertheless made vigorous attempts to reverse the policies of 
his Christian Democratic predecessor. He was a prominent opponent of equal 
administration and favoured etatist schemes. One of his first political acts 
was to retroactively abolish the 1953 pension scheme. The law of June 28,
187 Some leading Social Democrats, like the president of the Socialist Party Max Buset, were 
convinced that a de-clericalisation was the only way in which Socialism could make a 
permanent break-through in Flanders. The main means to achieve the de-clericalisation was 
the expansion of the laicized public education system. They therefore subordinated social and 
economic policies to the educational policies of the Government (see Luykx, 1973, pp.445-447; 
and Els WITTE & Jan CRAEYBECKX Politieke Geschiedenis van België sinds 1830. Spanningen in 
een Burgelijke Démocratie Antwerpen: Standaard Wetenschappelijke Uitgeverij, 1983, p.324). 
Some have argued though that the school conflict should be seen as symbolic for a more 
general conflict of the role of the State in society, and the attempts to cut back the funding of 
private Catholic schools was as much reflecting the etatism of the Socialists, as their anti­



























































































Johan Jeroen De Deken 73
1954 declared that the Government would implement all measures necessary 
to reinstate the social security legislation from the period before the Christian 
Democrats formed their homogeneous Governments. As a consequence, the 
new National Office for Manual Workers' Pension (RAP), was again 
dismantled (l88). Soon afterwards, in May 1955, Troclet established the 
National Fund for Old-Age and Widows Pensions (Rijkskas voor Rust- en 
Overlevingspensioenen or RROP) (389). This new institution would have the 
same responsibilities as its predecessor, but would not be administered by 
equal representation. Instead, the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare 
nominated a senior administrator-charge d'affair (beheerder-zaakvoerder) who 
was assisted by an advisory board formed on the basis of the principle of equal 
representation. The Christian labour movement fiercely opposed Troclet's 
reforms, but it was difficult to muster sufficient support against them, as 
Troclet had made the tactical move to include his administrative reforms in a 
package deal which also contained an increase of pension benefits.
Apart from the different method of administration, Troclet's scheme 
closely resembled that of the cancelled 1953 law. Again the mixed system of 
re-apportioning and individual capitalisation was replaced by a system only 
using re-apportioning; and the 1955 scheme also reinforced the link between 
past remunerations and length of career by introducing a benefit formula 
based on fractions of a maximum benefit amounting to a certain percentage of 
past wages. For each year of employment, male pensioners received 1/45 of 
the total pension benefit and female pensioners 1/40, which meant that the 
maximum benefit was granted after an employment career of 45 years for 
men and 40 years for women. This maximum benefit was set at 75 per cent 
for a married worker whose wife has ceased all gainful activity and was not in 
receipt of an old-age pension (or other social security benefit), and at 60 per 
cent for other workers (190). As there were no reliable records of wages of the
188 Other retroactive measures included the cancelling of various Christian Democratic reforms of 
sickness insurance, and the replacing in some social security institutions of some 
representatives of the Christian labour movement by representatives of the Liberal trade 
unions (for a relative partisan account of these policies see Robert VANDEPUTTE Sociale 
Geschiedenis van België. 1944-1985 Tielt: Lannoo, 1987, pp.51-52).
189 See the Act of 21 May 1955. The regulations of Troclet's new scheme were laid down by Royal 
Decree, dated June 1955. Both the Act and the regulations were published in Belgisch Staatsblad 
of 19 June 1955 (the act of 21 May has been reprinted in English in ILO Legislative Series 1955 
Bel.4, Geneve: International Labour Office, 1955).
190 In this respect, Trolet's scheme was more advantageous than the Christian Democratic scheme, 



























































































74 Social Policy in postwar Belgium
period prior to 1955, a lump sum was used, irrespective of the wage category 
to which the pensioner belonged (¡9 2 ). Where the working career consisted of 
more than 45 years (40 for women), the 45 (40) years which were most 
advantageous to the claimant were counted. Finally, the Troclet scheme also 
foresaw an adjustment of benefits to the cost of living; and the scheme 
included a residence requirement according to which pensions could only be 
claimed by persons who actually resided in Belgium.
4.1.2. Troclet's Reform of the Scheme for Salaried Employees.
In 1957, Troclet presented his second major pension reform which 
concerned the scheme for salaried employees (¡9 2 ). In terms of financing the 
new scheme was entirely based on collective capitalisation, a system 
somewhere midway between individual capitalisation and complete re­
apportioning. Under a system of collective capitalisation, the mathematical 
reserves are not determined individually but for the pension scheme as a 
whole. These mathematical reserves were to be kept to a strict minimum, and 
with this in mind, the law foresaw a revision of the contributions every five 
years as to adjust them to demographic evolutions. Yet it was expected that 
by the turn of the century they would amount to some 80,000 million francs.
Troclet would have preferred to abolish the so-called institutional 
pluralism and delegate the entire administration of the scheme to the semi- 
governmental National Pension Fund for Salaried Employees (NKBP). 
However, under pressure of his Liberal coalition partners, he was forced to 
maintain a place for the 15 private subsidiary insuring institutions and for the 
General Savings and Annuity Fund (ASLK). Officially the Liberals justified 
the continued existence of these private institutions in terms of individual
191 This lump sum was set at 37,333 francs per year for a married man and 31,166 francs per year 
for others. This meant that it would only be by the year 2,000 that actual pension benefits 
would fully reach the intended replacement ratios. Up to that date, the benefits granted would 
remain below the target of 60 per cent of past remunerations for singles and 75 per cent for 
couples, as the lump sum was inevitably lower than the real past remunerations of the 
claimant.
192 See Act of 12 July 1957 "Wet betreffende het rust- en overlevingspensioen voor bedienden" 
which appeared in Belgisch Staatsblad July 21, 1957 (reprinted in English in ILO Legislative Series 
1957 Bel.4, Geneva: International Labour Office, 1957; see also "Besluit op de 
verzekeringsinstellingen" (Royal Decree of July 29, 1957, appeared in Belgisch Staatsblad of July 
31,1957); "Algemeen Reglement" (Royal Decree of July 30, 1957, appeared in Belgisch Staatsblad 
of August 1,1957); "Organisatie en werking van de Nationale Kas voor Bediendenpensioenen" 
(Royal Decree of July 29, 1957, appeared in Belgisch Staatsblad of August 2, 1957); and 
"Aansluiting- en aannemingsverklaring" (Ministerial Decree of July 30, 1957, appeared in 



























































































Johan Jeroen De Deken 75
freedom, but in fact they seemed to have been more concerned with limiting 
the public control over the large mathematical reserves, and with the 
safeguarding of the profits of commercial insurance companies — even if with 
respect to the latter, the Liberal's obstruction seems to have been less 
successful. Troclet succeeded in severely limiting the freedom to dispose of 
the profits, by a series of complicated, if not obscure regulations (¡93). In 
addition, the law foresaw that in the definite scheme, the private institutions 
would no longer be authorised to pay "their" part of the pension directly to 
their members, but instead these subsidiary institutions would merely 
become debitors to the National Pension Fund for Salaried Employees 
(NKBP). They would have to deposit an amount calculated according to a 
fixed scale determined by the Government. Pieter Franzten has concisely 
summarized the intentions underlying these regulations:
"These stipulations make it clear that the recognised institutions 
no longer will have an interest in being involved in the 
administration of old-age pensions insurance. They probably 
will be gradually excluded until only the NKBP will remain, to 
the great advantage of the insured." (l94)
The Liberals also succeeded in obtaining another important concession from 
Troclet: by inscribing a maximum ceiling in the benefit structure, they
assured the commercial insurance companies an important future market for 
supplementary pension insurance (195).
193 In the future, the 15 private subsidiary institutions and the ASLK only were allowed to 
capitalise 4.25 per cent of the total pension contribution of 10.25 per cent (before the 
introduction of the 1957 scheme they controlled 7 per cent), and this contribution was to be 
calculate^ on a maximum annual salary of 60,000 francs, whereas the remaining 6 per cent 
would be calculated on a salary up to 120,000 francs. In addition, the private institutions were 
required to deposit all the profits they were left with, after making their contributions to the 
two reserve funds "A" (Act of 18 June 1930, 3 per cent) and "B" (Royal Decree 12 September 
1936, 4 per cent), to a Common Fund for Valorization (Gemeenschappelijk Herwaarderingsfonds). 
A new fund was established within the NKP, to finance the adjusting of benefits to increases in 
the cost of living. Before the 1957 reform, the profits of the private subsidiary institutions were 
required to distribute to their members, via a re-apportioning fund, 75 per cent of the profits 
remaining after those institutions had contributed to the two reserve funds. Thus, before the 
1957 reform they could dispose freely of one fourth of the profits after 7 per cent was deducted 
for the two reserve funds.
194 Frantzen, 1957, p.113.
195 M. DUPEYROUX Évolution et Tendances des Systèmes de Sécurité Sociale des Pays membres des 
Communautés Européennes et de la Grande-Bretagne Luxembourg: Services des Communautés 
Européennes, 1966, p.119. The ceiling in the benefit structure was set at 60,000 francs for 
pensions based on employment before 1958; 96,000 francs for pensions based on employment 
between 1958 and 1959; and at 120,000 for employment from 1960 onwards (for a discussion, 
see "Belgium. New Legislation on Pensions for Salaried Employees" in Bulletin of the 



























































































76 Social Policy in postwar Belgium
For the rest, the benefit structure closely resembled the arrangements 
of the scheme for manual workers: benefits came to be calculated on the basis 
of fractions per year of employment (1/45 for men, 1/40 for women) of 75 per 
cent of past remunerations (60 per cent for singles). Before the 1957 reform, 
claimants received each three months an annuity from their individually 
capitalised account, in addition to their monthly benefit. In accordance with 
the new law, these annuity, insofar they were formed by compulsory 
contributions, were confiscated up to a certain amount. The pensioners 
would no longer receive this sort of benefit, except if the amount exceeded the 
maximum rates, or if the benefits originated from other than compulsory 
contributions. Finally, like in the scheme for manual workers, the benefits 
would be adjusted to increases in the cost of living.
The reform of the scheme for salaried employees was even more 
controversial than the introduction of the new scheme for manual workers 
had been. It was fiercely opposed by the Christian union of salaried 
employees (Landelijke Bedienden Centrale or LBC), as well as by various 
employers associations and private insurance companies. The Christian 
union had been working on its own reform proposal. Already in 1952, the 
LBC had formulated a detailed reform program (796). This program was the 
basis for the legislative proposal submitted in 1955 by Léon Servais. 
However, even though the LBC had recognised that the excessive 
fragmentation of pension funds had resulted in excessive administration 
costs, the Servais proposal too continued to foresee a role for the 17 private 
subsidiary insurers. It differed from Troclet's scheme in that it proposed the 
maintaining of the element of individual capitalisation, and in that it 
recommended the introduction of administration based on "genuine" equal 
representation. Because of political manoeuvres by the Socialist Minister of 
Labour and Social Welfare, the Servais-proposal as such was never discussed,
effectively blocked an amendment proposed by the labour wing of the Christian Democratic 
opposition to require private subsidiary pension funds to have at least 10,000 members in order 
to be allowed to continue to exist. If this requirement had been adopted, some of the funds 
catering for a largely liberal electorate such as the Fund of the Notary (Notariat Beige), the Fund 
for Executives (Patromle Kas) or the Fund for Journalists (Toekomst van de Journalist) were likely 
to have been absorbed by the NKBP. In fact if this measure would have been adopted only 5 
private subsidiary insurance institutions would have survived (see "Verslag van de Commissie 
van Arbeid en Sociale Voorzorg, belast met het onderzoek van: 1. het wetsvoorstel op het 
bediendenpensioen en 2. het wetsvoorstel betreffende het rust- en overlevingspensioen voor 
bedienden" Belgische Senaat Zitting 1956-1957 17 January 1957, p.16).
196 See J. ROISIN "Het Bediendenpensioen" in ACV. Tioeemaandelijks Studieorgaan van het Algemeen 



























































































Johan Jeroen De Deken 77
but the Christian Democratic representatives succeeded in amending the 
Minister's proposal (197).
The employers association Vlaams Economisch Verbond (VEV), also 
strongly condemned the abandoning of the system of individual 
capitalisation. The association considered it "unacceptable" that under the 
new system of collective capitalisation, the State would control large sums 
within the capital market (i9s). Over time, the employers also always had 
maintained that institutional pluralism led to a "healthy spirit of competition” 
which they argued guaranteed a cost effective administration (199). Though 
this argument may correspond with the prejudgements on the functioning of 
public administrations, it is unambiguously refuted by the facts. The 
following table demonstrates that in 1953, the administration costs in the 
public and semi-public institutions was substantially lower than those in the 
15 private subsidiary institutions (200):
197 In particular, the maintaining of the same role for the private subsidiary insurers, and the 
establishing of a Common Fund for Valorization (Gemeenschappelijk Herwaarderingsfonds), 
financed by the profits of these subsidiary insurers.
198 The association estimated that by the turn of the century, the combined reserves for the two 
wage-earner schemes would amount to as much as 125,000,000,000 francs (see V. POTIER "De 
Nieuwe Wet op het Bediendepensioen" in VEV Berichten Vol.32, N o.2,1957, pp.195-198.
199 L. BEKAERT "De Hervorming der Maatschappelijke Zekerheid. II De ouderdomspensiœnen" 
in De Christelijke Werkgever Vol.6, April-May 1950, pp.141-147 (p.145).
200 Data from Frantzen, 1957, p.112. These figures are of even greater significance if one takes into 
account that most private subsidiary institutions primarily administered the accounts of 
insured who are employed in large enterprises, and that these accounts require comparatively 
less administrative work. The majority of the members of the two semi-public institutions on 




























































































78 Social Policy in postwar Belgium
Table 4.2. Administration Costs for Public and Private Pension Funds




National Pension Fund 
for Salaried Emplo­
yees (NKBP) 18,493,552 fr. 220,817 fr. 83,75 fr.
General Savings and 
Annuity Fund (ASLK) 14,373,855 fr. 120,182 fr. 119,60 fr.
15 private funds 30,675,125 fr. 209,635 fr. 146,33 fr.
entire scheme 63,542,532 fr. 550,634 fr. 115,40 fr.
Finally, the employers expressed the fear that the State might be tempted to 
use the huge reserves of the scheme for salaried employees for other purpose, 
like for the financing of possible future deficits in the scheme for manual 
workers.
The private insurance companies effectively exploited these fears and 
organised a massive campaign against the Troclet scheme by distributing, 
with the help of the employers, thousands of brochures to salaried employees, 
and by organising "neutral” committees such as the Association for the 
Defense of the Pension for Salaried Employees (Vereniging voor de Verdediging 
van het Bediendenpensioen or VVBP). This committee formulated its own 
proposal, which was "remarkably" close to the proposals of the Association of 
Insurance Companies (Verbond der Verzekeringsmaatschappijen). Both 
proposals essentially argued that there was no need at all to change the 
existing arrangements. The only thing needed was an increase of the 
supplementary benefits, so that married men would obtain a pension between
45.000 and 50,000 francs, and singles a pension ranging between 36,000 and
40.000 francs.
It has been argued that both proposals were based on irrealistic 
financial plans and in the near future would require an increase in 
contributions. In general both proposals are said to have been worked out by 
people who were more concerned with the interests of the private insurance 
companies than with the well-being of retiring salaried employees (201).



























































































Johan Jeroen De Deken 79
4.2. A Pension Scheme for Self-Employed Persons.
The Socialists and the Christian Democrats both failed to legislate a 
pension scheme for self-employed persons modelled after the arrangements 
for wage-earners. It would be the Liberal Minister for the (self-employed) 
Middle Class (Minister van Middenstand), not the Socialist Minister of Labour 
and Social Welfare, who towards the end of the 1950’s introduced a pension 
scheme geared to the demands of various organisations claiming to represent 
the interests of the self-employed middle classes. This scheme was closer to 
traditional life-insurance schemes than to the sort of solidaristic arrangements 
characteristic of the schemes for the various classes of wage-earners.
4.2.1. The Unsuccessful Attempts to Emulate the Wage-Earners Schemes.
The first attempts to establish a compulsory pension scheme for self- 
employed workers date back to the 1930's. The 1930 pension act, and more in 
particular the Decree of 12 March 1932, not only concerned wage-earners, but 
also applied to self-employed workers with an annual income below 18,000 
francs. However in the act of 12 December 1937, which coordinated the 
various existing pension laws, there no longer was any mentioning of self- 
employed. The explanatory note to this coordinating law explains the reasons 
of this omission as follows:
"It is evident that the self-employed workers who were 
incorporated into compulsory insurance by means of the law of 
14 July 1930, clearly failed to comply with their obligations. 
According to the annual report of the General Savings and 
Annuity Fund, only an insignificant number of contributions 
was made by self-employed persons, namely 7883 in 1932, 9,597 
in 1933, 7,610 in 1934 and 6,1 $9 in 1935."
According to the Ministry of Labour, the figure for 1935 represented only 0.37 
per cent of the number of people that should have complied with the law (202).
After the Second World War, several attempts were made to extend the 
pension scheme of wage-earners to cover also self-employed persons. The 
Social security Act of 1944 proclaimed that social security had to be assured to 
"self-employed workers, craftsmen, tradesmen, and persons exercising liberal 
professions, as well as to wage-earners". Even though the specific regulations
202 A. VAN ACKERE "De Vrije Pensioenkassen voor Zelfstandigen en het Pensioen der 



























































































80 Social Policy in postwar Belgium
only concerned the latter group, the act announced that similar measures 
would be taken to the benefit of the other categories. Already in December 
1945, the anti-royalist Government established a commission to study social 
security for self-employed workers. This commission was presided by the 
Christian Democrat baron Fernand Van Ackere and issued its report in 1947 
(203). Soon afterwards, the Social Democratic Minister of Labour and Social 
Welfare, Troclet, submitted a legislative proposal to establish a compulsory 
pension scheme for those self-employed persons who were covered by the 
1937 law on family allowances (204). The scheme would grant an annual 
pension of 13,500 francs, but was decisively rejected by those who claimed to 
speak on behalf of the self-employed because it required to high contributions 
(205). One of the associations of self-employed persons, the Fédération des 
Classes Moyennes, argued against an extension of the wage-earners' social 
security towards the group of self-employed as follows:
"les commerçants et artisans ... ont asser fait de douloureuses 
experiences en face de l'étatisme pour se mefier de celui-ci. 
D'autre part si la Sécurité Sociale des salariés est allimentée en 
grande partie par des cotisations patronales, il n'en est pas de 
même ae la Sécurité Social pour artisans qui vivrait de leurs 
propres cotisations. Au fond, ils mettraient leur argent en 
commun pour le retirer ensuite, diminuer des frais 
d'administration qui, on le sait, sont très lourds dans ces organes 
parastataux. Donc, zéro comme avantages, zéro comme 
sécurité. En se sens, il vaut mieux que chaque travailleur libre 
mette de côté une petite provision d'argent pour les mauvais 
jours. Double avantage: il toucherait plus, il resterait libre de 
gerer se petit capital sans subir l'ingérence d'une 
administrations." (206)
While the association recognised that times had changed, and the individual 
old-age provisions had become inadequate, it decisively rejected a publicly 
organised system of solidarity:
203 Gérard RENAUT La Pension des Travailleurs Indépendants Brussels: Parti Liberal (Joumeé 
d'étude des Classes Moyennes), 1952, p.4.
204 Troclet submitted his proposal to the Senate on July 5, 1950 (see Léon-Eli TROCLET "La 
Pension des Travailleurs Indépendants" in Centre d'Etudes et de Documentation Sociales de la 
Province de Liège No.l, 1954, pp.3-26).
205 A general problem in countries with contributory social insurance pension schemes, is that for 
wage-earners half of the contribution burden is taken care of by their employers, while self- 
employed insured persons inevitably have to pay the whole contribution themselves.
206 "Faut-il étendre la Sécurité Sociale aux Classes Moyennes?" in La Voix des Classes Moyennes 



























































































Johan Jeroen De Deken 81
"L'époque a changé. Actuellement on ne table plus sur l'épargne 
personelle, on compte sur la solidarité humaine ... C'est une 
evolution logique parfaitement acceptable ...
Par contre, il n'est pas prouvé du tout que cette fraternité 
humaine dans le cas de la pension notament, doive se traduire 
par une ingérence étatique. Il semble, même au contraire, que 
l'état fausse cette fraternité. En effect, l'administration est un 
organe inhumain qui écrase plus qu'il ne soutient, et même en 
dehors des frais énormes qu'il coûte, on se demande comment il 
pourrait réprésenter l'acte d'entre aide des hommes envers l'un 
d'eux plus malheureux.” (207)
The association concluded that a pension scheme for self-employed was 
necessary, but that it should not be organised by a semi-governmental 
institution. In September 1948, the association launched a vicious campaign 
against Troclet's proposals (2os).
Other unsuccessful proposals followed Troclet's faltered attempts, 
most of them authored by various Christian Democrats, but none succeeding 
in mustering sufficient support to become a law. Organisations claiming to 
represent the self-employed either altogether rejected a compulsory social 
security pension, or launched inconsistent proposals. At the occasion of its 
1949 congress, the Fédérations des Classes Moyennes again forcefully rejected 
compulsory social insurance and called for measures to promote individual 
private old-age provisions. The State was to encourage private savings by 
facilitating the purchase of a family house, by allowing grating tax- 
exemptions for life insurance plans, and by granting subsidies to private 
pension plans (209).
Other organisations claiming to speak on behalf the self-employed, 
such as the Federatie der Groeperingen van Fiscaal Verweer and the Economisch 
Blok van België, called for the abolishing of the existing insurance-based social 
security pension and the establishing of a Scandinavian type of universal flat- 
rate people's pension (210). However, one can question the seriousness of
207 idem, p.3.
208 See for example the articles "De quoi se mêle Monsieur Troclet" in La Voix des Classes Moyennes 
Vol.5, No.30, September 1-7, 1948; "M. Troclet veut tuer la petite entreprise" in La Voix des 
Classes Moyennes Vol.6, No.17, April 27-May 4,1949.
209 See "Sécurité pour les vieux jours!" in La Voix des Classes Moyennes Vol.6, No.12, March 23-30, 
1949; and "Les Triomphales Journées de Liège" in La Voix des Classes Moyennes Vol.6, No.6, 
February 9-16, 1949; and the "Open Letter" in La Voix des Classes Moyennes Vol.7, No.24, June 
14-21,1949.
210 Since 1937, the Economisch Blok van België had been calling for a universal flat-rate people s 
pension (nationaal gelijkheidspensioen) which was to be supplemented by individual private 



























































































82 Social Policy in postwar Belgium
these proposals, as the same organisations called for an all-out abolishing of 
income tax. It is difficult to see how a State which would only obtain its 
income from indirect taxes, would be capable of taking the entire burden of a 
national pension scheme. The constant references to Denmark and Sweden 
are rather deceptive, considering that in those countries the State obtained, at 
the time, about one third to even half of its revenue through direct taxation 
(222).
4.2.2. Towards a Scheme Geared towards the Demands of the Self-Employed.
In May 1952, the Christian Democratic Minister of Labour and Social 
Welfare, Geeraard Van den Daele, submitted a new legislative proposal (212). 
This proposal can be considered to be the last attempt to establish a scheme 
for self-employed persons resembling the wage-earner schemes. The 
proposed scheme would grant benefits amounting to 60 per cent of declared 
remunerations (with a maximum ceiling of 60,000 francs per year which 
would mean a maximum benefit of 36,000 francs); it would be financed by a 
contribution of 6 per cent on declared remunerations (with a ceiling of 60,000 
francs per year which would mean a maximum contribution of 3,600 francs 
per year); it would be administered by a new national pension office for self- 
employed persons under the aegis of the Ministry of Labour and Social 
Welfare. Again this proposal was decisively rejected by those who claimed to 
represent the interests of the self-employed. Dupeyroux has commented on 
this series of unsuccessful attempts that
Veralgemeend Gelijkheidspensioen Brussels, 1954. See also a dozen of articles published in the bi­
weekly journal Het Sociaal Verweer during the period 1946-1956. See for example "Voor de 
Herziening van het Pensioenstelsel" in Het Sociaal Verweer Vol.l, No.4, 1949, p.l; "De Les van 
Denemarken" in Het Sociaal Verweer Vol.15, No.22, June 1, 1951, p.1-2, 7-8; Maatschappelijke 
Zekerheid voor alien! Op een basis van gelijkheid en rechtvaardigheid" in Het Sociaal Verweer 
Vol.ll, No.25, June 22, 1947, p.1-2; and "Voor het Veralgemeend Gelijkheidspensioen. Het 
Licht Komt uit het Noorden" in Het Sociaal Verweer Vol.14, No.16, April 30, 1950, p.1-7. Even 
though the group claimed to have the support of the Socialist Party and as much as 103 
members of Parliament, one can question to what extent they really called for a Scandinavian 
Social Democratic welfare state model, as other "model" schemes, referred to, included those 
existing in Canada and South Africa and the schemes in operation in the states of California 
and New York!
217 In addition, Scandinavian countries suffered less from systematic fiscal fraud from the part of 
the self-employed, than countries like Belgium, France and Italy. It is quite understandable 
that wage-earners were not so keen on establishing general-revenue financed schemes granting 
flat-rate benefits, as that would mean that they would basically finance the pensions for the 
self-employed. It is precisely because of such conflicts that the family allowance scheme for 
self-employed calculates benefits on the basis of cadastral income.
272 For a discussion see Marcel LALOIRE "La Pension des Travailleurs Indépendants" in La Revue 



























































































Johan Jeroen De Deken 83
"il semble que les perspectives d'extension se soient heurtées, 
comme en France, à une certaine défiance des groupes 
intéressés, qui n'étaient psychologiquement préparés ni à l'idée 
d'une assurance maladie obligatoire, ni à cele d'une assurance 
viellesse obligatoire." (213)
Around the time the proposal of Van den Daele was discussed, the Institute 
for Economic and Social Studies of the Middle Class (Economisch en Sociaal 
lnstituut voor de Middenstand), issued a report in which it elaborated its own 
blueprint for a pensions scheme (214). The scheme was not to resort under the 
Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare, but was to be parented by the ministry 
for the self-employed middle classes (Ministerie van de Middenstand). In terms 
of benefits and contributions, the proposal remained rather vague: the
scheme was to guarantee a "descent minimum" which in 1953 would be about
18,000 francs per year; and contributions had to be "affordable for all and not 
absorb all savings" (which according to actuarian calculations would require 
an annual contribution of 2,400 francs per year for those who would start to 
work at the age of 25). The method of financing should be based on the 
principle of individual capitalisation, and the funds should be administered 
by private institutions. In particular on this last issue, the report took a very 
firm stand, as the failure of the 1930's scheme was considered to be partly a 
consequence of the absence of institional pluralism (215). Finally, the State 
was to finance the valorization of benefits to compensate fo devaluations and 
inflation. Most of these recommendations would be retained in the law that 
would be adopted under the Socialist-Liberal third Van Acker Government.
In January 1954, the homogeneous Christian Democratic Government 
of Jeun van Houtte introduced a provisional scheme by amending the 1937 
pensions act (216). In 1956, a more definite scheme was introduced by the
213 Dupeyroux, 1966, p.93.
214 This institute had been established in 1946 and resorted under the High Council for the Middle 
Class (Hogg Road voor de Middenstand). This council represents only part of the heterogeneous 
group of self-employed. It represents primarily small shop-owners and craftsmen. It does not 
represent such groups as farmers, doctors or lawyers. For an extensive discussion of this 
report see Hoge Raad voor de Middenstand "Advies betreffende het Pensioen voor 
Zelfstandige Arbeiders” in Informatieblad van het Economisch en Sociaal lnstituut voor de 
Middenstand No.6, June 1953, pp.1-27.
275 See the arguments of baron Van Ackere, the chairman of the High Council for the Middle 
Class, in Van Ackere, 1957, pp.6-7.



























































































84 Social Policy in postwar Belgium
Socialist-Liberal coalition (217). The scheme had been designed by the Liberal 
Minister responsible for the self-employed middle class (Ministerie van de 
Middenstand), Oscar Bossaert, and had two components: the first component 
consisted of so-called "unconditional pensions" and granted benefits based on 
a pure system of individual capitalisation. In addition, there was the second 
component which granted means-tested flat-rate allowances from a new 
solidarity fund (21s). This solidarity fund was to be financed by an annual 
State subsidy of 750 million francs (during the first 20 years to be increased by 
25 million each year); by an annual contribution of 5 per cent to be paid by 
the self-employed, who were required to establish a pension account (219); 
and by an additional State subsidy to be paid from 1970 onwards to 
compensate for the burdens caused by the 1954 provisional scheme. The 
scheme would be administered by the General Savings and Annuity Fund 
(ASLK) and by private licensed occupational and inter-occupational funds for 
self-employed workers set up for the purpose of the scheme (220). The law
277 See act of 30 June 1956 (published as "Wet betreffende het ouderdomspensioen der 
Zelfstandigen" in Belgisch Staatsblad 4 July, 1936), see also the Royal Decrees of 20 January, 26 
September, 30 October and 29 November, 1956. For a general discussion see J. VAN GEEL De 
Nieuwe Pensioenwet voor Zelfstandigen Brussels: Arbeiderpers, 1956; and "Belgium. Compulsory 
Scheme for independent workers" in Bulletin of the International Social Security Association No.11, 
1956, pp.463-468.
278 in 1963, these flat-rate means-tested allowances were set at 24,000 francs for married couples, 
and 16,000 francs for singles.
279 The contribution formula were rather complicated The scheme had various ceilings and 
distinguished persons whose self-employment was their main occupation, those for whom it 
was only a secondary occupation, lawyers, self employed who had a life-insurance contract 
and those who already had reached the retirement age (65 for men and 60 for women): For 
each of these groups the method of calculating the contribution differed according to the 
taxable income. For the first group of those who worked in self-employment as their main 
occupation the contributions were calculated as follows:
* taxable income between 0 and 30,000 francs per year
flat-rate contribution of 1,500 francs of which 
1/3  to the solidarity fund (men)
1 /2  to the solidarity fund (women)
* taxable income between 30,000 and 120,000 francs per year
contribution of 5 per cent of which
1 /3  to the solidarity fund (men)
1 /2  to the solidarity fund (women)
* on the part of taxable income between 120,000 and 270,000 francs per year
contribution of 1 per cent entirely for the solidarity fund 
These contributions were linked to the index of consumer prices. For a more detailed 
description and the formula for the other groups see J.MUTTON & J.KERKHOFS "Het 



























































































Johan Jeroen De Deken 85
applied to farmers, craftsmen, traders, shop-owners, revisers, administrators, 
doctors, pharmacists etc.
The scheme can hardly be called the institutional expression of a 
system of social solidarity. Rather, in seeking to establish a strict relation 
between personnel effort and benefits, it is more a form of compulsory saving
(221).
4.3. The Christian Democratic Counter-Offensive, the Policies of the 
"Labourist" Government of the Early 1960's, and the Establishing of a 
Unified Scheme for Salaried Employees.
The 1958 elections again brought a homogeneous Christian Democratic 
Government to power (222). The minority Government implemented a few 
minor changes in social legislation (such as a raising of pension benefits), but 
was soon replaced by a coalition between the Christian Democrats and the 
Liberals (223). In this coalition, the Christian Democrat Léon Servais became 
the new Minister of Social Welfare (224). Servais reversed some of the
measures of his Socialist predecessor. He thus re-introduced individual 
capitalisation in the scheme for salaried employees. The unrest around the
220 For example, on 6 July 1056, the employers association VEV established its own pension fund 
(see "De Nieuwe Wet op het Ouderdomspensoen der zelfstandigen). De pensioenkas voor 
Zelfstandigen van het V.E.V." in VEV-Berichten Vol.31, No.15, 1956, pp.1663-1671. By 1966, 
there were 16 such inter-occupational pension funds for self-employed persons. These funds 
were subject to control by the Ministerie van Middenstand.
221 J. ROMANS "Vergelijkende Studie van de Pensioenregelingen" in CEPESS-Documenten Vol.5, 
N o.6,1966, pp.122-140.
222 The voters apparently had sanctioned the educational policies of the Socialist-Liberal coalition, 
but the election results were such that neither the outgoing coalition, nor the Christian 
Democratic opposition held a majority: the Christian Democratic Party obtained 104 seats in 
the 212 seats Parliament, whereas the ousted coalition obtained 106 seats (84 for the Social 
Democrats and 21 for the Liberals) (the other three seats were controlled by the Communists, 2, 
and by the Flemish Nationalists (1). The Christian Democrats nevertheless did have an 
absolute majority in the Senate, and formed a minority Government which in the Chamber of 
deputies succeeded to obtain the support of two Liberals and of the Flemish Nationalist 
deputy.
223 This occurred after an "Education Pact" was concluded between the three main parties, 
Christian Democrats, Socialists and Liberals, settling the long-lasting conflict on the public 
financing of private Catholic schools.
224 Servais was a leader of the Christian labour movement. He had been the author of the 
legislative proposal to reform the pensions scheme for salaried employees, the proposal which 



























































































86 Social Policy in postwar Belgium
rentrenchment policies of the so-called Eenheidswet can be considered to be 
the culmination of the postwar dispute on social and economic issues. The 
unrest though also was a turning point announcing a pacification of the 
ideological conflict on social security. From the middle of the 1960's onwards, 
it became increasingly difficult to identify a close link between the policy 
decisions taken regarding the statutory pension scheme and political actors 
responsible for them. It would be a coalition of Christian Democrats and 
Liberals that would implemented a major step towards unifying the main 
pension schemes for wage-earners. And in contrast to what happened during 
the 1950's, successive Governments of different ideological colours would no 
longer try to reverse each other reforms. At least with respect to statutory 
social security, the postwar controversies seemed to have been pacified.
4.3.1. The Re-introduction of Individual Capitalisation.
The new centre-right coalition reversed some of the pensions reforms 
of the 1950's. In 1960, the Government passed a law whereby the system of 
individual capitalisation was again introduced in the pension scheme for 
salaried employees (22s). Of the pension contribution of 10.25 per cent, 3 per 
cent was again individually capitalised, whereas the remaining 7.25 per cent 
was used for the purpose of collective capitalisation (226). The new system 
amalgamated the various components of the pension into one single benefit. 
In order to incorporate the individual capitalised annuities, the law 
introduced the principle of so-called subrogation (subrogatie) which implied 
that the subsidiary insurers did not pay the annuity to the insured directly, 
but to the NKBP which incorporated them into the single pension benefit.
The new law also stipulated that under certain conditions, retiring 
salaried employees could withdraw an important part of their pension at once
225 Act of 22 February, 1960. See also "Beknopt Verslag over de Verichtingen van de Individuele 
Kapitalisatie inzake Pensioenverzekering der Werknemers" in Belgisch Tijdschrift voor de Sociale 
Zekerheid Vol.10, No.9, 1964, pp. 1325-1337. Under the 1960 act, the old-age pensions were 
financed via a system of individual capitalisation, whereas survivor pensions and the 
supplement voor widows (aanpassingsvergoeding) were financed by a system of collective 
capitalisation.
226 Of this 7.25 per cent, 6 per cent was contributed by the employer and 1.25 per cent by the 
employees. The 10.25 per cent contribution was calculated on a monthly remuneration of 
maximum 8,400 francs (as of April 1, 1960; this amount was regularly increased, for example 
as of 1 July 1966 it was already set at 9,850 francs). For more details see Nationale Kas voor 



























































































]ohan Jeroen De Deken 87
as a pension capital; and it lifted some of the restrictions Troclet had imposed 
upon the 15 private subsidiary insurers (227).
4.3.2. The General Strike of 1960-61 and the Policies of the "Labourist" Government.
In November 1960, the conservative Government announced the so- 
called Eenheidswet, a law which was to finance a programme of economic 
expansion by a policy of welfare state retrenchment (22»). The proposed law 
was strongly criticised by the Socialists and prompted the most important 
postwar protest movement paralysing for four weeks the mining and steel 
industry in Wallonia, and crippling the harbour of Antwerp during 20 days 
(229). Despite the massive strikes, Parliament approved the Eenheidswet on 
January 21, 1963, but the strike aggravated internal divisions within the 
Government. The labour wing of the Christian Democrats, which had played 
a pivotal role in breaking the strikes, demanded a revision of some of the 
social welfare retrenchment measures. Behind the scenes, contacts were 
forged to establish a "labourist" coalition. When in the March 1961 elections, 
the "striking" parties were not sanctioned as expected, but even made some 
moderate gains, the Christian Democratic-Liberal coalition was replaced by a 
centre left Government of Christian Democrats and Socialists.
227 P. HORION "Het Particulier Beheer van de Sociale Zekerheid" in Belgisch Tijdschrift voor Sociale 
Zekerheid Vol.10, No.3, 1968, pp.397-414.
228 On November 4, the Government approved a legislative proposal "for economic expansion, 
social progress and financial recovery" which announced a programme for economic 
expansion which had to be financed by a large-scale retrenchment programme of 
10,000,000,000 francs of spending cuts (primarily in civil servants pensions, education, defense 
and social welfare), and of 6,000,000,000 francs of new taxes (of which 85 per cent would be 
indirect and thus regressive). The proposal contained seven chapters. Each of these chapters 
separately was unacceptable for one of the coalition partners, but by combining them into a 
single act, Prime Minister Gaston Eyskens hoped to neutralise the resistance (in particular, 
opposition from the part of the Christian labour movement). For a discussion see Brepoels, 
1988, pp.168-174; Mampuys, 1991, pp.240-242; and Luykx, 1973, pp.467-469.
229 The strike movement started in the administration of Socialist controlled municipalities and 
rapidly spread into the private sector in the Southern Walloon provinces. The fact that this 
movement did not succeed in penetrating the private sector of the Northern Flemish provinces 
to the same extent was related to the hegemony, in that part of the country, of the Christian 
trade unions, whose national leadership refused to support a "political" strike (even if some 
radical local sections of the Christian trade union federation often ended up supporting the 
strike). In Wallonia, the strike movement was accompanied by riots and acts of sabotage 
prompted a severe authority crisis. The Government mobilised 15,000 soldiers to guard 
bridges, important intersections, and railway- and power stations. The riot-police was used to 
dismantle strike picket-lines, about 2000 workers were arrested, of which about half were 
condemned to at least one month imprisonment, whereas a "civilian" who fired a fatal shot at a 




























































































88 Social Policy in postwar Belgium
Table 4.3. A Comparison of the 1958 and the 1961 Parliamentary 
Elections (and Number of Seats in the Chamber of Representatives):
1958 1961
Christian Democrats 46.49% (104) 41.45% (96)






Communists 1.89% (2) 3.08% (5)
Volksunie (230) 2.20% (1) 3.46% (5)
Others 0.70% (0) 2.92% (2)
In this centre-left cabinet, the Walloon Social Democrat, Edmond Leburton, 
became the new Minister of Social Welfare. This Government tried to 
implement a progressive fiscal and social policy.
It was primarily in the area of sickness insurance and educational 
policies that important reforms were accomplished, but on 3 April 1962, a law 
amending the pension scheme was adopted by Parliament too. The act had 
been prepared by Walloon Social Democrat Leburton. It did not contain 
fundamental changes, but accelerated the consolidation of the principle 
equivalence in benefits: it speeded up the granting of increased benefits, so 
that the high replacement ratios (60 per cent for singles and 75 per cent for 
married men) would become a reality earlier than originally planned by the 
previous Government (231). In addition, the law introduced a guaranteed 
minimum old-age benefit for pensioners who had retired before 1962.
During the late forties, when Leburton was director (kabinetschef) of the 
Minister of Labour and Social Welfare Troclet, Leburton had been very critical 
of the complexity and fragmentised nature of the Belgian social security 
system (232). He took up the threat of this criticism and started to prepare a 
new proposal to integrate and simplify the architecture of the pensions
230 The successor of the Flemish Nationalist Party, which over time evolved from a right-wing 
nationalist party into a centrist party advocating a federal state structure for Belgium with 
strict application of uni-lingualism in Flanders. Even though the party had primarily a 
Catholic middle class support, it increasingly called for left of the centre political, social and 
economic reforms, and as such became a functional equivalent to the Left Liberal parties that 
developed in several European countries during the 1%0's.
231 In other words, the so-called transition period was shortened. See Marcel DEMETS "L’Apport 
Sociale de la Nouvelle Loi de Pensions" in Socialisme Vol.9, N o.52,1962, pp.431-438.



























































































Johan Jeroen De Deken 89
system. This work resulted in the legislative proposal presented in 1966 by 
the Social Democrats. The plan proposed to amalgamate the various schemes 
for wage-earners and the scheme for civil servants, but failed to muster 
sufficient support in Parliament (233). It would only be under Leburton's 
Christian Democratic successor that a final integration of the different 
pensions schemes for wage-earners would finally come about, while the civil 
service and the self-employed would keep their own separate schemes.
Even after more than two decades of intensive reform, the Belgian old- 
age pension system had remained overly complex and far too fragmented. 
True, an overall majority of the population had some form of coverage, but 
the terms under which this occurred remained very diverse. Basically there 
were six main schemes, with each its own organisational logic: manual
workers, salaried employees, miners, seamen, lawyers, self-employed, and 
finally, civil servants all had their own schemes (234).
The following table attempts to summarize the main characteristic of 
the five most important schemes (23s).
233 See Michel HUENS "La réforme des régimes de pension" in Les Dossiers de l'Action Sociale 
Catholique Vol.45, No.l, 1968, pp.40-56 (p.42).
234 The preceding paragraphs focussed on the changes in the two main schemes for wage-earners 
and the scheme for self-employed persons. During the postwar yaers, the scheme for civil 
servants also saw some minor changes, such as the introduction, in 1951, of the valorization 
and of the so-called perekwatie, which established a link between pension benefits and wage 
increases for civil servants, while also guaranteeing the same benefit for retired servants with a 
similar employment career (see Act of 14 July, 1951 "Wet houdende de perekwatie van de rust- 
en overlevingspensioenen" in Belgisch Staatsblad 29 July 1951). Other changes included the 
regulations governing cumulation of a pension benefit with gainful activities (Act of 20 March 
1958 "Wet betreffende de cumulatie van de pensioenen en wedden, en de regeling inzake 
rustpensioen voor verschillende ambten" in Belgisch Staatsblad 29 March 1958); the extension of 
the scheme towards employees of accredited semi-govemmental organisations (Act of 28 April 
1958 "Wet tot vaststelling van een zeker verband tussen de onderscheiden pensioenregelingen 
van de openbare sector" in Belgisch Staatsblad 7 May 1958); the integration of the various public 
sector schemes, i.e. the schemes for civil servants employed in the administration of the State, 
and those employed in the provincial administrations, municipal administrations, the postal 
service, the National Railways Corporation NMBS, and other semi-Govememental institutions 
(Act of 14 April, 1965), the centralisation of the administration of the scheme in the pensions 
department of the Ministry of Finance (see Vinciane MOLITOR Étude Comparative des 
Régimes de Pension Applicables aux Fonctionnaires en Belgique, en France et au Luxembourg 
Brussels: Ministère des Finances, École Nationale de Fiscalité et des Finances, 1992, p.9).
235 Not included in this table are the numerically small scheme for seamen, and the "seventh" 
scheme of voluntary insurance. Even though numerically quite important, this seventh scheme 
has been left out of the discussion as it hardly involved a solidaristic element (except for State 
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men: 55-60 65 65 65 65
women: (236) 60 60 60 65
contributions
max wage: none none 118,200 insured pays no contrib.
employers: 6.25% 7.00% 6.00% 1,500 fr./year for old-
insured: 4.25% 5.50% 4.25% + 1-5% (237) age
state subsid: 6.0% of wages 3,282,000,000 47,000,000 1,000,000,000 not appi.
main principle
of financing: re-apportion. re-apportion. indiv.cap. indiv.cap.(238).gener. rev.
main benefit
formula (239): (240) 1/40-1/45 per 1/40-1/45 per 1/40-1/45 per 1/30-1/60
year of empi. year of empi. year of empi. last wage
administration: Nationaal Rijkskas voor NKBP, ASLK ASLK and 16 Ministry of
Pensioen- Rust en and 16 recogn.inter-occup. Finance
fonds voor Overlevings- subsidiary pension-





capitalisation: 6,000 mill. 10,000 mill. 40,000 mill. not avail. not appi.
re-apportion: - 200 mill. 1,407,mill. 19,550 mill. not avail. not appi.
number of acti-
ve accounts: 433,133 2,902,934 1,227,309 684,153
236 Women were not allowed to work in the mines. The retirement age of 55 applied to those 
miners who worked underground, those who worked above ground could retire at 60.
237 1,500 francs per year for income below 30,000 per year, 5 per cent for part of income between 
30,000 and 120,000 and 1 per cent on part of income between 120,000 and 270,000 francs per 
year.
238 The Solidarity Fund is financed by re-apportioning and by loans from the individually 
capitalised funds.
239 The lower fractions apply for women, whereas the higher fractions for men — except in the 
scheme for salaried employees where the lower fractions apply to certain ranks and for 
pensioners (those who performed a functions requiring university-level education; for a 
discussion see section 1.1.4 of this paper).
240 Depended upon the contributions individually capitalised which were supplemented by a state 
subsidy which was as much as three times as high when the miner had worked underground 
for more than 30 years. In addition miners received free deliveries of coal.



























































































Johan Jerœn De Deken 91
4.3.3. The Unification of the Schemes for Wage-Earners.
The "Labourist" coalition performed poorly in the 1965 elections, to the 
benefit of the Conservative Liberals and the Volksunie who both more than 
doubled their number of seats in Parliament (242). After a short and reluctant 
continuation of the coalition between Christian Democrats and the Social 
Democrats, the former traded their Socialist partner for the Liberals (243). A 
Christian Democrat, Placide de Paepe, became the new Minister of Social 
Welfare. This representative of the Christian labour movement maintained a 
relative progressive social policy, as the Government needed the support of 
the vigilant Christian trade unions (244). It is under de Paepe's rule that the 
pension system for wage-earners would at last be harmonized and that the 
"provisional" arrangements of the Social Pact would find a more definitive 
solution.
In February 1967, Parliament approved a law granting special powers 
to the Government to implement its policy of economic recovery (245). On the 
basis of this law, the Government could implement a number of reforms 
without needing a Parliamentary majority for each measure separately. It is 
only by means of these special executive powers that de Paepe succeeded to 
implement his pension reform (246). The Minister declared that his main goal
242 In addition, a Walloon nationalist party, Front Walloon, and a party whose main programme 
consisted of preserving the privileges of the french-speaking population in and around the 
capital city of Brussels (the so-called Front des Francophones), entered into Parliament. The 
Social Democrats saw their share of the vote drop from 84 to 64 seats. They experienced 
particularly severe losses in Brussels, where the party had seen its share of the votes drop from 
42.0 per cent to 25.7 per cent, within a time-span of only 10 years.
243 This interim Government, with the Socialist Hervé Brouhon (a former teacher, and journalist at 
the Socialist Daily Le Peuple) nevertheless legislated an important amendment of the pension 
scheme for wage-earners. The Act of 13 June 1966, introduced the principle of the "presumed 
employment" which meant that in the calculation of benefits for a pensioner who had always 
worked between January 1, 1946 and the day he reached the age of 65, the State presumed 
without any proof that he had been employed prior to the year 1946. Thus in calculating the 
benefit, the administration would add the number of years necessary to arrive at a full career. 
During these "presumed" years, the pensioner was assumed to have earned 76,000 francs per 
year.
244 See Luykx, 1973, pp.506-509.
245 "Wet van 21 Februari 1967 tot toekenning van bepaalde machten aan de koning ten einde de 
economische wederopleving, de bespoediging van de régionale reconversie, en de stabilisatie 
van het begrotingsevenwicht te verzekeren".
246 For a discussion of the main traits of the reform see Ministerie van Sociale Voorzorg Het 
Pensioenstatuut voor Werknemers. Solidariteits en Eenheidsstelsel voor Arbeiders, Bedienden, 



























































































92 Social Policy in postwar Belgium
was to assure "the optimal use of all available resources" in order to guarantee 
a "balanced development of the pension sector" (247). In a note to the neo- 
corporatist consultation institution, the Nationale Arbeidsraad, de Paepe 
explained more in detail the motives behind the reform he proposed.
The fragmentised nature of the pensions system had undermined the 
financial viability of some of the schemes. As the following table illustrates, it 
was in particular the miners' scheme which was on he verge of going 
bankrupt, but reserves for the manual workers' scheme were also too limited 
to guarantee a sound financial basis in the future.
Table 4.5. The Financial Situation of the Four Pension Schemes 
for Wage-Earners (in 1967 in million francs):
revenues expenses reserves
contribut. subsidies capitalis. repartit.
Seamen 93 22.5 78 + /- 550 114
Miners 4,301 3,282 4,424 + /- 6,000 -200
Workers 21,230 2,525 20,979 + /-10,000 1,407
Sal. Empi. 7,365 47 6,115 + /- 40,000 19,550
The Minister convincingly argued that the better financial basis of the scheme 
for salaried employees had less to do with the fact that before 1944 they had 
paid much higher contributions, than with the long-term shifts in the 
structure of employment. Indeed during the postwar years the number of 
salaried employees had grown much faster than the number of manual 
workers, whereas the miners actually had seen a sharp drop in their numbers. 
These employment trends were reflected in the evolution of the number of 
contributions to the three schemes, and in the ratios between contributors and 
beneficiaries.
247 Placide DE PAEPE "Verslag aan de Koning" enclosed in the Royal Decree of 24 October 1967 
Komnklljk Besluit Nr.50 betreffende het rust- en overlevingspensioen voor werknemers" in 



























































































)ohan Jeroen De Deken 93
Table 4.6. The Evolution of the Number of Contributions and the 
Ratio between Contributors and Beneficiaries in the Three Main 
Schemes for Wage-Earners (1957-1967).
Miners Manual Salaried
Workers Employees
evolution of the number
of contributions during 
the period 1957-1966
- 44.2% + 9.4% + 46.4%
ratio between contributors 
and beneficiaries in 1965 132.6% 33.7% 20.9%
The salaried employees interpreted the planned merger of the pensions 
schemes as a confiscation of the important collectively capitalised assessment 
funds. After the Minister had announced his plans, the Walloon section of the 
Christian federation of salaried employees (Centrale Nationale des Employés or 
CNE) (24«) promptly issued the following statement:
«On mobilise tous les employés contre les projets 
gouvernementaux impliquant la collectivisation des reserves 
autres que celles qui concernent la capitalisation individuelle, ce 
qui aurait pour conséquence de compromettre définitivement 
une amélioration des pensions d'employés proportioned à 
l'effort de prévoyance qu'ils ont consenti depuis plus de trente 
ans, tous en n'apportant aucune solution réelle aux problèmes 
des autres régimes de pension»." (249)
Its Socialist counterpart, Syndicat des Employés, Techniciens et Cadres (or 
SETCA) also strongly reacted against the Government's plans. The Socialists 
claimed that the only goal of the Government was to reduce the state 
subsidies to the pensions system, in order to unburden the state budget:
"En réalité, ce problème fondamental de l'harmonisation des 
systèmes de pension et même de tout le système de sécurité 
sociale est vu comme une simple opération gouvernemental 
d'equilibre du budget."(250)
248 The CNE was the Walloon equivalent of the Landelijke Bediendencentrale or LBC in Flanders.
249 Quoted by Huens, 1968, p.43.



























































































94 Social Policy in postwar Belgium
In general the salaried employees rejected the envisioned increases in 
contribution rates for their scheme without it being accompanied by 
corresponding increases in benefits. On September 1, both Walloon 
federations threatened to launch a strike; and on September 12 and October 
10, they organised walk-outs in Brussels and in Wallonia (251).
The Flemish LBC was more moderate in its criticism and still hoped to 
amend the plan of de Paepe. In the end though, the union only succeeded in 
obtaining a few minor amendments to the original proposal. The main 
problem precluding a common strategy, was that the LBC refused to engage 
in a collective action with the Socialist unions as long as the latter did not 
abandon the legislative proposal of the Socialist representative Raoul Higuet, 
who also called for the introduction of a unitary pension scheme, the 
confiscation of reserve funds and important increases of contribution rates.
The fact that in the end only few amendments were made is partly 
related to the procedures used by the Government, in particular its resorting 
to special executive powers to pass the law. This had made it possible to by­
pass the normal Parliamentary procedures, and had closed the avenue for the 
salaried employees to obtain amendments through their Parliamentary 
representatives. The failure to amend is probably also a consequence of the 
fact that the Christian Employers' Association had made a remarkable turn 
towards advocating the sort of solidaristic social policies which the new law 
exemplified. In an article published in its members' magazine, the Christian 
employers association assiduously defended the de Paepe proposal. The 
association seemed to have entirely abandoned its long-standing commitment 
to corporatist design of a compartmentalized social security system
"One can question the compartimentalisation of solidarity, i.e. 
the maintaining of separate schemes for manual workers, 
salaried employees, miners, seamen and self-employed workers.
One can as well limit the solidarity to persons with black hair 
among one another, persons with red hair etc. The reform 
proposed by Minister de Paepe is an important step in breaking 
this new sort of group-egoism." (252)
While approving the fact that the proposal left untouched the individually 
capitalised funds, the Christian Employers also decisively rejected the claims 
the salaried employees made upon the collectively capitalised assessment
251 See "Le Syndicat des Employés remet un préavis de grève générale" in Le Peuple 24 August 
1967, p.l; and Huens, 1968, p.47.




























































































Johan Jeroen De Deken 95
funds. The employers argued that the fact that these reserves were 
comparatively much larger for salaried employees than for manual workers, 
was solely due to the changes in employment structure. In fact, up to 1967 
salaried employees had paid relatively smaller contributions to re­
apportioning funds (since the 1960 reform 7.24 per cent, compared to 12 per 
cent for manual workers). Moreover the employers argued that
"... salaried employees have no property right, individual nor 
collective, to these re-apportioning reserves." (253)
Finally, the employers also defended the gradual increase of contribution 
rates for salaried employees, and even argued that the projected increases 
probably would not be high enough to allow in the long-term the maintaining 
of a replacement ratio of 75 per cent.
The other main employers association, the Verbond der Belgische 
Nijverheid (VBN), criticised both the Government and the SETCA-CNE strike. 
According to the VBN, the issue was to be decided by Parliament and not 
solely by a Government endowed with special executive powers. In this 
res_pect this employers' association took a position close to the LBC (254). 
Within the National Labour Council (Nationale Arbeidsraad), the employers 
also strongly opposed the projected increases in contribution rates. However, 
on October 24th, the Decree was issued with only minor amendments to the 
original proposal (25s).
The new amalgamated scheme completely abandoned individual 
capitalisation (256). This measure was justified by referring back to arguments 
made in Walter Leën's report for the 1951 Royal Commission:
"... re-apportioning better corresponds to the true nature of 
«social» insurance than capitalisation; the latter belongs to the 
techniques of private insurance and better fits an individualistic 
view upon society. Social insurance on the other hand is based 
on the sharing of misfortunes. The hardships of old-age have to
253 Lavens, 1967, p.451.
254 See the articles of the secretary general of the LBC, K. VAN ROMPAEY "Handen af van 
bediendengelden" in Gazet van Anhverpen of 14 February 1967, p.2; and "Regeringsappetijt voor 
de bediendengelden. LBC niet akkoord met minister de Paepe" in Gazet van Anhverpen of 20 
February 1967, p.2. Just like the employers, Van Rompaey called for a decision to be taken via 
a normal Parliamentary procedure.
255 Royal Decree No.50 of 24 October 1967 in Belgisch Staatsblad 27 October, 1967 (reprinted in 
English in ILO Legislative Series 1967 Bel.4, Gemeva: International Labour Office, 1967).
256 Even if the legislator did not annul the acquired privileges under the existing systems of 



























































































96 Social Policy in postwar Belgium
be shared by the younger generations just as the hardships of 
those who are weak and are likely to become sick have to be 
partitioned with those who are strong and healthy, or like 
misfortunes of those who face a higher risk for accidents are 
shared by those who only face little risk; and just as family 
allowances are also financed by singles, and families with no or 
only few children." (257)
The 1967 order announced a covergence of contribution rates for manual 
workers and salaried employees. This convergence was to assure a long-term 
financial balance, and implied a gradual increase of the contributions to be 
paid by salaried employees from 10.25 per cent to 12.50 per cent. The increase 
would be implemented as follows:
1968: no increase 
1969: no increase
1970: increase of 0.50% (0.25% for the insured, 0.25% for the employer) 
1971: increase of 0.50% (0.25% for the insured, 0.25% for the employer) 
1972: increase of 0.50% (0.25% for the insured, 0.25% for the employer) 
1973: increase of 0.50% (0.25% for the insured, 0.25% for the employer) 
1974: increase of 0.25% (entirely for the insured) (25s)
In addition, the law foresaw the possibility to introduce a maximum wage in 
the calculation of benefits for workers, similar to the one which already 
applied to salaried employees and seamen (259). The State pledged to 
subsidise the scheme with 6,000 million per year, and this subsidy would be
257 Ministerie van Sociale Voorzorg, 1967, p.18. However, under the new arrangements, the 
existing individually capitalised funds would not be confiscated and the insured maintained 
their rights to the annuities on those funds. The profits on the investments of the funds for 
salaried employees would nevertheless be used to finance the re-apportioning for all the four 
categories of wage-earners incorporated in to the new unitary scheme, whereas before they 
were only used to finance the re-apportioning fund for salaried employees. The fact that the 
salaried employees maintained these annuity claims meant that they would get on average 
some 15,000 francs in addition to the pension "unitary" pension benefit, whereas manual 
workers with a full career on average only would received about 1,000 francs as annuity to 
supplement their regular pension benefit.
258 Later on these rate-increases would be revised. On 1 July 1970, the new rates were set at 14 per 
cent: 8 per cent to be paid by the employer and 6 per cent to be paid by the insured (see De 
Bedrijzngheid van het ACV 1970-1972 XXV Congress 23-25 November, Brussels: ACV, 1972, 
p.273; see also J. ROMANS "Het Pensioenstelsel voor werknemers" in CEPESS-Documenten 
Vol.12, No.4, 1973, pp.7-40 (p.35). The contributions paid by the miners, which before the 
amalgamation amounted only 10.5 per cent, were also gradually raised. This increase was 
planned to take place between 1968 and 1972.
259 The latter would be increased to 13,200 francs per month from 1968 onwards, and to 15,000 



























































































Johan Jeroen De Deken 97
increased annually by 4 per cent in addition to adjustments to fluctuations in 
the retail price index (260).
The law also increased the flat-rate presumed remuneration that was 
counted in the benefit formula for the period prior to 1955. For manual 
workers this substitute wage was set at 77,333 francs per year, and for salaried 
employees at 100,000 francs. This meant that even in the new general scheme, 
there still were substantially different benefit levels for the various categories 








couples above ground: 58,000
singles underground: 54,900




The amalgamated scheme was to be administered by a new public institution, 
the National Office for Wage-Earners Pensions (Rijksdienst voor 
Werknemerspensioenen or RWP). The new institution took over the rights and 
obligations of the National Office for Workers Pensions (RAP), the National 
Pension Fund for Salaried Employees (NKBP), the National Pension Fund for 
Miners (NPM), and the Assistance and Welfare Fund for Seamen Sailing 
under the Belgian Flag (Hulp en Voorzorgskas voor Zeevarenden onder Belgische 
Vlag). The new institution was governed by a board composed on the basis of 
equal representation: 12 members represented the employers associations
and 12 members represented the trade unions.
The 1967 reform in a way concluded the construction of the pension 
pillar of the postwar Belgian welfare state. During the remainder of the 
period under study, the scheme no longer underwent radical changes. 
During the 1970's and 1980’s a number of measures were implemented to 
harmonize the various regulations of individual capitalisation and to facilitate
260 See chapter VIII of the 1967 Act. See also "Belgium: Amalgamation of Four Employees Pension 



























































































98 Social Policy in postwar Belgium
the mobility between the scheme for wage-earners and that of civil servants; 
and during the 1980's a number of measures were adopted to bring these two 
schemes closer to one another (263).
4.3.4. The Establishing of a Guaranteed Minimum Income for the Elderly.
In the 1968 elections, the governing parties performed poorly, though 
not to the benefit of the leftists opposition parties. Instead it were the new 
regionalist parties seeing their share of the vote doubling to more than 15 per 
cent.
Table 4.7. A Comparison of the 1965 and the 1968 Parliamentary 
Elections (and Number of Seats in the Chamber of Representatives):
1965 1968
Christian Democrats (262) 34.48% (77) 31.73% (69)
Socialists 28.28% (64) 27.99% (59)
Liberals 21.68% (48) 20.87% (47)
Communists 4.56% (6) 3.30% (5)
Volksunie 6.69% (12) 9.79% (20)
FDF & RW (263) 2.24% (5) 5.90% (12)
It took some 79 days after the March 31 elections before a new coalition
between the Christian Democrats and the Socialists was formed. In the
formation of this Government, a new procedure was introduced, whereby the 
forging of the Government was preceded by a detailed coalition agreement 
(;regeerakkoord). This new procedure drastically reduced the importance of the 
government policy statement (regeringsverklaring), which came to be limited to
261 For example, in 1983 the contribution paid by civil servants was raised to 7.5 per cent, and. even 
though formally this contribution was solely used for the financing of the survivors pension 
scheme, it had become as high as the contributions paid by employees for the statutory social 
security pension scheme for wage-earners.
262 In the 1968 elections, the Christian Democrats participated in the elections with three lists: the 
CVP in Flanders, the PSC in Wallonia and a cartel list under the leadership of former Prime 
Minister Paul Vanden Boeynants in Brussels.
263 The Front des Francophones (FDF) was a party defending the interests of the french-speaking 
population in Brussels, and advocating discriminatory policies against the Dutch-speaking 
minority in the capital. The Rassemblement Walloon was a Walloon Party seeking the 
establishing of a federal state and was in a way the Walloon functional equivalent of the 



























































































Johan Jeroen De Deken 99
"a sort of comment on the coalition agreement" (2m) This evolution continued 
the degradation of the powers of Parliament to the benefit of various pressure 
groups, in particular the political parties and the so-called social partners. 
The new Government was primarily active in implementing the first steps of 
reforming the unitary Belgian state into a country more based on federal 
principles (265). But the Government's policy statement also stressed the 
necessity to allow the least privileged to take part in social progress (266). The 
statement announced the introduction of a guaranteed minimum for all 
citizens (267).
For this purpose, the Minister of Social Welfare, Placide de Paepe, 
submitted in 1968 a legislative proposal (26s) that would become the act 
establishing a guaranteed minimum for the elderly (269). The new benefit was 
to replace the supplements the State granted under anterior legislation to the 
so-called voluntary insured (vrijwillig verzekerden) (270). The arrangements
264 Theo LUYKX and Marc PLATEL Polüicke Geschiedenis van Belgié van 1944 tot 1985 Antwerpen: 
Kluwer, 1985, p.565.
265 See in particular the 1970 reform of the constitution and the establishing of the regional 
economic councils.
266 L. VICTOR "Het Gewaarborgd Inkomen voor Bejaarden" in CEPESS Documenten Vol.12, No.3, 
1973, pp.91-98.
267 Already in 1965, the short-lived Christian Democratic-Socialist coalition Government under the 
leadership of Pierre Harmel (with the Socialist Hervé Brouhon as Minister of Social Welfare) 
had started to work on the introduction of this type of benefit (see Veldkamp, 1978, p.259).
268 "Wetsontwerp tot Instelling van een gewaarborgd inkomen voor bejaarden" in Parlementaire 
Documenten Kamer van Volksvertegenivoordigers Vol.134, 1968, No.l.
269 Act of 1 April 1969 "Wet tot instelling van een gewaarborgd inkomen voor bejaarden" in 
Belgisch Staatsblad 29 April 1969. Further secured by the Act of 7 August 1974 guaranteeing a 
general existential minimum ("Wet tot instelling van het recht op een bestaansminmum" in 
Belgisch Staatsblad 18 September 1974). Elegibility to either of those two benefits remained 
nevertheless subject to a means-test. Both "rights" contained a clause whereby the first degree 
relatives (spouse, parents, children) were obliged to support the claiments before they could 
invoke the "right" to the existential minimum. Moreover, the law also stipulated that abled 
claiments had to be employed.
270 See in particular the Act 12 February 1963. For a discussion of this law see J. VERDEYEN "Het 
Pensioenstelsel der Vrijwillig Verzekeren" in CEPESS-Documenten Vol.5, No.6, 1966, pp.106- 
121. The 1963 scheme was entirely based on individual capitalisation, but also foresaw a 
transition period in which the State was to grant supplements to those who were too old to 
build up a sufficiently high annuity. This supplement was reduced according to year of birth 




























































































100 Social Policy in postwar Belgium
under this legislation had turned out to be inadequate (27 i). Under the new 
law, the means-test was made stricter, but at the same time benefits were to be 
increased.
The new benefits were granted after claimants had reached the age of 
60 (women) or 65 (men). Claimants had to be Belgian citizens, or possessing 
the nationality of one of the countries with which Belgium had concluded an 
agreement of reciprocity, or they had to be political refugees. Other persons 
were only eligible if they could prove to have been a resident for at least five 
years preceding the date of their claim. Benefits were only granted to 
claimants who actually resided in Belgium. The guaranteed minimum 
amounted to 30,000 francs per year for married men, and 20,000 francs for 
other persons. Claimants were subject to a means-test: the actual benefit 
equalled the amount of the guaranteed minimum reduced by income 
exceeding the following thresholds: 11,979 francs for "head of families" and 
7,986 for others (272).
Even though the new regulations were quite innovative in introducing 
the legal right to an existential minimum, in fact the new benefits continued to 
have more affinities with social assistance then with social security. The new 
scheme remained residual, but in contrast to social assistance and charity, the 
granting of the benefit was no longer conditional upon an evaluation of social 
welfare commission, but a personal right of the claimant (273). Even if the 
scheme thus was no longer administered by the social welfare commissions 
(the heirs of the poor relief institutions of the 19th century), but by the 
institutions administering the statutory pension scheme, in practice things did 
not change that much. The following table demonstrates how the State 
simply re-directed its financial effort from granting supplements to granting
271 Because of many exemptions in the means-test, too many persons were granted benefits 
without really needing it, on the other there was a substantial number of persons who were 
unable to make the required contributions to the system of individual capitalisation.
272 A head of family was a married man living with his spouse, a divorced man whose divorced 
spouse obtained a part of the man's guaranteed minimum, as well as a man or a women who 
had to support at least one child (only if the spouse or the child did not claim a guaranteed 
minimum income). In general it was recognised that the benefit levels of the "guaranteed 
minimum for elderly" were too low to allow to live a "dignified and human" life, and 
recepients often ended up at the local social welfare commissions (openbare centra voor 
maatschappelijk welzijn OCMW) to supplement the basic benefit by invoking the "right" to an 
existential minimum.
273 The general right to social assistance continued to exist and claimants of the guaranteed 



























































































Johan Jeroen De Deken 101
the social minimum without on the whole drastically increasing the financial 
means for the program.
Table 4.8. The Shift from State Subsidies for 
the Scheme for Voluntary Insured to the Scheme Granting 
a Guaranteed Minimum (in million francs) (274):
previous regulations Guaranteed Mi- Total
for voluntary insured nimum Income Budget
old-age survivor
1969 790.3 1.3 172.8 964.4
1970 188.6 0.6 995.0 1,184.2
1971 85.2 0.8 1,264.1 1,350.1
1972 53.6 0.6 1.341.7 1.395.9
The total number of beneficiaries even went down from 86,172 in 1971 to 
68,784 in 1976 (275). In general one can argue that the 1969 act was seen as the 
first step towards establishing a general basic income., and that — at least in 
the far future -- an abolishing of the means-test and an increase of the basic 
benefit to 60 or 75 per cent of the minimum wage was being considered by 
some to be desirable (276).
4.4. The Consolidation of Christian Democratic Housing Policies.
During the 1950's, the Social Democrats made a few timid attempts to 
re-direct the housing policies initiated by the Christian Democrats. However, 
apart from some verbal commitments in Parliamentary debates, the Socialist 
Party seemed to have abandoned its pre-war preference for garden cities 
operated by tenants cooperatives. The Socialists now tried to reinforce the 
planning element in housing policies, and wanted to shift public funds from 
the promotion of home-ownership to the subsidising of council housing. 
However, in part because of the pressure of their Liberal coalition partner the
274 From Victor, 1973, p.96.
275 Herman DELEECK et.al. De Sociale Zekerheid tussen Droom en Dmd Deventer: Van Loghum 
Slaterus, 1980, p.272.
276 See Victor, 1973, p.98. This article was published by the Research Centre of the Christian 
Democratic Party, though does not claim to reflect a policy statement of the party. The article 
argues that budget constraints make it unlikely that these goals would be realised in the near 



























































































102 Social Policy in postwar Belgium
Socialist had to moderate their attempts to re-focus policies. After all, the 
Christian Democratic model had more affinities with Liberalism than the 
Social Democratic project. The Liberals were not ready to endorse increased 
planning and the drastic extension of subsidised housing. They preferred the 
policies of subsidising the promotion of home-ownership so dear to the 
Christian Democrats. Ironically, it would be a coalition of Christian 
Democrats and Liberals that would, during the 1960's, implement measures 
aimed at reinforcing the planning element in Belgian housing policies. 
However, the sort of planning they realised barley resembled that demanded 
by the Social Democrats. It was planning stripped of any social objectives. 
Instead of subordinating the economy to social concerns, the planning of the 
1960 subordinated the long-term planning of the State budget to the 
requirements of the capitalist economy.
4.4.1. The Failure of the Socialist Attempts to Re-Orient Housing Policies.
As was argued, the Socialists had received the promotion of home- 
ownership with mixed feelings. After "their" Brunfaut Act had been watered 
down to such, an extent that it hardly counterbalanced the effects of the De 
Taye scheme, the Social Democrats launched a new attempt to re-orient 
housing policies. In 1953, the Socialist deputy Jozef Vecauteren again 
criticised in Parliament the policy of promoting home-ownership. He argued 
that
"There are a number of preconditions in order to be able to build 
a house for oneself: one needs to be young, dispose over a 
certain capital, regular employment, one cannot become sick or 
experience misfortunes, and in addition one needs to dispose of 
the necessary sums to pay off the debt and furnish the nouse."
(277)
The Christian Democrats' policy of promoting home-ownership thereby was 
doomed to fail when it came down to satisfy the needs of the majority of low 
income groups. Vercauteren once more called for a re-orienting of housing 
policies into the direction of promoting low-cost rental housing. When in 
1954, the Socialist Edmond Leburton became Minister of Public Health and 
Family, he started to work on such a re-orientation. Leburton made eligibility 
for De Taye subsidies conditional upon taking a loan amounting to 60 per
277 See his intervention in Parliament reprinted in Parlementaire Handelingen -  Kamer van 



























































































Johan Jeroen De Deken 103
cent of the value of the dwelling (27s). Formally, the Social Democrats thereby 
hoped to limit the construction subsidies to the lower income groups. But for 
that purpose one could question the efficiency of the measures, as more 
fortunate candidates for a subsidy could always take up the 60 per cent loan 
and invest the means they disposed of somewhere else. In fact, Leburton and 
his comrades hoped to reduce the total number of subsidies and gradually 
liquidate the De Taye scheme. This underlying intention was well 
understood by the Christian Democrats who interpreted Leburton's policies 
as an attempt to stifle the promotion of home-ownership (279). Under 
pressure of their Liberal coalition partner, the Social Democrats were 
nevertheless compelled to renew the De Taye scheme (2so).
Apart from attempting to curtail the policies of his Christian 
Democratic predecessors, Leburton also submitted a legislative proposal that 
would reinforce Social Democratic accents into the State's housing policies. In 
June 1955 Leburton submitted a legislative proposal which symbolically was 
to change the rather pejorative term "inexpensive houses" (goedkope woning) 
into "people's housing" (volkswoningen) and of the National Society for 
Inexpensive Housing (NMGW) into National Housing Society (Nationale 
Huivestingsmaatschappij or NHM). This change in terminology was not simply 
a formalist detail, but illustrated the intention to remove public housing from 
the residual sphere where it had been banned by Leburton's Catholic and 
Christian Democratic predecessors (2«i). Leburton's proposal set forth a more 
planned and coordinated approach of the housing problem. For that purpose
278 Royal Decree of 25 September 1954 "Koninklijk besluit tot wijziging van het Besluit van de 
Regent van 12 Augustus 1948, houdende vaststelling van de voorwaarden gesteld tot het 
verlenen van premiën om niet voor aanbouw door het privaat initiatief, van goedkope 
woningen en kleine landeigendommen zoals bij Koninklijke Besluiten van 30 September 1951 
en 21 Mei 1953 gewijzigd werden" in Belgisch Staatsblad 30 September 1954.
279 See for example the article in the theoretical journal of the Christian labour movement: Eugène 
DE JONGHE "Het Sociaal Leven in 1955" in De Gids op Maatschappelijk Gebied Vol.47, No.6, 
1956, pp.602-641 (in particular p.618).
280 See the Royal decree of 30 December 1955. The "elitist" public which benefitted from the De 
Taye scheme also included a substantial number of Liberal voters. In addition Goosens makes 
the argument that the scheme was also needed to support the Government's counter-cyclical 
policies to combat unemployment. The so-called "small expansion acts" (kleine expansiewetten) 
of the Liberal Minister of Economic Affairs relied upon the presumed stimulating effect of 
small and medium sized enterprises which played an important role in the construction of 
family houses (see Goosens, 1982, p.5.2.-50).
287 Edmond Leburton "Wetsontwerp tot wijziging en aanvulling van de wetgeving betreffende de 
huisvesting" in Parlementaire Dokumenten -  Kamer van Volksvertegemvoordigers 1954-1955, 



























































































104 Social Policy in postwar Belgium
he wanted to establish a National Housing Institute (Nationaal Instituut voor de 
Huisvesting). In addition, Leburton intended to reinforce the directive power 
of the renamed NMH over the local licensed building societies in order to 
facilitate the implementation of national political guide-lines. Finally, the 
Minister proposed to increase the resources to finance collective facilities in 
public housing estates, and restructure the Government's subsidies in such a 
way as to assure tenure equality between rental housing and owner- 
occupation.
Goosens has summarised the Social Democratic accents of Leburton's 
proposal as follows (282):
- subject-oriented (people) instead of object-oriented (houses) subsidies 
(targeted to low-income groups;- a planned housing policy based on 
the systematic processing of nationally collected housing data;
- housing policies fully integrated into urban planning policies;
- tenure quality (the equal treatment of ownersnip and rental housing);
- the fostering of a full-fledged social life on the level of neighbourhoods. 
The Christian Democrats strongly criticised what they considered to be the 
"excessive" etatism of Leburton's proposal (283). They were particularly upset 
with Leburton's intention to reduce the illustrious De Taye scheme to a banal 
article of a broader housing act, whereas the "Socialist" Brunfaut Act would 
continue to exist as a separate law. The Christian Democrats tried to torpedo 
Leburton's plans by depositing an amendment, designed by the postwar 
"master builder" De Taye himself. This amendement proposed to order a 
preparatory study from the NIH, and in anticipation of the results of this 
study, to prolong all existing housing laws (284). However, in the end the 
Minister succeeded in convincing Parliament to accept his proposal with only 
few minor amendments. The impact of the new law however was immediate: 
the number of building subsidies dropped from 20,500 in 1954 to 13,844 in 
1955, and a mere 10,607 in 1955 and 10,155 in 1957 (285).
282 Goosens, 1983, p.26f.
283 De Jonge, 1956, pp.621-622.
284 Alfred De Taye "Amendement bij het wetsontwerp tôt wijziging en aanvulling van de 
wetgeving beteffende de huisvesting" in Parlementaire Debatten — Kamer van 
Volksvertegenzvoordigers 1954-1955, Vol.325, No.4, 28 June 1955, pp.1-2.
285 Nationaal Instituut voor de Statistiek Statistieken over Bouwnijverheid en Huisvesting No.l, 1971, 



























































































Johan Jeroen De Deken 105
Goosens offers less boastful data, when he breaks down governmental 
expenditure on housing: during the first year of Leburton's rule, there was 
indeed a significant drop in the funds reserved for the promotion of home- 
ownership (from 70 per cent in 1954 to 58 per cent in 1955), and a 
corresponding increase in the funds reserved for the promotion of social 
rental housing (up from 31 per cent in 1954 to 41 per cent in 1955). But this 
change was not sustained, and by 1967, the promotion of home-ownership 
again took more than 70 per cent of the State's housing budget, whereas the 
resources for social rental housing were again down to a mere 25 per cent 
(2«6). In other words, the drop in the absolute number of construction grants 
has probably more to do with a general drop in the budget for housing. This 
drop can be related to the budgetary constraints the Government faced in the 
aftermath of the Korean war and the large sums that were swallowed by the 
infrastructure works in preparation of the world exhibition that was to take 
place in Brussels in 1958 (2S7).
If in terms of re-focussing housing policy towards the social rental 
sector Leburton's rule was far from unambiguously successful, it is even more 
surprising that during his four year rule the Social Democrats failed to pass 
the legislative orders necessary to implement the most "Socialist" articles of 
the Brunfaut Act -- in particular article 8 concerning the construction of 
facilities of social or collective utility. It is through this article that Brunfaut 
had hoped to revive the 1920's idea of the garden city and to promote a fully 
fledged community life. In effect, because of the lack of implementing orders, 
this notorious article 8 had remained a dead letter. It is difficult to 
understand the passivity of the Socialist Minister in this respect. It may in 
part be related to the social and economic concessions, the Socialist were 
forced to make in order to sustain their anti-clerical coalition with the 
Liberals; or it may be related to sheer sloppiness of the person of the Minister. 
Either explanation seems to insufficient.
A third possible explanation might be related to the changes within the 
Socialist Party to the, where technocratic adherents of a production logic had 
gained the upper hand over those seeking the creation of a social living 
environment. For the former, the sheer volume of construction was more
286 Goosens, 1982, table 44.
287 Herman DELEECK "Het Sociaal Leven in 1957" in De Gids op Maatschappelijk Gebied Vol.49, 




























































































106 Social Policy in postwar Belgium
important than the method of financing and the social dimension of the newly 
built estates.
When in 1958 the Socialist-Liberal coalition was replaced by a 
homogeneous Catholic Government, the original format of the De Taye 
scheme was immediately reinstated by abolishing the requirement to take up 
a loan of 60 per cent of the value of the dwelling to built or to be constructed 
(288). However, the Christian Democrats did not really practice a policy of 
revanchism, and in fact it seems to be the case that after 1958 the Social and 
Christian Democrats concluded a tacit pact in the spirit of the pacification 
around the 1950's controversy on educational policies. The fortunes of the De 
Taye and the Brunfaut Act were linked. First both schemes were 
provisionally prolonged in tandem (289), and in 1964 the "Labourist" coalition 
of Christian Democrats and Socialists finally adopted a law whereby the two 
schemes were made a permanent part of Belgian housing policies (290).
4.4.2. Planning Yes, but Socialist?
Leburton had at least been partly successful in introducing a more 
planned housing policy, and this aspect of his policy was not reversed by the 
subsequent non-Socialist governments. More in general, the 1960's saw the 
final acceptance by Belgian capitalism of a more interventionist State (291). 
However, the sort of planning that came into being was only marginally 
related to the demands the Social Democrats had formulated for the first time 
in 1935 with Hendrik De Man's Labour Plan. Whereas Social Democrats had 
hoped to subordinate the economy through planning to social concerns, the 
so-called economic programming (economische programmable) of the 1960's
288 Royal Decree of 1 September 1958 "Koninkliik Besluit tot wijziging van het besluit van de 
Regent van 12 augustus 1948, houdende vaststelling van voorwaarde tot het vervullen van 
premiën om met aanbouw, door het privaat initiatief, van volkswoningen en van kleine 
landeigendommen" in Belgisch Staatsblad 6 September 1958.
289 Both the scheme of the De Taye Act and of the Brunfaut Act were initially only intended for a 
limited period. In 1956 they had both been extended till the end of 1960 by the compromise 
around Leburton's housing act. Then in 1962 and in 1963 both schemes were again 
provisionally prolonged respectively by the Act of 26 January 1962; the act of 7 June 1963.
290 It is in this context that one can also interpret the introduction in 1960 of an income limit in the 
De Taye scheme itself by the Christian Democratic-Liberal coalition (see Speltincx, 1980, p.48).
291 During the first decade after the war, the Belgian state already had intervened in the economy, 
but this intervention had been limited to subsidies to decaying industries (such as the mines in 
Wallonia) on demand of Belgian capitalism. But public authorities did not obtain any control 
in exchange for these financial injections (see André MOMMEN "État, Acumulation du Capital 



























































































Johan Jeroen De Deken 10 7
reversed this hierarchy by subordinating the long-term planning of the State 
budget to the requirements of the economy.
"les diverses structures de la planification et de la 
programmation n'entravent nullement la liberté d'action des 
milieux industriels. Au contraire, elles leurs permettent un 
meilleur contrôle de la politique d'investissement de l'Etat car le 
Plan se limite à n'être qu'un «planning des dépences des 
pouvoirs publics»." (292)
In terms of housing, this sort of economic programming led to a renewed 
subordination of social housing policy to economic goals. Illustrative of this 
subordination are the what one could call "Stalinist" housing policies of the 
Christian Democratic-Liberal coalition under the leadership of Paul Vanden 
Boeynants. In 1967, this Government passed a law whereby the two national 
housing associations were to built housing reserved for the labour force of 
expanding industries (293). The new law proclaimed that "a certain number" 
of the dwellings of the housing associations was to be reserved for employees 
of enterprises in expanding industries, even if these employees did not 
conform to the eligibility criteria anterior housing laws prescribed. The 1967 
Act was implemented when the Government announced the construction of 
500 dwellings for the work-force of the new Steel complex SIDMAR in Zelzate
(294).
4.4.3. Rapid Expansion of Owner-Occupation.
With the adoption of the Leburton Act of 1956 and the conclusion of 
the tacit "Housing Pact"(295) during the early 1960's the edifice of a more 
permanent compromise on housing policy had been erected, and the main 
traits of the regulatory apparatus of the Belgium post-war housing system
292 Michel QUEVIT Les Causes du déclin Wallon. L'Influence du Pouvoir Politique et des Groupes 
Financiers sur le Dévelopment Régional Brussels: Vie Ouvrière, 1978, p.142.
293 Act of 3 July 1967 in Belgisch Staatsblad 21 July 1967. Two months earlier, this Government had 
reinforced the executive's control over public and semi-public corporations (see Royal Decree 
No.4 of 18 April 1967, and No.88 of 11 November 1967).
294 See Royal Decree of 27 December 1968 in Belgisch Staatsblad 15 January 1968; and Nationale 
Maatschappij voor Huisvesting Jaarverslag Brussels: NMH, 1969, pp.37-38. 150 NMH dwellings 
were constructed in Zelzate and 350 in Wachtebeke (see Nationale Huisvestingsmaatschappij 
Jaarverslag 1969 p.14, 37-38).



























































































108 Social Policy in postwar Belgium
had been consolidated (296). Even more than the old-age pensions system, the 
compromise on housing bore the imprint of a Christian Democratic design. 
The postwar housing system contained a structural bias in favour of the 
promotion of home-ownership. The results of this bias are clearly illustrated 
by the steady increase in owner-occupation: whereas in 1947, owner-
occupation only represented 39 per cent of all tenure, by 1960 its share had 
risen to 50 per cent. It reached 55 per cent in 1970 and even 61 per cent in 
1977 (297). .
296 The only other important addition to this edifice was the adoption of the law protecting future 
owners. This so-called Breyne Act was adopted on 9 July 1970 (published in Belgisch Staatsblad 
11 September 1971), after a big scandal in which a large group of future owners became the 
victims of the fraudulent bankruptcy of the private building and real estate company ETR1MO. 
For a discussion of the law see Speltincx, 1980, p.27-28. In 1970, the Government also issued a 
Housing Code (Huisvestingscode) which coordinated all the existing housing laws (See Royal 
Decree of 10 December 1970 (in Belgisch Staatsblad 17 December 1970), corroborated by the Act 
of 2 July 1971 (in Belgisch Staatsblad 6 August 1971). The fact that the law did nothing more 
than consolidate the existing compromise is illustrated by the fact that Parliament accepted the 
law without a single minute of discussion (see Goosens, part 3, p.48).
297 De Ridder and Minon, 1979, p.16. In neighbouring countries the comparable figure was far 
lower: in 1970 in France it amounted to 45 per cent, in Germany only to 36 per cent and in the 



























































































Johan Jeroen De Deken 109
5
The Lim its of Christian D em ocratic Solidaristic Social Policy.
This section will not elaborate on the welfare state retrenchment 
policies of the late 1970's and early 1980's (298). Rather, it will focuss on the 
neo-Liberal germs built in to the scheme as it was consolidated during the 
second half of the 1950's and during the 1960's. It will be argued that by 
refraining from legislating a publicly controlled comprehensive second pillar 
to the pension system, the market was not crowded out and existing privately 
controlled extra-statutory pension schemes experienced a rapid expansion.
The second half of this final part examines the impact of the gradual 
transformation of the unitary state into a federal one. It will be argued that — 
at least during the period under study — this institutional reform did not at all 
affect social security. The reform however fundamentally altered the 
framework within which housing policies were to be realised. Even though it 
is likely that, in the future, substantial policy divergences will occur and that 
housing policies will take a different turn in the three regions of the new 
federal state, it seems to be to early to make a balance of such substantial 
policy shifts.
5.1. From Subsidiary Insurer in the Statutory Scheme to Complementary 
Insurer in the Extra-Statutory Scheme: the Continued Existence of 
the Privileges for Salaried Employees.
After the 1967 reform the pension system appeared to have been 
consolidated. The fundamental political disagreements which first produced 
a stalemate, and subsequently had led to a sequence of reforms and counter-
298 These policies affected in particular the scheme for civil servants. Of particular importance are 
the so-called "programme laws" (programma-wetten) which combined a series of measures to 
keep the State's budget under control. Another typical example was the Act of 5 August 1978 
on Economic and Budgetary Reforms which curtailed high pensions. For a discussion see 
Philippe DE FOOZ 5 Août 1978: Loi de Reformes Economiques et Budgetaires Pensions du Secteur 




























































































110 Social Policy in postwar Belgium
reforms, disappeared from the political agenda. The changes to the statutory 
scheme, that were implemented during the years following the oil crisis, seem 
to have been less inspired by political ideas then by budgetary constraints. 
With respect to old-age pensions, the programmes of the two main 
protagonist of the postwar conflict, the Social Democrats and the Christian 
Democrats, had to a large extent converged (299). The changes in the statutory 
scheme that were implemented during the last two decades of the period 
under study, contained only marginal technical adjustments, and did not bear 
the imprint of one or the other ideological commitment (300).
However at the level of extra-statutory arrangements more important 
changes were on the agenda which contained a potential for important 
political conflicts. Whereas in several other European countries, legislators 
had developed a detailed framework for a comprehensive second pillar in 
addition to the first pillar of the statutory pension scheme, in Belgium such a 
framework, if it existed at all, was still only in an embryonic stage.
Supplementary pension arrangements in Belgium, by and large had 
remained the perquisite of privileged segments of the category of salaried 
employees. During the postwar decades, the extra-statutory pension 
arrangements had increasingly become a way to circumvent redistributive 
income taxes:
"les pensions extra-légales bénéficent d'un traitment fiscal 
favorable à l'égard du salaire ordinaire, tant dans le chef de 
l'employeur que du travailleur, que ce soit au moment du 
versement des primes ou lors du paiement des prestations. De 
même, on exclut traditionellement la protection de la base de 
calcul des cotisations de sécurité sociale." (307)
299 For an analysis see Philippe DEFEYT & Pierre REMAN "Les Partis Politique Face á la Reforme 
de la Sécurité Sociale" in Courrier Hebdomadaire du CRISP No.1041-1042, 25 May 1984. In 
general, one can argue that during the second half of 1960's, the so-called community problems 
had become the divisive element in Belgian politics, overruling all other policy issues.
300 The obsession with budgetary constraints can of course be related to the influence of orthodox 
liberalism which during the 1970's started to make its come back presenting old ideas as "new" 
solutions to the economic and budgetary problems of West European welfare states. This rise 
of neo-liberalism brought the expansion of the welfare state in general and of the statutory 
pension scheme in particular to a standstill, just as the old 19th century laisser-faire liberalism 
had been the main cause for the relative late introduction of compulsory insurance in the 
country.
301 Pascale VIELLE Aspects Juridiques de la Prevoyance Veillesse en Europe June Paper Department of 
Law, San Domenico di Fiesole: European University Institute, 1990, p.60. See also D. 



























































































Johan Jeroen De Deken 111
It is therefore surprising that the political parties had virtually nothing to say 
on the subject of complementary pensions. One can indeed wonder whether 
this is due to political prudence or wether it implied an implicit approval (302).
One factor, which might have contributed to this absence of debate in 
the political sphere, can be related the fact that, in Belgium, extra-statutory 
pensions traditionally had been the competence of neo-corporatist 
consultation between the so-called the social partners, i.e. the employer 
associations and the trade unions. It is in these circles that one can find more 
pronounced positions on the subject of extra-statutory pension schemes. 
Whereas both the Socialist and the Christian trade union federations opposed 
the expansion of the second pillar, employers associations traditionally 
favoured their development (303). The trade unions, ABVV and ACW, wanted 
to limit the development of extra-statutory pension schemes by maintaining 
an important link between contributions and benefits in the statutory 
schemes, by strictly regulating complementary insurance schemes as to 
prevent them from undermining the principle of national solidarity, and by 
introducing a special tax levied on extra-statutory benefits (thereby reducing, 
if not terminating, the favourable fiscal treatment of extra-statutory schemes). 
The national employers association, Verbond der Belgische Ondernemers (VBO) 
(304), and the associations of self-employed, on the other hand, wanted to see 
the development of extra-statutory schemes to occur in pair with a limitation 
of statutory social protection. The other main employers' association, the 
Vlaams Ekonomisch Verbond (VEV), went even further by advocating a full- 
streched privatisation of social security, limiting the role of the public system 
to providing a minimal protection by means of a system of negative income 
taxes (30s). Within the system proposed by the VEV, extra-statutory 
provisions were to become the crux of the new old-age pensions system.
The fact that the conception of the regulatory framework for extra- 
statutory schemes occurred largely outside the parliamentary sphere, makes it 
difficult to give a systematic overview of the political concomitants of these
302 Feyt & Reman, 1984, p.49.
303 For an analysis of the respective positions see Philippe DEFEYT & Pierre REMAN "Les 
Interlocuteurs Sociaux Face à la Réforme de la Sécurité Sociale" in Courrier Hebdomadaire du 
CRISP No.1103-1104, 20 December 1985.
304 The VBO succeeded the VBN as the main national employers association.
305 See the report of the congress the VEV organised on 11 March 1980 VEV De Hervorming van de 
Sociale Zekerheid Brussels (CHECK): 1980; see also the reaction of the VEV to the Dillemans 



























































































112 Social Policy in postwar Belgium
developments. Such an overview would require a detailed examination of the 
genesis of the Collective Labour Accords (Collectieve Arbeidsovereenkomsten or 
CAO's) relevant to this subject matter. Such a inquiry goes well beyond he 
scope of this study and will require additional future research. The following 
paragraphs therefore will only offer little more than an introduction to the 
complicated web of extra-statutory pensions arrangements.
5.1.1. Individual Capitalisation in the Statutory Pensions Scheme for Salaried 
Employees.
Even if after the amalgamation of the various pensions schemes for 
wage-earners, and the technique of individual capitalisation had been 
completely abandoned — at least as far as the statutory pension scheme was 
concerned — the fact that the legislator was committed to honour previously 
granted privileges had meant that the various existing schemes for individual 
capitalisation were to continue to exist until they would dissolve themselves 
because those who had contributed to them (up to 1967) would have died
(306).
It were in particular the salaried employees who still enjoyed 
important individually capitalised annuities. The technique had always been 
more important in their scheme, compared to that of manual workers. In 
1957, the Social Democrats indeed had attempted to abolish the technique for 
salaried employees too, but the 1960 reform had brought it back to the 
foreground (307). The pension system thus was left with two important 
schemes of individual capitalisation: one accumulating contributions made 
under the 1930 Act, and one accruing contributions made under the 1960 Act. 
There were two public insurance carriers, and 14 private carriers. In 1967, 
there existed a total of 1,370,045 individually capitalised accounts in the
306 Individual capitalisation was definitively abandoned for manual workers in 1953, for seamen 
in 1955, for miners in 1957 and for salaried employees in 1967.
307 In the other schemes, individual capitalisation also had left a legacy, though on the whole its 
relative importance was of a rather limited nature. In 1971, the Government attempted to 
harmonise the regulations governing the various schemes of individual capitalisation. For a 
brief discussion of this attempt see J. DENAEYER ,rDe Harmonisering van de 



























































































Johan Jeroen De Deken 113
scheme for salaried employees (30«); and in 1970 the remaining open accounts 
could be broken down as follows (309):
308 Nationale Kas der Bediendenpensioenen Verslag over het Dienstjaar 1967 Brusels: NKBP, 1968,
P-7.
309 The following tables are based on data from archival sources of the Actuarial Service of the 
Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare un Brussels. The reported data should be interpreted 
with caution, as the information does not seem to be very reliable. Even though the Ministry 
was required by law to exercise control on the insurance carriers, the figures for various years 
are often conflicting and lack consistency. Most archival material older than 20 years at the 
time of writing, had been destroyed. The subsidiary insurers were even less capable or willing 
to provide the information of interests here. They too argued -  if they replied at all to requests 
for information -- that they were only able to provide figures on the number of affiliates who 
had not retired at the time of writing, i.e. in 1994, or that data more than 20 years old were no 
longer available. A notable exception was the mutual benefit society l'Intégrale which 
promptly provided a complete times-series of the evolution of the number of its affiliates going 
back to 1939.
The annual reports of the NKBP, the public insurance carrier which since 1957 also operated as 
a "central fund" administering an account for all salaried employees — even those insured with 
a private subsidiary carrier, only provide fragmented information which mentions only the 
total number of accounts and a breakdown of new accounts between those employees who 
choose the NKBP and those who opted for another carrier. On the basis of these data one can 





























































































114 Social Policy in postwar Belgium s
Table 4.9. The Number of Individually Capitalised Accounts in 1970 and the 
Corresponding Mathematical Reserves (Expressed in Million Francs) 
in the Statutory Scheme for Salaried Employees
I
1930 Act 1960 Act
accounts reserves accounts reserves
Public Carriers 66.9% 61.6% 72.3%
NKBP 374,623 10,911 (310) 9,914
ASLK 246,022 6,774 160,612 2,324
Private Carriers 33.1% 38.4% 2 7 .7 %
Non-Profit (311) 51,796 1,938 50,350 876
Commercial (312) 255,265 9,063 236,208 3,803
In the same year,
1
these carriers paid out a total of 401,526 annuities which
could be broken down as follows:
)
Table 4.10. The Number of Individually Capitalised Annuities Paid 
out in 1970 by the Statutory Scheme for Salaried Employees.
1930 Act 1960 Act
Public Carriers 73.3% 56.6%
NKBP 58,169 22,426
ASLK 96,208 11,792
Private Carriers 26.7% 43.4%
Non-Profit 10,194 5,319
Commercial 46,145 20,926
310 This figure is not available. If one makes an extrapolation on the basis of the mathematical 
reserves of the NKBP and the average amount reserved per account for the other carriers one
would arrive at some 600,000 accounts for the NKBP. j
311 This category includes mutual benefit funds (gemeenschappelijke verzekeringskassen),
cooperatives, and non-profit corporations (verenigingen zcinder winstbejag) i.e. l'Intégrale, De 
Eerste Gemeenschappelijke Verzekeringskas, Notariat Belge, Fédérale de Belgique, De 
Toekomst van de Journalist, and the Patronale Kas. §
372 i.e. Assubel (Caisse Nationale Belge d'Assurance), Assurance Générales, La Royale Belge,
Assurance Belgische van de Boerenbond, Urbaine, Noordstar en Boerhaave, Winterthur,
Belgishe Arend, Union et Prévoyance. Formally these carriers are also had the status of mutual 
benefit fund (gemeenschappelijke verzekeringskas), but as they were owned by commercial 
insurance companies their activities did not conform to any of the social goals normally 
associated with these funds (in particular administration by means of equal representation and 



























































































Johan Jeroen De Deken 115
One could wonder to whether or not the re-introduction of individual 
capitalisation was to benefit of private carriers, as, during the 1950's, it had 
been in particular the commercial insurance companies who had been 
opposing the re-organisation the administration of the scheme for salaried 
employees into single semi-public institution, the NKBP. However, it is not 
possible to come to a firm conclusion on the basis of the data represented in 
the two tables. Judging on the magnitude of the reserves one would be 
tempted to argue that it was primarily the semi-public NKBP which benefited 
from the re-introduction of individual capitalisation. However, if one 
considers the number of annuities paid out in 1970 as part of the 1960 scheme, 
the private insurance carriers seem to have been the main beneficiaries of the 
reform. Both tables though seem to suggest that the other semi-public carrier, 
the ASLK, at any rate did far worse in attracting new clients under the 1960 
regulations.
5.2.2. Individual Capitalisation in the Extra-Statutory Pensions Schemes for Salaried 
Employees.
The method of individual capitalisation is used in three types of extra- 
statutory pension schemes. The first two types, the mutual benefit funds and 
the so-called group insurances, are part of what one could call the nascent 
second pillar to the Belgian pension system. This pillar is only embryonic, in 
that it only covers a minority of the population. The third type of extra- 
statutory scheme which is based on individual capitalisation, the individual 
life insurances, can be considered to be part of what is often called the third 
pillar in a pension system. One can question to what extent individual life 
insurances should be considered to be part of the architecture of the welfare 
state. Their completely individualised nature makes them alien to a system 
which is supposed to be the institutional expression of social solidarity. This 
section nevertheless briefly elaborates on these individualised arrangements 
as they have been promoted by the representatives of neo-liberalism as an 
alternative to the solidaristic welfare state.
Mutual Benefit Funds: In addition to the system of individual capitalisation for 
the statutory scheme, the 1930 and 1957 Acts also allowed for contributions to 
be made to a supplementary scheme administered by the same 17 insurance 
carriers. These contributions could be made by the employees or their 



























































































116 Social Policy in postwar Belgium
those in force in the statutory scheme (313). In 1970 there existed a total of 
81,219 accounts in this supplementary scheme.
After the amalgamation of the wage-earners schemes in 1967, the 17 
subsidiary insurance carriers saw their license to offer supplementary 
insurance plans renewed by the decree of 14 May 1969 (314). Since the 1957 
reform of the scheme for salaried employees, the State no longer licenses new 
mutual benefit funds (375). Whereas most of the 17 existing insurance carriers 
did not further exploit the possibilities offered by the 1969 decree, one of the 
three "genuine" mutual benefit fund, the mutual benefit society lintérgrale, 
launched an active recruitment policy (376). This recruitment policy was 
effective indeed: by 1970, this insurance carrier alone administered 47 per 
cent of the total number of this type of supplementary accounts, and even as 
much as 84 per cent of those concluded under the regulations introduced by 
the 1957 Act (377). By 1984 l'Intégrale controlled more than three quarts of this 
specific segment of the pension insurance market, with most of the remaining 
market share controlled by the two semi-public institutions: the General 
Savings and Annuity Fund (ASLK) and the National Office for Pensions (the 
Rijksdiesnt voor Werknemerspensioenen, RWP, the semi-governmental 
administration that had taken over the responsibilities of the NKBP) {ms). 
One can only speculate why the commercial insurance companies showed so 
little interest for this type of insurance. A possible explanation is that the 
Belgian insurance market is rather oligopolistic and that it collectively
313 Rijksdienst voor Pensioenen -  Directie Rervten Syllabus Brussels: Rijksdient voor Pensioenen, 
1989, p.14-15.
314 Royal Decree of 14 May 1969 CHECK Belgisch Staatsblad
315 Pascale VEILLE Note de Travail en vue de la première réunion du groupe d'étude sur l'adaptation du 
statut des caisses communes à l'évolution des pensions complémentaires de vieillesse Brussels, 1991,
p.10.
316 L'Intégrale is a mutual benefit society only operating in the sector of pensions, which was 
established in 1925 after the merger of various pension funds that were active in the coal and 
steel industry around the city of Liège.
317 The Statistics of the Ministry make a distinction between accounts ruled by the 1930 Act and 
those concluded under the 1957 Act up to 1960 (which is referred to at as "old rates" and those 
concluded after 1960 (called "new rate").
318 Lewalle, 1986, p.48. The only fund, owned by a commercial insurance company to maintain 
some activity in this sector was the fund of the Royal Beige, but compared to the activities of 
l'Intégrale, the market share of the Royal Beige was insignificant: in 1984, l'Intégrale collected 
639 million francs in contributions, the Royal Beige only 15 million francs. In the same year the 
mathematical reserves of l'Intégrale amounted to some 6,485 million francs, whereas those of 



























































































Johan Jeroen De Deken 117
decided that the mutual benefit fund formula was uninteresting as it was the 
most regulated of the various formats for extra-statutory pensions. The 
insurance companies might have preferred to promote other forms in which 
they could alone set the rules.
Group Insurances: In addition to the supplementary schemes incorporated into 
the statutory scheme, there developed other non-statutory schemes for 
supplementary pension insurance. Particular mention should be made in this 
context of the so-called "group insurances" (groepsverzekeringen). These 
schemes started to develop in Belgium during the 1920's, and became subject 
to legislation in 1930 (319). As was argued above, this sort of collective life 
insurance experienced a rapid expansion during the Second World War.
Comprehensive information on these schemes is not available as they 
are generally not considered to be part of the social security system as such. 
They are not sanctioned by statutory regulations, but rather are concluded 
under the initiative of the employer with a commercial insurance company. 
The main goal of the employers was to stabilise and motivate their work-force 
by granting supplementary pension benefits. Initially these privileges were 
only organised for employees in executive positions, but after a stagnation of 
the number of contracts during the late 1940’s and early 1950’ (320), group 
insurances experienced a steady expansion and also came to be granted to 
lower ranked segments of the class of salaried employees. By 1968, some
400,000 employees benefited from a supplementary pension contract in a 
group insurance scheme (321). In 1993, it was estimated that some 620,000 
wage-earners in the private sector were affiliated to a group insurance (322). 
In addition there were some 15,000 civil servants benefiting from such an
379 See the Act of 25 June 1930 regulating life-insurances "Wet betreffende de controle op de 
levensverzekeringen" in Belgisch Staatsblad 18 July 1930. They were modelled after collective 
insurance contracts first concluded in the Netherlands during the late 19th century.
320 In 1952, there were some 55,000 group insurance contracts for old-age and another 150,000 
policies to insure against pre-mature death (Troclet, 1953, p.53).
327 A. DELPEREE ,rDe Problematiek van de Belgische Regeling van de Werknemerspensioenen" in 
Belgisch Tijdschhrift voor Sociale Zekerheid Vol.25 N o.2,1974, pp.107-152 (p.122).
322 Philip NEYT De Drie Pensioenpijlers Antwerpen: UFSIA, 1993, p.24. These figures are based on 
an extrapolation of a survey organised in collaboration with the Control Administration of 
Insurances with the 10 largest commercial insurance companies. Neyt claims that in 1993, 
some 11,000 enterprises were affiliated to a group insurance, with another 600 enterprises 



























































































118 Social Policy in postwar Belgium
insurance contract, and some 16,000 self-employed were affiliated to a similar 
collective pension arrangement.
In 1981 there were about 60 private insurance companies licensed to 
offer group insurances. The insurance companies kept a more than 300,000 
million francs in reserve to be able to meet their contractual obligations. 
However, most contracts were concluded by some 10 companies controlling 
more than 75 per cent of total turn-over (323). By 1986, the concentration had 
proceeded that far that as little as three companies controlled two thirds of the 
total collective life insurance market (324).
There are two types of group insurances. In the first type, the so-called 
defined contribution system, the contributions are determined in the insurance 
contract, and the benefits are granted in proportion to the contributions made. 
In the second type, the so-called defined benefit system, the insurance contract 
stipulates the replacement rate (for example, 75 per cent of the last wage) and 
contributions are regularly adjusted on the basis of actuarial calculations, in 
order to be able to reach this goal. In both cases, the reserves are individually 
capitalised. The tax exemptions that were introduced in 1944 were somehow 
restricted in 1984, when a Government facing a fiscal crisis, decided to limit 
the deduction to contributions aimed at establishing an extra-statutory 
pension of at most 80 per cent of the last annual earnings. It was generally 
recognised that employers used the group insurance plans to offer their 
higher paid workers an additional remuneration upon which they did not 
have to pay social security contributions and which up to than received a very 
favourable treatment by the treasury. In that respect they did not behave any 
different from their colleagues, who during the war used these plans to avoid 
to pay taxes to the occupying regime. However, even after the introduction of 
these restrictions, the tax exemptions remained largely to the benefit of high 
income groups: for example, in 1982, the average exemption for persons
earning between 500,000 and 750,000 francs per years was on average 3,544 
francs (representing little over 8 per cent of the total tax exemptions granted 
for group insurances), whereas persons earning between 1,500,000 and 
5,000,000 francs enjoyed a tax advantage of on average 44,052 francs
323 D. VAN BERLAER "Standpunt van de Beroepsvereniging der Verzekeringsondememingen in 
België" in S. FREDERICQ & J. ROGGE, eds. Het onder Contrôle Brengen van de Privé 
Pensioenfondsen in België Antwerpen: Kluwer, 1982, pp.163-173.




























































































Johan Jeroen De Deken 119
(representing some 42 per cent of the total sum the State lost because of tax 
exemptions for the scheme) (32s).
Individual Life Insurance Contracts: A third type of individually capitalised 
supplementary pensions are the individual life insurances concluded with the 
ASLK (326) or with one of the licensed insurance companies (327). However in 
view of the complete individualised nature of these arrangements, they 
hardly qualify to be included in a discussion of social security (32«). These 
individual plans nevertheless do represent a lucrative business for the 
insurance industry. In 1984, there were some 925,000 individual life 
insurance contracts. In 1985, life insurances were responsible for some 27.5 
per cent of the turn over of the industry and thus came only second to the 
sector of car insurance (329). Life insurances also enjoy important tax 
exemptions: up to a certain amount they are completely tax-deductibale, 
beyond this threshold, only a part of the contributions are taken into account, 
and above a certain threshold there are no exemptions at all. Like was the 
case with group insurances, the tax-exemptions for individual life insurances 
are much to the advantage of higher income groups (330).
325 Data from Lewalle, 1986, p.41 and M. FRANK "Les dépenses fiscales et le budget de 1986" in 
Bulletin de Documentation du Ministère des Finances Brussels, July/August 1985, p.l.
326 See in particular the act regulating voluntary pension insurance "Wet van 12 februari 1963 
betreffende de inrichting van een ouderdoms- en overlevingspensioen ten behoeve van de 
vrijwillig verzekerden" in Belgisch Staatsblad 2 March 1963.
327 See in particular the Royal Decree of 14 May 1969 "Koninklijk Besluit betreffende de 
toekenning van buitenwettlijke voordelen aan de werknemers bedoeld bij koninklijk besluit 
Nr.50 van 24 oktober 1967 betreffende het rust en overlevingspensioen voor werknemers" in 
Belgisch Staatsblad 10 June 1967.
328 The concrete conditions are not specified by legislation or collective agreements, but by purely 
individualised contracts.
329 "L’Assurance en Belgique. Points de repères" in Cahiers de l'Assurance Brussels: UPEA, 1985, p.8. 
Part of the popularity of life insurance can attributed to the fact that concluding a life insurance 
contract is often a requirement to obtain a mortgage loan. In a survey carried out in 1981, more 
than 35 per cent of the respondents said that they concluded a life insurance contract because it 
was a requirement to obtain a mortgage loan (see INUSOP Attitudes et opinions de la population à 
l'égard de la souscription d'assurance-vie Brussels: ULB, May 1981, p.42.
330 In 1982, of those who earned between 500,000 and 750,000 francs per year, only 22 per cent 
benefited from tax-deductions for their life insurance and on average their advantage 
amounted to 5,455 francs. On the other hand, of those earning between 1,500,000 and 5,000,000 
francs per year who concluded a life insurance, 47 per cent benefited from a tax advantage 



























































































120 Social Policy in postwar Belgium
In 1986, the Government of Christian Democrats and Liberals tried to 
promote these sort of individualist pensions arrangements by creating the so- 
called "pensions savings" plans (pensioensparen) (332). These plans were to 
encourage capital investment by granting tax exemptions to the purchase of 
shares in enterprises or in investment funds, or to the deposits to an 
individual savings account in a bank or an insurance company, if the savings 
are used for at least 30 per cent to buy share in Belgian enterprises. Such 
accounts had to be kept open for at least 10 years. The only tax on this form 
of income amounts to the same 16.5 per cent beneficiaries of a group 
insurance pay when they take up their benefits.
5.1.3. Collectively Capitalised Extra-Statutory Pensions Schemes for Salaried 
Employees: the Entereprise-Based Pension Funds.
Another important form of supplementary pensions for salaried 
employees are the enterprise-based pension funds (bedrijfspensioenfondsen). 
Initially, these funds had a wide spectre of formats: they could be organised 
per sector or per enterprise using the technique of re-apportioning (332). 
Alternatively they could be organised as autonomous non-profit corporations 
[vereniging zonder winstbejag) and use the method of collective capitalisation 
(333). Until 1975, the most common format though was that of the so-called 
non-autonomous pension funds (the so-called employers' funds or patronale 
kassen). These funds did not have reserves which were separate from the 
assets of the enterprise. There were two types of non-autonomous funds. In 
the first type, the enterprise booked the supplementary pensions benefits as 
part of its operating costs (334). In the second type, the enterprise wrote in its
337 The law provided for three types of savings plans: one could participate in a collective savings 
plan of a bank, one could administer one’s own savings through an individual savings account, 
or one could participate in an plan of an insurance company.
332 Collective agreements regulating such a scheme were for instance concluded in the gas and 
electricity sector. These sectoral agreements were governed by the legislation on the so-called 
"funds for existential security" (fondsen voor bestaanszekerheid). See in particular the Act of 7 
January 1958 "Wet betreffende de fondsen voor bestaanszekerheid" in Belgisch Staatsblad 7 
February, 1958. The 1958 act prescribed that these funds were to be administered through 
equal representation.
333 Delp£r6e, 1974, p.121. Toward the end of the period under study, the book-reserve system was 
prohibited by law (see Winfried SCHMAL The Future of Basic and Suplementary Pension Schemes 
in the European Community ~ 1992 and beyond Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1991, p.208.
334 Techincally this type came close to applying a form of re-apportioning, however, the risks 



























































































Johan Jeroen De Deken 121
pension obligations into the passive of its balance under the heading of its 
own assets (eigen vermögen). In 1975, a law was adopted which made non- 
autonomous pension funds illegal. Existing funds either had to adopt the 
format of a non-profit corporation or of a mutual benefit fund (33s).
But even after this reform, legislation only provided a general 
framework for pension funds. More detailed regulations were not the work 
of the legislator. In the case of sector-specific arrangements (the funds for 
existential security), these conditions continued to be specified by collective 
agreements between employers and unions. In the case of enterprise-specific 
arrangements (autonomous pension funds), the employers alone continued to 
determine the rules of the game.
The sort of solidarity generated by these sectoral and entereprise-based 
pension funds differs depending on their format. In the case of sectoral 
pension funds, one can speak of a solidarity between persons employed on 
the same sector of the economy. Autonomous enterprise-based pension funds 
can be considered the institutional expression of a solidarity between 
employees of the same enterprise. Finally the non-autonomous pension 
funds that used the book reserve system reflected a solidarity between the 
employers of today and those of tomorrow.
In most cases one can question to what extent the solidaristic relations 
generated by pension funds give birth to true social rights, in view of the 
many strings attached to the benefits. Even more than was the case with the 
so-called group insurances, employers can easily impose conditions upon 
eligibility. These conditions are primarily intended to use the pension funds 
as a tool to foster the loyalty of the employees, to limit labour turn over, to 
give additional work-incentives, or to lure away qualified employees from 
competing enterprises by offering them advantages which are only 
marginally taxed. However, as Pascale Veille has argued, the enterprise- 
based pension funds should not be considered to be a modem form of 
employer-paternalism:
"Loin de représenter une forme contemporaine du paternalisme 
du chef d'entreprise, ils constituent ... davantage un élément 
d'une politique de concurence permettant aux employeurs, en se 
fondant, d'une part, sur le discrédit jeté sur la fiabilité du
higher than when applied by a public scheme. As Van Berlear has argued, "whereas the state 
will always find its revenue somewhere ... such a practice is irresponsible at level of a private 
enterprise" (Van Berlaer, 1982, p.168).
335 The Act of 9 July 1975 ("Wet betreffende de controle der verzekeringsondememingen" in 



























































































122 Social Policy in postwar Belgium
premier pillier et, de l'autre, sur la possibilité d'améliorer les 
prestations plafonnées de sécurité sociale, de s'attierer et de 
fidéliser la main d'ouvré la plus compétente." (336)
It has been argued that up to 1975, the enterprise-based pension funds 
operated largely unregulated and thereby had a competitive advantage over 
traditional individual life-insurances (337). The lack of regulation also resulted 
in a diversity of arrangements. In 1989, the Belgian Association organised a 
survey among 75 enterprise-based pension funds which documents this 
diversity (333). Since the 1975 reform, all pension plans allowed employees, 
when they terminated their employment contract before the official 
retirement age, to claim the contributions they had made themselves to the 
pension plan. However, only in 6 out of the 75 plans surveyed, employees 
enjoyed an unconstrained claim to the contributions made to the plan on their 
behalf by their employer. Most plans require a minimum period of 
employment, usually 5 years, but in some cases even as much as 20 years, in 
order for employees to obtain the recognition of a claim to the contributions 
paid by the employer. In 11 enterprises surveyed in 1989, employees had no 
claim at all before retirement, to the contributions made by their employer if 
they terminated their employment contract.
In 40 per cent of the plans surveyed in 1989, were entirely financed by 
the employer, in the other plans both employers and employees contributed 
to the fund. In 1990, employers contributions amounted to some 87 per cent 
of the total financing of pension funds (339). In some cases, the employers 
contributions were deposited in a group insurance contract (13 out of 75 plans 
surveyed in 1989). In 1988, the assets of the Belgian pension funds 
represented a total of 17.6 per cent of GNP.
In 1989, the reserves of the various forms of extra-statutory pension 
insurance in Belgium were estimated as follows
336 Veille, 1990, p.25.
337 H. DELANGE "De Bedrijspensioenfondsen in België" in Belgisch Tijdschrift voor Sociale Zekerheid 
Vol.23, N o.3,1976, pp.335-337.
338 Philip NEYT Enquete Pensioenplannen Brussels: Belgische Vereniging voor Pensioenfondsen, 
1989. Another study estimated the total number of enterprise-based pension funds at 150, with 
another 166 "autonomous" pension funds organised as non-profit corporations. See also Philip 
NEYT et.al. Beloning van Kaderleden Antwerpen: UFSIA, 1993.
339 In that year, employers contribution amounted some 11,409,000 million francs whereas 
employees only paid a total of 1,933 million francs in contributions (See Guy VAN BREMPT De 
Werking van de Belgische Pensioenfonsen unpublished MA-thesis (actuariële wetenschappen) 




























































































Johan Jeroen De Deken 123
Table 4.11. The Reserves of the Various Supplementary Schemes 
in 1989 (expressed in million francs).
Group Insurances: 434,048
Enterprise Funds: 200,000
Ind. Life Insurances: 340,046






Occupational pension plans are still clearly a privilege for salaried 
employees. In 1990 only 10 per cent of manual workers benefit from an 
enterprise-based pension plan, whereas as much as 60 per cent of salaried 
employees participated in such a plan. This is partly an intended 
consequence of the fact even after the 1957 and 1967 reforms, the scheme for 
salaried employees had continued to contain a maximum threshold of the 
wage taken into account for calculating contributions and benefits. As was 
argued, the commercial insurance companies had insisted on maintaining 
these thresholds in order to safeguard the lucrative market of supplementary 
pensions insurance. It is no surprise that in 1982, the conservative coalition 
Government of Christian Democrats and Liberals extended these thresholds 
to the pension arrangements for manual workers, and that since then, a 
gradual increase of the participation rate of manual workers in enterprise- 
based pension plans can be observed.
5.1.4. The Problem of Transferability of Rights and of the Control of the Reserves of 
Extra Statutory Pension Reserves.
Under current regulations, employees, when they change employer, 
have a claim to the contributions they themselves made and their employer 
made on their behalf to a group insurance. Only under certain specific 
conditions, such as being fired because of a major error, or not complying 



























































































124 Social Policy in postwar Belgium
to the contributions paid on their behalf by the employer (340). However, as 
far as enterprise-based pension funds are concerned, it has been argue that 
until recently "everything was possible" and abuses by employers were not 
excluded, and much depended upon the lenience of the employer in question 
(342).
The same holds for the control over the reserves used to finance the 
extra-statutory benefits. In the case of group insurances, these funds are 
controlled by the private insurance companies with whom the enterprises 
have concluded the collective life insurance contract. In the case of non- 
autonomous pension funds, there were not really reserves to be control as 
they were either inexistent, or a were a artificial book-keeping construction. 
However, in the case of autonomous pension funds there was room for more 
variation. Again, it is impossible to generalise, as the Belgian legislator has 
refrained from imposing detailed legislation in this respect. Instead it was 
largely left to the employers to determine the rules of the game.
As was argued, since 1975, pension funds either have to take the 
format of non-profit corporations or of mutual benefit societies. In case they 
became organised as non-profit corporations, the funds are administered by a 
general council composed of representatives of the enterprise. The law does 
not require a participation of the employees in this council, and if they are 
represented at all, they generally only get a minority of the seats in the 
general council (342). The general council normally nominates a board, which
340 G. SINNESAEL & G. VERNAILLEN "Standpunt van de Controledients voor Verzekeringen" in 
S. FREDERICQ & J. ROGGE, eds. Het onder Contrôle Brengen van de Privé Pensioenfondsen in 
België Antwerpen: Kluwer, 1982, pp.181-195. If the employee left the enterprise after less than 
five years or if he did not comply with one of the two above mentioned conditions (i.e. if he 
was fired for major infractions or if he left without giving notice), the employers contributions 
were deposited into a so-called solidarity fund (solidariteitsfonds), which was used for social 
purposes for employees of the enterprise (for example, to grant additional benefits to 
employees who had a too short employment career to have the right to claim a sufficiently 
large supplementary benefit). Recently legislation has been changed in such a way that these 
rules more lenient towards employees have come to apply to all enterprise based pension 
funds.
342 Sinnesael & Vemaillen, 1982, p.189. The most notorious case is that of Belgian Shell, where 
employees did not, until recently, have any claim at all on enterprise-based pension fund. It is 
only after the period under study, in 1994, that a Social Democratic Minister of Pensions, 
Freddy Willox, took the initiative to improve the transferability of the rights of employees.
342 An illustrative example is that of the pension fund of the chemical fibres producer Fabelta. 
Since the 1930's Fabelta offered a group insurance to its salaried employees. When the 
enterprise was taken over by the Dutch trans-national corporation AKZO, the direction of the 
multinational decided to improve the benefits of its extra-statutory pension scheme by adding 
a supplement to the benefits of the group insurance as to make them conform to wage 




























































































Johan Jeroen De Deken 125
has to have at least one representative of the employees. According to a 
collective labour agreement concluded in 1972, the board has to constituted 
on the basis of equal representation, if the employees contribute to the fund 
(343). But even then, the actual management of the funds is generally 
delegated by the board to banks or commercial insurance companies, as the 
employees prefer the safety of a high return on their capitalised funds over a 
say in their allocation.
The regulations concerning the administration of mutual benefit 
societies are stricter and more to the advantage of the employees. Such 
societies have to be administered on the basis of equal representation. For 
example, the administration of l'Intégrale has 8 representatives of the 
employers and 8 representatives of the employees. Each group nominates a 
president, and these two presidents carry out their function in alternance. 
Day-to-day management of the funds is carried out by a management 
committee composed of 4 members of the administration council and the 
General Director of the society.
Thus in general, one can conclude that the insured or the employees 
have little influence in the administration of the large sums of money that are 
accumulated in the various extra-statutory schemes. Only in the 3 mutual 
benefit societies, and in the autonomous pension funds that adopted the 
format of a mutual benefit society, there exists something close to equal 
representation. In general, investment decisions are taken by boards in which 
representatives of the employer have an absolute majority. Moreover, these 
decisions are generally delegated to banks or commercial insurance 
companies, even by most mutual benefit societies. In addition employers try 
to circumvent the 1972 collective labour agreement on equal administration
established an autonomous pension fund. This fund was administered by a "members' 
council" (road van deelnemers). This council consisted of three representatives of the direction, 
three members elected by the employees (independent from the trade unions), and of a 
chairman who was the president of the board of directors of the multinational. The members' 
council nominated an investment commission consisting of the chairman, a representative of 
the direction, a representative of the employees and two external advisers. This commission 
decided where the accumulate funds were to be invested. The commission could invest at 
most 5 per cent of the funds into enterprises of the AKZO group. The funds were also partly 
used to grant mortgage loans at preferential interest rates to employees of the enterprise. In 
general though, one can argue that the representatives of management had a majority at all 
decision making levels, and that the employees, even if they were represented, at no point 
were able to block a decision (this information is based on an interview with a former chairman 
of the fund).
343 Collectieve Arbeidsovereenkomst Nr.7 as concluded on 9 March 1972 in the National Labour 



























































































126 Social Policy in postwar Belgium
by depositing their own contribution into a fund organised as a non-profit 
corporation, while making their employees contribute to a group insurance 
plan administered by a commercial insurance company. The trade unions 
have tried to obtain some influence in the administration of these insurance 
companies, but this attempt faced strong resistance from the side of both the 
employers and the insurance companies' lobby:
"L'instauration d'une forme de de co-gestion ou de contrôle 
paritaire des compagnies d'assurance a rencontré lors de la 
négociation de la Convention Collective de Travial No.9 une 
vive opposition de la part des employeurs et du lobby des 
assurances." (344)
The trade unions have in vain tried to obtain more influence in the 
management of extra-statutory pension reserves. They have also been critical 
of the extensive fiscal advantages these schemes enjoy, but during the period 
under study, they did not resort to industrial action to support their claims 
(345).
5.2. The First Impact of the Fédéralisation of the Country on Social 
Policy.
From the 1960's onwards, the Belgian state has been gradually 
transformed from a unitary state into a federal state (346). Even a cursory 
review of the complexities of Belgian federalism goes well beyond the scope 
of this paper.
5.2.1. Belgian Federalism in a Nutshell.
Essentially the new state structure is based on three levels of authority 
(if one wants of three types of citizenship). The first level, the federal level, 
comprises what is left of the unitary state. This level includes such domains
344 Pascale VIELLE Aspects Sociaux des Pensions Complementaires de Travailleurs Salairie en Droit 
Beige Rapport ordered by the Commission of the European Community D G V/C/1, Brussels: 
Commission of the European Community, June 1991a, p.12.
345 In this respect one can, in particular amidst the Christian trade unions, identify an increasing 
discrepancy between a very radical program aimed at establishing far-reaching economic 
democracy on the one hand, and the tacit support for Governments carrying out neo-liberal 
policies and reluctance to engage in industrial action on the other hand.
346 For a brief overview of the background of the transformation of the country from a unitary to a 



























































































Johan Jeroen De Deken 127
as the currency and financial affairs, defense, foreign affairs, justice, and at the 
time of writing social security. At the second level, the two language 
communities (gemeenschappen) are responsible for so-called individual issue 
[persoonsgebonden materies) for which language is more important than place of 
residence. This level includes such policy areas as education, culture, health 
care, social assistance, etc. There are two language communities: (1) the 
Dutch-speaking community which comprises the population living in the 
Northern Flemish part of the country, and the Dutch-speaking inhabitants of 
Brussels; (2) the French-speaking community, which comprises the 
population living in the Southern Walloon part of the country, and the 
French-speaking inhabitants of Brussels (¡47). At a third level, the regions 
(gewesten) are responsible for the so-called territory-bound (grondgebonden) 
issues for which place of residence is more important than language. This 
level includes responsibility for urban planning, housing, environmental 
protection, regional economic expansion, exploitation of natural resources etc. 
There are three regional entities: Flanders, Wallonia and Brussels.
What is important in the context of this paper, is that the process of 
establishing a new federal structure has had a different impact on the two 
policy areas under study. Up to now, social security has remained the 
responsibility of the central state, which means that in this area, the process of 
fédéralisation has hardly had a specific impact on the policies (348). On the 
other hand, since 1975, the responsibility for housing issues has been 
transferred to the regional level. In the long term this will probably lead to 
three divergent housing systems, as the three regions are characterised by 
different political power configurations, and as they each have their specific 
housing needs:
"Because of the régionalisation of housing policies, each region 
will be able to implement a policy which can take into account 
regional differences in terms housing issues: Brussels being a 
metropolitan area, Flanders with a relative new housing stock 
and Wallonia with a relative old patrimony." (349)
347 The small German minority has its own council which has more restricted responsibilities, and 
is for other individual issues subordinated to the French community.
348 Even if there are increasingly strong voices to split social security too, and one can see the 
gradual development of some sort of a consensus between separatist and neo-liberals, albeit for 
different reasons, to dismantle the postwar unitary welfare state.
349 G. T'JONCK, H. DE SMET, G. DE CLERCQ, & L. GOOSENS "Het Juridisch-Organisatorisch en 
Finacieel Werkkader voor het Sociaal Woonbeleid in Vlaanderen" in Sociaal Woonbeleid 



























































































128 Social Policy in postwar Belgium
However, the institutional legacy of almost a century of common policy is 
likely to leave a lasting imprint for the years to come.
Towards the end of the period under study, housing policies in the 
three regions already started to diverge significantly. For example, in 1987, 
the maximum income to benefit from a fiscal exemptions in Flanders was set 
at 1,250,000 francs per year, whereas in Wallonia, it was set at 534,000. In the 
region of Brussels there was no maximum income at all. The amount of the 
exemptions also differed significantly: in Flanders between 120,000 francs and
250,000 francs, on Wallonia 100,000 francs and in Brussels 10 per cent of the 
purchasing price with a maximum of 150,000 francs (350). These different 
policies can to some extent be considered to reflect the relative hegemony of 
different political parties in the three regions: the Christian Democrats in 
Flanders, the Social Democrats in Wallonia, and the Liberals in Brussels.
5.2.2. Housing Policies in a Federal State: the Case of the Flemish Region.
During the last decade of the period covered by this study, housing 
issues in the Flemish region were primarily the responsibility the Department 
of Health and Family Policy, and later on of the Department of Family Policy 
and Housing. Initially, the National Housing Fund, while still continuing to 
be nationally organised, was split into a Flemish and a Walloon division. The 
National Housing Association (NHM) and the National Land Society (NMKL) 
underwent a similar fate and were split into a Flemish and a Walloon 
department. First, in 1975, the administrative structures of these national 
institutions were not split. But later, from 1982 onwards, their assets were, 
and the control was transferred from the national Government to the regional 
Governments, even if the authority issue for the Brussels region still remained 
open.
Already in October 1980, the Housing Fund of the League of Large 
Families also had been completely split into the Vlaams Woningfonds voor Grote 
Gezinnen and the Funds du Logement des Families Nombreuses.
In 1984, the National Housing Association (NHM) was altogether 
abolished (3si). The same law established a new Brussels Regional Housing 
Association. Two months earlier, the Walloon Regional Housing Association 
had been established which amalgamated the Wallonian departments of the
350 L. LAURENT & M. JACQUES Social Housing Policy in Belgium Brussels: COFACE Commission 
Logements Documents, 1987, p.59.
357 Act of 28 December 1984 "Wet tot afschaffing of herstructurering van sommige instellingen van 



























































































Johan Jeroen De Deken 129
NHM and the NMKL. In Flanders the situation remained more complicated, 
as the Flemish department of the NMKL strongly resisted attempts by the 
regional government aimed at a merging of the associations. The Flemish 
regional Government announced a gradual combination of all housing 
activities into one institution, and of agricultural activities in another, but the 
governing board of the NMKL saw it differently and wanted to continue its 
overall activities in rural areas (352).
Even semi-governmental institutions such as the Housing Fund of the 
League of Large families in Belgium (WBKGB) was affected by the tendency 
of regionalising housing policies. That organisation too has been divided into 
three regional housing funds, for Flanders, Wallonia and Brussels. The old 
unitary organisation continued to exist, but only in order to administer files 
and loans dating from the days before the new federal structure of the 
country. In Flanders the new organisation, the Flemish Housing Fund 
(Vlaams Woningfonds or VWF) has shifted its accent from merely providing 
credit, to a more active policy of urban renewal.
"The accent on credit accommodation has been shifted to 
renewal and improvement projects and at the same time other 
sorts of activities have been started. The VWF not only runs its 
own urban renewal schemes, it also provides housing 
allowances etc. It might be said that the VWF is the most 
complete housing association of this time. All its activities, 
including urban renewal schemes, are aimed at providing 
decent housing to large families as well as to the 
underprivileged/' (353)
The process of establishing a new federal state structure was accompanied by 
a series of authority conflicts, and housing policies were not saved from such 
clashes. Like in other policy areas, these conflicts have been nurtured by 
financial problems. The financial problems in the housing sector were 
aggravated by the system of pre-financing which, from 1975 onwards, became 
the dominant mode of financing new projects (354). Under this system,
"the capital investment of the state is advanced by a financial 
institution, usually the Municipal Credit bank (Gemeentekrediet).
352 See Luc GOOSENS "Belgium" m Hans KROES, Frits YMKERS and André MULDER eds. 
Between Owner-Occupation and Rented Sector. Housing in ten European Countries De Bilt: The 
Netherlands Christian Institute for Social Housing, 1988, pp.215-241.
353 Goosens, 1988, p.223-224.
354 For a discussion of the technical implications of this method of financing see Daniel KETELS 
"Het Huisvestingsbeleid in Budgettair Perspectief in Documentatieblad van het Ministerie van 



























































































130 Social Policy in postwar Belgium
The state pays back this sum over a couple of years ... and also 
pays interests." (355)
This system allowed to start or continue investment in housing during 
periods of budgetary constraints, but in the long run it created a heavy 
burden of accumulating debts. The new regional housing administration thus 
inherited a debt burden which they increasingly were unable to pay off. In 
particular Wallonia ceased to pay its contribution necessary to pay off the 
outstanding debt of the NMH. The NMH therefore had to attract new loans, 
and the interest for these loans would be divided between the three regions. 
One region thus had to pay additional money because of the "irresponsible" 
behaviour of the other region — a familiar problem in a country on the road 
towards a federal state...



























































































Johan Jeroen De Deken 131
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Note: The following list of references does not include documents I have 
consulted in the Algemeen Rijksarchief in Brussels; the Navorsings- en 
Studiecentrum voor de Geschiedems van de Tweede Wereldoorlog in Brussels; the 
archives of the Ministerie van Sociale Voorzorg in Brussel; the Archiefen Museum 
van de Socialistische Arbeidersbeweging in Gent; and the KADOC in Leuven. 
References to the relevant archival sources and unpublished appear in the 
notes. References to various newspapers and contemporary journals that 
have been consulted also often only appear in the notes. These serials include 
official gazettes, reports of parliamentary debates, reports of parliamentary 
commissions, annual reports of public and semi-public institutions, internal 
reports of various associations etc.
BAL, Nick "De illegale partii van 1940 tot 1944" in J.DHONDT, ed. Geschiedenis 
van de socialistische arbeidersbeweging in België Antwerpen, 1968, pp.567-572.
BALTHAZAR, Herman "Sociale Welvaart en Overlegeconomie, een 
Onvolkomen Wens" in De Industrie in België. Twee Eeuwen Ontwikkeling 
1780-1980 Brussels: Gemeentekrediet van België, 1981, pp.243-260.
BEKAERT, L. "De Hervorming der Maatschappelijke Zekerheid. II De 
ouderdomspensioenen" in De Christelijke Werkgever Vol.6, April-May 1950, 
pp.141-147.
"Beknopt Verslag over de Verichtingen van de Individuele Kapitalisatie 
inzake Pensioenverzekering der Werknemers" in Belgisch Tijdschrift voor de 
Sociale Zekerheid Vol.10, No.9,1964, pp.1325-1337.
"Belgium. Compulsory Scheme for independent workers" in Bulletin of the 
International Social Security Association No.11,1956, pp.463-468.
"Belgium. New Legislation on Pensions for Salaried Employees" in Bulletin of 
the International Social Security Association Vol.10, No.12, 1957, pp.524-533.
"Belgium. Amalgamation of Four Employees Pension Schemes" in 
International Social Security Review Vol.21, No.3, 1968, p.443-444.
BERTRAND, Louis Le Logement de l'Ouvrier et du Pauvre en Belgique. Avec une 
Préface sur l'Hygiène du Habitation par C. de Paepe Brussels: A Lefèvre, 1888.
BOURGEOIS, Victor "La Cité Moderne" in L'Habitation a Bon Marché Vol.3 
No.10 1923, pp.245-254.
BONDAS, Joseph "Pensions de Veillesse" in Les Cahiers de la Commision 
Syndicale No.9, December 1926.
BREPOELS, Jaak Wat zoudt gij zonder 't werkruolk zijn? Anderhalve eeuw 
arbeidersstrijd in België Leuven: Kritak, 1988.
Bureau d'Etudes Sociales l'Exécution du Plan de Travail Antwerpen: De Sikkel, 
1935.
BUYST, Erik An Economie History of Residential Building in Belgium between 1890 
and 1961 Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1992.
CHLEPNER, B.S. Cent Ans d'Histoire Sociale en Belgique Brussels: Editions de 
l'Université de Brussels, 1972.
CEUTERICK, J. "De Begrotingslasten van de Volkswoningpolitiek" in VJonen 
No.2, October 1957, pp.116-128
CLAEYS-VAN HAEGEDOORN, Mieke Hendrik De Man. Een Biografie 



























































































132 Social Policy in postwar Belgium
C.V. "De Maatschappelijke Zekerheid der Arbeiders in België" in De Gids op 
Maatschappleijk Gebied No.1-2,1945, p.34-40.
D AMBRE, Wouter Fundamenten van de Verzerrgingsstaat. Planning en Uitvoering 
van de Sociale Politiek in België (1942-1950) unpublished MA-thesis 
University of Gent, 1986
DE BELLEFROID, Diane La Commission vour l'Étude des Problèmes d'Après- 
guerre (CEPAG, 1941-1944) unpublished MA-thesis, University of Louvain- 
Ia-Neuve: 1987.
DE BROECK, G. "Sociale wetgeving" in S.H. SCHOLL 150 jaar Katholieke 
Arbeidersbeweging 1789-1939 Deel 3: 1914-1939, Brussels, 1966, @CHECK 
PAGE NUMBERS.@
DE DEKEN, Johan Jeroen Social Policy in Postwar Czechoslovakia. The 
Development of Old Age and Housing Policies during the Period 1945-1989 
European University Institute, Working Paper, SPS /1994.
DEFEYT, Philippe & Pierre REMAN "Les Partis Politique Face à la Reforme 
de la Sécurité Sociale" in Courrier Hebdomadaire du CRISP No.1041-1042, 25 
May 1984.
DEFEYT, Philippe & Pierre REMAN "Les Interlocuteurs Sociaux Face à la 
Réforme de la Sécurité Sociale" in Courrier Hebdomadaire du CRISP 
No.1103-1104, 20 December 1985.
DELANGE, H. "De Bedrijspensioenfondsen in België" in Belgisch Tijdschrift 
voor Sociale Zekerheid Vol.23, No.3, 1976, pp.335-337.
DE JONGHE, Eugène "Het Sociaal Leven in 1955" in De Gids op 
Maatschappelijk Gebied Vol.47, No.6,1956, pp.602-641
DELDIME, A. "Les Cooperatives de locataires" in Les Trois Tilleuls Vol.2, No.4, 
1925, p.1-2.
DELEECK, Herman "Het Sociaal Leven in 1957" in De Gids op Maatschappelijk 
Gebied Vol.49, No.7-8, 1958, pp.673-705.
DELEECK, Herman et.al De Sociale Zekerheid tussen Droom en Daad Deventer: 
Van Loghum Slaterus, 1980, p.272.
DELPÉRÉE, A. "De Problematiek van de Belgische Regeling van de 
Werknemerspensioenen" in Belgisch Tijdschhnft voor Sociale Zekerheid 
Vol.25 No.2,1974, pp.107-152.
DEMETS, Marcel "L'Apport Sociale de la Nouvelle Loi de Pensions" in 
Socialisme Vol.9, No.52,1962, pp.431-438.
DENAEYER, J. "De Harmonisering van de Kapitalisatiestelsels" in Belgisch 
Tijdschrift voor Sociale Zekerheid Vol.13, No.8, 1971, pp.863-866.
"De Nieuwe Wet op het Ouderdomspensoen der zelfstandigen. De 
pensioenkas voor Zelfstanndigen van het V.E.V." in VEV-Berichten Vol.31, 
No.15,1956, pp.1663-1671.
DE RIDDER, V.A. & P. MINON Economische en Sociologische Aspecten van de 
Activiteiten van het Woningsfonds 1929-1979 Brussels: Mens en Ruimte, 1979.
DES TILLEULS, A. "Les Coopératives de Locataires et le Parlement" in Les 
Trois Tilleuls Vol.l, No.9, 1924, p.1-2.
"De Wet De Taeye" in Problemen Vol.2, No.11,1948, pp.692-696.
DOUCY, Arthur La Sécurité Sociale en Belgique. Le Plan Van Acker Paris: 



























































































Johan Jeroen De Deken 133
DUPEYROUX, M. Évolution et Tendances des Systèmes de Sécurité Sociale des 
Pays membres des Communautés Européennes et de la Grande-Bretagne 
Luxembourg: Services des Communautés Européennes, 1966.
ESPING-ANDERSEN, Gôsta The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1990.
EYSKENS, Gaston De Mémoires Tielt: Lannoo, 1993.
FALLON, Valère Principes d'Économie Sociale Brugge: Beyaert, 1923.
FLORQUIN, Joost Ten Huize van... Zevende Reeks Leuven: Davidsfonds, 1971.
FLORQUIN, Joos "Ten Huize van Achiel Van Acker" in Liber Amicorum Achiel 
Van Acker Brugge: Orion 1973, pp.79-116.
FRANÇOIS, Léon "Les Pensions Civiles à Charge de l'Etat" in Comptes-Rendus 
des Traveaux de la Société d'Economie Politique de Belgique No.151, March 
1940.
FRANÇOIS, L. & J. BASYN Verslag over de Burgerlijke Pensiœnen ten Bezware 
van den Staat Koninklijk Commissariaat voor de Pensioenen, Brussels: 
Belgische Staatsblad, 1940.
FRANK, M. "Les dépenses fiscales et le budget de 1986" in Bulletin de 
Documentation du Ministère des Finances Brussels, July/August 1985
FRANTZEN, Pieter "Voor of tegen het ontwerp Trociet betreffende het 
bediendenpensioen" in Socialistische Standpunten Vol.4, No.2, 1957, pp.105- 
123.
FUSS, Henri "Het Onstaan van het ontwerp van akkoord van sociale 
solidariteit in België. I. De sociale zekerheid' in Arbeidsblad Vol.59, No.7-8, 
July-August 1958, pp.863-870.
FUSS, Henri & Walter LEEN Verslag over de Hervorming van de Maatschappelijke 
Zekerheid Brussels: Ministerie van Arbeid en Sociale Voorzorg January, 
1951.
GERARD, Emmanuel "De Christelijke Mutualiteiten" in Emmanuel GERARD, 
ed. De Christelijke Arbeidersbeweging in België Vol.2, Leuven: Universitaire Pers 
Leuven, 1991, pp.66-145
GILLINGHAM, John Belgian Business in the New Nazi Order Gent: Jan Dhondt 
Stchting, 1977.
GOOSENS, Luc "Het Sociaal Huisvestingsbeleid Ln België sinds 1830" in L. 
GOOSENS & G. KNOPS, eds. Sociaal Woonbeleid Brussels: Koning 
Boudewijn Stichting, 1983, pp.12-31.
GOOSENS, Luc "Belgium" in Hans KROES, Frits YMKERS and André 
MULDER eds. Between Owner-Occupation and Rented Sector. Housing in ten 
European Countries De Bilt: The Netherlands Christian Institute for Social 
Housing, 1988, pp.215-241.
GOSSERIES, Fernand L'Habitations à Bon Marché Louvain: Editions de la 
Société d'Etudes Morales, Sociales et Juridique, 1926.
HENAU, Brigitte "Shaping a new Belgium: the CEPAG -- the Belgian 
Commission for the Study of Post-war Problems, 1941-44 in M.L. SMITH 
and Peter M.R. STIRK, eds. Making the New Europe. European Unity and the 
Second World War London: Pinter, 1990, pp.112-131.
HEYMAN, Hendrik "De Maatschappelijke Zekerheid in België. Twee jaren 




























































































134 Social Policy in postwar Belgium
Hoge Raad voor de Middenstand "Advies betreffende het Pensioen voor 
Zelfstandige Arbeiders” in Informatieblad van het Economisch en Sociaal 
Instituut voor de Middenstand No.6, June 1953, pp.1-27.
Honderd Jaar Sociaal Recht in België 1886/1887 - 1986/1987 published at the 
occasion of the exhibition "Een Sociaal Verhaal" Brussels: Ministry of 
Employment and Labour and Ministry of Social Affairs, September 10-23,
HORION, P. "Het Particulier Beheer van de Sociale Zekerheid" in Belgisch 
Tijdschrift voor Sociale Zekerheid Vol.10, No.3, 1968, pp.397-414.
"Housing Policy in Belgium” in International Lanour Review No.60, July- 
December 1954, pp.86-100.
HUENS, Michel "La réforme des régimes de pension" in Les Dossiers de 
l'Action Sociale Catholique Vol.45, No.l, 1968, pp.40-56.
KELDERS, Freddy L'Organisation Administrative de la Sécurité Sociale en 
Belgique Liège: Faculté de Droit de l'Université de Liège, 1955.
KETELS, Daniël ”het Huisvestingsbeleid in Budgettair Perspectief" in 
Documentatieblad van het Ministerie van Financiën No.1-2, 1982, pp.17-51.
KLIJN, Annemieke Arbeiders- of Volkspartij. Een Vergelijkende Studie van het 
Belgisch en Nederlands socialisme 1933-1946 Maastricht: Universitaire Pers 
Maastricht, 1990.
"La Cité-jardin du Kapelleveld à Woluwe St-Lambert" in L'Habitation a Bon 
Marché Vol.4 No.6 1924, pp.123-146.
LALOIRE, Marcel "La Pension des Travailleurs Indépendants" in La Revue 
Politique Vol.3, No.3, 1953, pp.336-346.
LAURENT, L. & M. JACQUES Social Housing Policy in Belgium Brussels: 
COFACE Commission Logements Documents, 1987
LAVENS, A. "De Hervorming van de Pensioenstelsels" in De Christelijke 
Werkgever No.ll, 1967, pp.450-451.
LEEN, Walter Sécurité Sociale et Logement Populaire Brussels: Editions Erasme, 
1954.
LEHOUCK, F. "Oorlog en sociale zekerheid" in Arbeidsblad Vol.81, No.9-10, 
September-October, 1980, pp.643-693.
Le Logis: Histoire de la Société Brussels: Société Cooperative de Locatiare Le 
Logis (published on the occasion of its 30th anniversary), 1951.
"Les Patrons Face au Problème du Logement des Travailleurs" in Bulletin 
Social des Industriels Vol.17, No.111, August-October 1945, pp.267-268.
LESPES, J. "Une Cité-Jardin «Le Logis» in Les Trois Tilleuls Vol. 1 No.12, 1924, 
pp.2-3.
"Les Projets du Gouvernement en Matière d'Habitation à Bon Marché" in 
L'Habitation à bon Marché Vol.2, No.8, 1922, p.198-203.
LEW ALLE, Henri "Les Pensions Légales et Complementaires" in Courrier 
Hebdomadaires du CRISP No.1131-1132, 7 November 1986.
LUYKX, Théo Politieke Geschiedenis van België Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1973.
LUYKX, Théo & Marc PLATEL Politieke Geschiedenis van België van 1944 tôt 
1985 Antwerpen: Kluwer, 1985.
LUYTEN, Dirk "Het Katolieke Patronaat en het Korporatisme in de Jaren 



























































































Johan Jeroen De Deken 135
Studiecentrum voor de Geschiedenis van de Tweede Wereldoorlog No.13, 
October 1990, pp.91-148.
MAGITS, M. & M. QUERTON "De Opbouw van de Sociale Zekerheid in 
Belgiè. Een Historisch Overzicht" in èocialistische Standpunten Vol.31, No.5- 
6, 1984, pp.5-13.
MAJOR, Louis "Interviewed by Michel Magits" in Socialistische Standpunten 
Vol.31, No.5-6, 1984, pp.15-20.
MAMPUYS, Jozef "De Christelijke Vakbeweginç" in Emmanuel GERARD, ed. 
De Christelijke Arbeidersbeweging in België Vol.2 Leuven: Universitaire Pers 
Leuven, 1991, pp.146-271.m
MARCY, J. "La Réforme des Pensions Capitalisation ou Répartition? in 
Problèmes Vol.l, No.7, 1947, pp.414-419.
MASSARD, D. Les Pensions Extra-Légales Brussels: Ced Samson, 1987, pp.25- 
33.
MASSON, J.P. "Introduction a l'Etude des Pensions du Secteur Public” in
Journal des Tribinau du Travail No.408, May 20, 1988, pp.1-5.
Ministerie van Sociale Voorzorg Het Pensioenstatuut voor Werknemers. 
Solidariteits en Eenheidsstelsel voor Arbeiders, Bedienden, Mijnwerkers en 
Zeevarenden onder Belgische Vlag Brussels: Ministerie van Sociale Voorzorg, 
1967.
MOMMEN, André "État, Acumulation du Capital et la Lutte des Classes de 
1945 à 1960" in Contradictions No.23-24, 1980, pp.217-239.
MORRENS, Fr. "Het Pensioensvraagstuk” in De Christelijke Werkgever Vol.2, 
No.5-6, 1946, pp.145-149.
MOUGENOT, Catherine "Promoting the Single-Family House in Belgium: the 
Social Construction of Model Housing” in International Journal of Urban and 
Regional Research Vol.12, No.4, 1988, pp.531-549.
MUTTON, J. & J.KERKHOFS "Het Pensioenstelsel voor Zelfstandigen" in 
CEPESS Documenten Vol.5, No.6, 1966, pp.88-105.
Nationale School voor Fiscaliteit en Financien De Militaire 
Ancieniteitspensioenen Brussels: Ministerie voor Financiën, 1993
NEUVILLE, Jean La C.S.C en l'an 40 Brussels: Vie Ouvrière, 1988.
NEYT, Philip De Drie Pensioenpijlers Antwerpen: UFSIA, 1993.
NEYT, Philip et.al. Beloning van Kaderleden Antwerpen: UFSIA, 1993.
PASTURE, Patrick Kerk, Politiek en Sociale Actie. De Umeke Positie van de 
Arbeidesbeweging in België 1944-1973 Leuven: Garant, 1992.
PIERLOT, Hubert Note sur le Rapport de la Section Sociale London, 31 August 
1943.
POTIER, V. "De Nieuwe Wet op het Bediendepensioen" in VEV Berichten 
Vol.32, No.2, 1957, pp.195-198.
QUEVIT, Michel Les Causes du déclin Wallon. L'Influence du Pouvoir Politique et 
des Groupes Financiers sur le Dévelopment Régional Brussels: Vie Ouvrière, 
1978
RENAUT, Gérard La Pension des Travailleurs Indépendants Brussels: Parti 
Liberal (Journeé d'étude des Classes Moyennes), 1952.




























































































136 Social Policy in postwar Belgium
ROMANS, J. "Vergelijkende Studie van de Pensioenregelingen" in CEPESS- 
Documenten Vol.5, No.6, 1966, pp.122-140.
ROMANS, J. "Het Pensioenstelsel voor werknemers" in CEPESS-Documenten 
Vol.12, No.4,1973, pp.7-40
ROYER, Roger Het Vraagstuk der Sociale Pensioenen in Belgiè. Vergelijkende 
Studie over de Pensioenstelsels: «Individuele Kapitalisatie» en «Collectieve 
Kapitalisatie» Brussels: [author], January 1948.
ROISIN, J. "Het Bediendenpensioen" in ACV. Tweemaandelijks Studieorgaan van 
het Algemeen Christelijk Vakverbond van Belgiè Vol.25, No.5, 1957, pp.381- 
395.
SCHMÄL, Winfried The Future of Basic and Suvlementary Pension Schemes in the 
European Community — 1992 and beyond Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1991.
SINNESAEL, G. & G. VERNAILLEN "Standpunt van de Controledients voor 
Verzekeringen" in S. FREDERICQ & J. ROGGE, eds. Het onder Contrôle 
Brengen van de Privé Pensioenfondsen in Belgiè Antwerpen: Kluwer, 1982, 
pp.181-195.
SMETS, Dore & Jef RENS Historique du Centre Syndical Belge à Londres, 7947- 
1944 Brussels: FGTB, 1976, Annexe I, pp.1-110.
SMETS, Marcel De Ontwikkeling van de Tuinwijkgedachte in Belgiè. Een Overzicht 
van de Belgische Volkswoningbouw. 1830-1930 Brussels: Piere Mardaga, 1977.
SPELTINCX, H.J. Historique de la législation belge relative au logement social 
Brussels: Institut National du Logement, 1980.
SP1TAELS, Guy "Achille Van Acker: Père de la sécurité sociale en Belgique" in 
Liber Amicorum Achiel Van Acker Brügge: Orion 1973, pp.173-206.
STRAUWEN, Francis "Renaat Braem: van Beheerst Functionalisme tot 
Formele Retoriek. Architectuur als Tastbaar Gemaakte Dromen" in Wonen 
-  TA/BK 1979, No.14, pp.13-27.
T'JONCK, G., H. DE SMET, G. DE CLERCQ, & L. GOOSENS "Het Juridisch- 
Organisatorisch en Finacieel Werkkader voor het Sociaal Woonbeleid in 
Viaanderen" in Sociaal Woonbeleid Brussels: Koning Boudewijn Stichting, 
1983, pp.34-74.
TROCLET, Léon-Eli La Première Expérience de Sécurité Sociale Liège: Décret de 
Napoléon de 1813 Brussels: Editions de la Librairie Encyclopédique, 1953.
TROCLET, Léon-Eli Initiation au Problème des Pensions de Veillesse Brussels: 
Institut E: Vandervelde, 1953.
TROCLET, Léon-Eli "La Pension des Travailleurs Indépendants" in Centre 
d'Etudes et de Documentation Sociales de la Province de Liege No.l, 1954, pp.3- 
26.
TROCLET, Leon-Eli De Sociale Zekerheid in Belgiè. Deel 1: Algemene 
Vraagstukken inzake Sociale Zekerheid Brussels: Solvay-instituut voor 
Sociologie, 1958.
"Unitas-Tuinwijk. Cooperative de Locataire à Anvers-Deurne" in L'Habitation 
a Bon Marché Vol.6 No.8 1926, pp.140-148.
VAN ACKERE, A. "De Vrije Pensioenkassen voor Zelfstandigen en het 
Pensioen der Zelfstandigen" in Tijdschrift van de Middenstana van Belgiè 
No.2,1957, pp.5-8.
VAN BERLAER, D. "Standpunt van de Beroepsvereniging der 



























































































Johan Jeroen De Deken 137
eds. Het onder Contrôle Brengen van de Privé Pensioenfondsen in België 
Antwerpen: Kluwer, 1982, pp.163-173.
VAN BREMPT, Guy De Working van de Belgische Pensioenfonsen unpublished 
MA-thesis in actuarian scieneces, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven: 
Departement Toegepaste Economische Wetenschappen, 1992.
VAN DAMME, Dirk De Politiek Determinanten van het Sociaal Huisvestingsbeleid 
in België unpublished MA-thesis, Departement Politieke Wetenschappen, 
Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, 1979.
VAN DEN BOSCH, Hilde Het Huisvestingsbeleid in België. Deel 1: 
Literatuurstudie unpublished MA-Thesis, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, 
Departement Sociologie, 1984.
VAN DEN WIJNGAERT, Mark Het Bestuur van de Secretarissen-Generaal in 
België tijdens de Duitse Bezetting 1940-1944 Ph.D.-thesis of the History 
Department, Leuven: Katolieke Universiteit Leuven, 1972.
VAN DEN WIJNGAERT, Mark Ontstaan en Stichting van de C.V.P/P.S.C 
Brussels: Instituut voor Politieke Vorming, 1976.
VANDEPUTTE, Robert Sociale Geschiedenis van België. 1944-1985 Tielt: Lannoo, 
1987
VAN DIEVOET, Emile. Het Verzekeringswezen in België. Economische en Sociale 
Gegevens, Het Bestaande Recht, De Voorgestelde Hervormingen Part 1, 
Antwerpen: De Sikkel, 1940.
VAN GESTEL, C. ed. Kerk en Samenleving. De Bijzonderste Sociale Documenten 
van de Pausen Leo Xlll, Pius XI, Pius XII en Johannes XXII Brussels: DAP 
Sociale Uitgaven, 1964.
VELGE, Henri "Le Problème de la Simplification des Lois Sociales" in Bulletin 
Social des Industriels Vol.17, No.110, March-April 1940, pp.53-59.
VELGHE, O. "Coopératives de Locataires" in L'Habitation a Bon Marché Vol.9 
No.2 1922, pp. 205-210.
VELDKAMP, G.M.J. Inleiding tot de Sociale Zekerheid en de Toepassing ervan in 
Nederland en België Deel 1. Karakter en Geschiedenis Deventer: Kluwer, 1978.
VERDEYEN, J. "Het Pensioenstelsel der Vrijwillig Verzekeren" in CEPESS- 
Documenten Vol.5, No.6, 1966, pp.106-121.
VERWILGHEN, Rafaël "Waar Staan wij met de Stedebouw in België" reprint 
of Bouwen en Wonen No.3, March 1960.
VICTOR, L. "Het Gewaarborgd Inkomen voor Bejaarden" in CEPESS 
Documenten Vol.12, No.3, 1973, pp.91-98.
VIELLE, Pascale Aspects Sociaux des Pensions Complementaires de Travailleurs 
Salairié en Droit Belge Rapport ordered by the Commission of the European 
Community DGV/C/1 Brussels: Commission of the European Community, 
June 1991.
WAT1LLON, L. "Het Ontstaan van het Ontwerp van Akkoord van Sociale 
Solidariteit in België. III. Lonen en Arbeidsduur" in Arbeidsblad Vol.59, 
No.10, October 1958, pp.1191-1206.
WILLAME, J.C. "L'Union Démocratique Belge (U.D.B.) Essai de création 
«travailliste»" in Courier Hebdomadaire du CRISP No.743-744, November 26, 
1976.
WITTE, Eis & Jan CRAEYBECKX Politieke Geschiedenis van België sinds 1830. 































































































EUI Working Papers are published and distributed by the 
European University Institute, Florence
Copies can be obtained free of charge 
-  depending on the availability of stocks -  from:
The Publications Officer 
European University Institute 
Badia Fiesolana
1-50016 San Domenico di Fiesole (FI) 
Italy



























































































Publications of the European University Institute
To The Publications Officer
European University Institute 
Badia Fiesolana
1-50016 San Domenico di Fiesole (FI) -  Italy 
Telefax No: +39/55/573728 
E-mail: publish@datacomm.iue.it
From N am e.........................................................................
Address.....................................................................
□  Please send me a complete list of EUI Working Papers
□  Please send me a complete list of EUI book publications
□  Please send me the EUI brochure Academic Year 1995/96














































































































Educational Expansion and 
Changes in Women's Entry into 
Marriage and Motherhood in the 
Federal Republic of Germany
SPS No. 90/3
Nico W ILTERDINK 
Where Nations Meet: National 
Identities in an International 
Organisation *
SPS No. 90/4 
Hans-Peter BLO SSFELD  
Changes in Educational 
Opportunities in the Federal 
Republic of Germany. A 
Longitudinal Study of Cohorts 
Bom Between 1916 and 1965
SPS No. 90/5 
Antonio LA SPINA 
Some Reflections on Cabinets and 
Policy-Making: Types of Policy, 
Features of Cabinets, and Their 
Consequences for Policy Outputs
SPS No. 90/6
Giandomenico MAJONE 
Cross-National Sources of 
Regulatory Policy-Making 
in Europe and the United States
SPS No. 91/7  
Hans-Peter BLO SSFELD  
Is the German Dual System a 
Model for a Modem Vocational 
Training System?
SPS No. 91/8 
Hans-Peter BLOSSFELD/
Gianna GIANNELLI/
Karl Ulrich M AYER 
Expansion on the Tertiary Sector 
and Social Inequality.
Is there a New Service Proletariat 
Emerging in the Federal Republic 
of Germany?
SPS No. 91/9 
Giandomenico MAJONE 




Market Integration and 
Regulation: Europe after 1992 *
SPS No. 91/11
Jean BLONDEL
Ministers of Finance in Western
Europe: A Special Career?
SPS No. 91/12 
Jean BLONDEL 
Governments and Supporting 
Parties: Definitions and 
Classifications



























































































SPS No. 91/13 
Jean BLONDEL 




The Political Factors Accounting
for the Relationship Between
Governments and die Parties
Which Support Them
*  *  *
SPS No. 92/15
Jerry A. JACO BS
Consumer, Social and Business
Services Industries in the United
States: Trends Between 1969 and
1987
SPS No. 92/16 
Hans-Peter BLOSSFELD/
Yossi SHAVIT 
Persisting Barriers: Changes in 
Educational Opportunities in 
Thirteen Countries
SPS No. 92/17 
Hans-Peter BLOSSFELD/
Jan HOEM/Alessandra 
DE ROSE/Gotz ROHWER 
Education, Modernization and 
Divorce. Differences in the Effect 
of Women's Educational 
Attainment in Sweden, the Federal 
Republic of Germany 
and Italy




Post-Industrial Class Structures: 
Classifications of Occupations and 
Industries (United States, 
Germany, Sweden and Canada)
SPS No. 92/19 
Gotz ROHWER 
RZoo: Efficient Storage and 
Retrieval o f Social Science Data
SPS No. 92/20 
Stefano GUZZINÌ 
The Continuing Story o f a Death 





Ideas, Interests and Policy Change
SPS No. 92/22 
Arpàd SZAKOLCZAI 
On the Exercise of Power in 
Modem Societies, East and West
SPS No. 92/23 
Stefan ROSSBACH 
The Autopoiesis of the Cold War: 
An Evolutionary Approach to 
International Relations?
SPS No. 92/24 
Steven LUKES
On Trade-Offs Between Values
SPS No. 92/25 
Stephan RUSS-MOHL 
Regulating Self-Regulation: The 
Neglected Case of Journalism 
Policies. Securing Quality in 
Journalism and Building Media 





























































































SPS No. 92/26  
Véronique MUNOZ DARDÉ 
The Idea of Feminism from a 
Kantian Perspective. An Exercise 
in Practical Reasoning
SPS No. 92/27  
Giandomenico M A i ONE 
The European Community 
between Social Policy and Social 
Regulation
SPS No. 92/28  
Volker EICHENER 
Social Dumping or Innovative 
Regulation?
Processes and Outcomes of European 
Decision-Making in the Sector of 





Mutual Recognition in 
Federal Type Systems *
SPS No. 93/2 
Giandomenico MAJONE 
Deregulation or Re-Regulation? 
Policym aking in the European 
Community Since the Single Act
SPS No. 93/3 
Giandomenico MAJONE 
Controlling Regulatory 
Bureaucracies: Lessons from the 
American Experience
SPS No. 93/4  
Arpàd SZAKOLCZAI 
From Govemmentality to the 
Genealogy of Subjectivity:
On Foucault’s Path in the 1980’s
* out of print
SPS No. 93/5 
Arpad SZAKOLCZAI 
Types of Mayors, Types of 
Subjectivity: Continuities and 
Discontinuities in the East-Central 
European Transitions I
SPS No. 93/6 
Louis CHARPENTIER 
Le dilemme de Faction positive 
Analyse du concept à travers les débats 
parlementaires relatifs à la loi sur l’éga­
lité professionnelle entre les femmes et 
les hommes
SPS No. 93/7 
Arpâd SZAKOLCZAI 
Nietzsche’s Genealogical Method: 
Presentation and Appli cation
SPS No. 93/8 
Arpad SZAKOLCZAI 
Re-Building the Polity: A Com­
parative Study of Mayors in the 
Hungarian, Czech and Slovakian 
Republics
SPS No. 93/9 
Giandomenico MAJONE 
The European Community:




The Author’s Care of Himself 
On Friedrich Nietzsche, Michel 
Foucault, and Niklas Luhmann
SPS No. 93/11
Anna TRIANDAFYLLIDOU 
From Qualitative to Quantitative 


































































































Richard ARUM/Yossi SHAVTT 
Another Look at Tracking, 
Vocational Education and Social 
Reproduction
SPS No. 94/2 
Arpád SZAKOLCZAI 
Thinking Beyond the East-West 
Divide: Patocka, Foucault, 
Hamvas, Elias, and the Care of the 
Self
SPS No. 94/3 
Giandomenico MAJONE 
Independence vs. Accountability? 
Non-Majoritarian Institutions and 
Democratic Government in 
Europe
SPS No. 94/4 
Martin J. BULL 
The European Community and 





Value Changes in Hungary, 1978- 
1993: Continuity and 




Bertrand Badie: Cultural Diversity
Changing International Relations?
SPS No. 94/7 
Stefano GUZZINI 
Robert Gilpin. The Realist Quest 
for the Dynamics of Power
SPS No. 94/8 
Roumen DASKALOV 
Images of Europe: A Glance from 
the Periphery
SPS No. 94/9 
Anna LEANDER 
“Robin Hood” Politics? Turkey 
Probing a New Model in the 1990s
SPS No. 94/10
Alan CAFRUNY





Building up a National Identity: 
The Case of Bulgaria
SPS No. 94/12
Stefano GUZZINI 
The Implosion of Clientelistic 
Italy in the 1990s: A Study of 
“Peaceful Change” in 
Comparative Political Economy
SPS No. 94/13 
Johan Jeroen DE DEKEN 
Social Policy in Postwar 
Czechoslovakia.
The Development of Old-Age 
Pensions and Housing Policies 





























































































Media Strength and Infrastructural 




Frank R. PFETSCH 
Die Außenpolitik der 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland. 
Kontinuität oder Wandel nach der 
Vereinigung?
SPS No. 94/16  
Martin J. BULL
Another Revolution M anqu él The 




Understanding Regulatory Growth 
in the European Community
SPS No. 94/18 
Johan Jeroen DE DEKEN 
Social Policy in Post-War 
Belgium. The Development of Old 
Age Pensions and Housing 
Policies from 1945 to 1989 as 
Two Case Studies of the 
Formation of a Christian 
Democratic Welfare State.
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
